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PAKISTAN SPECIAL

RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM AND TERRORISM IN
PAKISTAN AND ITS IMPLICATIONS

K. Warikoo

KASHMIR, AFGHANISTAN, INDIA AND BEYOND:
A TAXONOMY OF ISLAMIC EXTREMISM AND
TERRORISM IN PAKISTAN

Michael Fredholm

PAKISTAN'S QUEST FOR STRATEGIC DEPTH:
REGIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS

Ashish Shukla

THE SEMI-AUTONOMOUS TRIBAL
AREAS OF PAKISTAN

Carlos Setas

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Editor's Page

With over 180 million people, Pakistan has nearly six times the population of Afghanistan, twice that of Iran and almost two-thirds of the population of the Arab World, besides a large diaspora in USA, Europe and the Middle East. Pakistan has used its Islamic identity to forge close political, strategic and economic ties with West Asia. Projecting itself as a meeting point of Middle East, Central Asia and South Asia, Pakistan seeks to be the leader of the Muslim Ummah. To quote a Pakistani diplomat who spoke at a Seminar in JNU sometime back, "We look upon Pakistan as a country which transcends West Asia, Central Asia and South Asia." And its policy of seeking strategic depth vis-à-vis India puts Pakistan in a state of contrived confrontation with its immediate neighbour. Given the complicated internal dynamics in Pakistan-political disorder, backward economy, growing violence, sectarian conflicts and terrorism, rise of Islamist extremism, oppression against women and minorities, assertion of regional identities, attrition between the government and judiciary, continuing upper hand of the military, Pakistan is at a sort of crossroads. It is for the first time that in the nuclear armed Pakistan, its most powerful army has been hesitating to stage a coup against the elected government which has been embroiled in a conflict with the judiciary for quite some time now. This is despite the fact that the military continues to exercise control over major issues-security, defence matters, nuclear programme, key aspects of foreign policy particularly towards Afghanistan, India, Kashmir and also over various religious and political groups in the country.

Though Pakistan was created on 14 August 1947 following the partition of the Indian sub-continent in the name of Islam, its founder Mohammad Ali Jinnah later assured that the new state would provide full rights to the non-Muslim minorities. However, soon after the death of M.A. Jinnah on 11 September 1948, his successors made every effort to make Pakistan a monolithic religious state. The Constituent Assembly adopted the Objectives Resolution moved by the first Prime Minister of Pakistan, Liaquat Ali Khan on 12 March 1949, which stated that the future constitution of Pakistan would be modeled on the ideology and faith of Islam. Outlining the relationship between Islam and the state of Pakistan,

Liaquat Ali Khan stated that, "Pakistan came into being as a result of the urge felt by the Muslims of the sub-continent to secure a territory, where Islamic ideology and the way of life could be practiced and demonstrated to the world. A cardinal feature of this ideology is to make Muslim brotherhood a living reality". All the constitutions of Pakistan (1956, 1962, 1973) underline the need to strengthen "the bonds of unity among the Muslim countries". After its independence, Pakistan organised several conferences of Muslim countries as part of its foreign policy initiatives: (International Islamic Conference in 1949; two sessions of World Muslim Congress in 1949, 1951); Congress of Ulema-i-Islam in 1952; International Assembly of Muslim Youth in 1955; second conference of heads of states/governments of the OIC (Organization of Islamic Countries) at Lahore in 1974; two meetings of foreign ministers of the OIC in January and March 1980 and so on). The constitution of 1973, which decreed that "sovereignty over the entire Universe belongs to Almighty Allah alone", enjoined upon the state to promote "observance of the Islamic moral standards".

The Islamic parties which had raised the slogan of "Islam in Danger" in the general elections of December 1970 were routed. Soon after, independence movement in erstwhile East Pakistan led to its secession and formation of the independent state of Bangladesh, thus disproving the validity of two-nation theory. The ongoing separatist movements in Balochistan and Sindh and the recurring inter and intra-sectarian violence in Pakistan, have only exposed the fragility of religious bonds. It is, however, the Pakistan army which has over the decades retained control over both the military, strategic and foreign policy initiatives of Pakistan, besides occupying leading positions in corporate houses, civilian posts, owning vast land estates, running huge welfare organizations and so on, and has been claiming to be the defenders of the Islamic ideology of Pakistan. Military leaders – Ayub Khan (1958-1969), Yahya Khan (1969-1971), Zia-ul-Haq (1979-1988), Pervez Musharraf (1999-2008), who ruled the country for decades strengthened the nexus between the military and the Islamist forces consolidating the domination of Pak army over both civil, military and foreign affairs. It was during General Zia-ul-Haq's tenure that major steps towards Islamisation of government were taken. He not only inducted extremist Islamist elements into the security agencies, but also introduced infamous Blasphemy laws, provided legal basis for collection of *Zakat* (charity), established the federal *Shariah*

courts, Islamic Ideological Council and the *Salat* system (facilitating five prayers daily) in government offices, meetings etc. By endorsing Brigadier S.K. Malik's *Quranic Conception of War*, General Zia turned the Islamic state of Pakistan into a sort of perpetual conflict. To quote Brigadier Malik, "the Islamic state was obliged to engage in jihad; jihad was its *raison d'être*, to be waged until an ultimate triumph. Jihad aims at attaining the overall mission assigned to the Islamic state". Zia's vision was further reinforced by his successors and the Pakistan army's officer corps is increasingly drawn from the Islamist extremist classes. So much so, the present Pak army chief, General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani underlined in his lecture to policemen in Peshawar in 2009, "Pakistan was founded in the name of Islam by our forefathers... and each one of us should work for strengthening the country and should make a commitment towards achieving the goal of turning the country into a true Islamic state".

This is a crucial period in the history of Pakistan which is confronted on the one hand with the belligerent and radical Islamist forces which are hell bent on taking the country backwards to medieval times, and the silent majority of common people which seeks modernization, economic development, liberal democratic order and peace. In this situation of internal contradictions, its powerful military and political leadership cutting across party lines need to lead Pakistan onto the path of stability, peace, sustainable development and good relations with its immediate neighbours – India and Afghanistan. Time has come for Pakistan to reengage itself with South Asia and discard its flawed and failed policy of seeking strategic depth and obsessive mindset against India.

K. Warikoo

RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM AND TERRORISM IN PAKISTAN AND ITS IMPLICATIONS

K. WARIKOO

Religion and culture play an important role in traditional societies. The traditional and moderate Islamic beliefs and practices with strong indigenous and Sufi content in South Asia are diametrically opposed to the radical Wahhabi and Taliban ideologies and practices which are intolerant of other cultures and groups. Emergence of radical and extremist Islamist movements in Pakistan is the main source of instability and conflict in this region. The rise of radical Islamist groups has been influenced by the leading ideologues of Islamic fundamentalist thought - Sheikh Muhammad ibn-Abd-al-Wahab (1703-1791), Jamal-ud-Din Afghani (1839-1897), Ali Shariati (1933-1977), Ayatollah Ruhullah Khomeini (1909-1989) - leader of the *Islamic Revolutionary Party of Iran*, Hassan-al-Banna (1906-1949) - founder of the *Ikhwan-al-Muslameen* (Muslim Brotherhood) and Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966) of the *Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt*, and Maulana Syed Abul Ala Mawdudi (1903-1979) of Pakistan - the first Amir of the *Jamaat-i-Islami*. These ideologues emphasised that political power is indispensable to the establishment of an Islamic state. The emphasis by the Islamist radicals on the supremacy of their ideology and practice of pan-Islamism which is based on the concept of *Ummah* (community of believers), transcending national boundaries, ethnicities, creeds, race and all other distinctions, is at the root of violence, conflict and instability.¹

If one goes by the strict definition of the term 'Islamic fundamentalism', it stands for a return to the doctrines of Islam in their original form as were practised in the medieval times. It could also mean idealising the historical past of Islam and calling for a return to 'pure and original Islam', which can be achieved through peaceful, lawful,

cultural and spiritual means. But in practice, the focus of religious radicals has been Islamisation of the state rather than reform of the individuals. In its quest for the Islamisation of both state and society, Islamic fundamentalism has become the struggle for establishment of an Islamic polity by enforcing *Shariah* (Islamic law). And Islamists invoke *Jihad* (use of violent means) to promote this cause. Maulana Mawdudi, who founded the *Jamaat-i-Islami* of Pakistan and remained its effective leader till his death in 1979, trained a huge cadre of Islamic workers to function as “a vanguard of an Islamic revolutionary movement”.² He developed *Jamaat-i-Islami* into a dynamic political force in Pakistan. Mawdudi wanted all the affairs of the state, administration, production and distribution of wealth to be run on Islamic lines. Being a staunch opponent of the concepts of secularism, democracy and socialism, Mawdudi’s concept of *Iqamat-i-Deen* (establishment of Islamic order) sought total subordination of the institutions of civil society and state to the authority of the *Shariah*. Maulana Mawdudi, while describing all other systems as irredeemably flawed, floated the idea of pan-Islamic *Jihad* and gave the call for use of arms. He believed that democracy led to chaos, greed, mob rule and that capitalism fostered class warfare and inequalities and that communism stifled human initiative and curbed freedom of religion. So, Mawdudi proposed *Jihad* and Islamic state as the only remedy to these ills of modern times. Mawdudi’s view of Pakistan was to promote and develop *Jamaat-i-Islami* until it had assimilated the country and had “to all intents and purposes become the state”.³ In theory, *Jihad* in Islam was meant to create an egalitarian social order where the poor and the deprived would be treated fairly and dignity. But what would have been a social, political or economic struggle against inequality, injustice and deprivation, has been turned into *Qital* (violence) by Osama bin Laden, Al Qaeda, Taliban and other Islamist militant groups which have been spearheading extremism and terrorism.

Though Muslims like any other non-Muslims have multiple identities - religious, ethnic, tribal, linguistic or territorial, the emphasis by the religious extremists on the Islamic communal identity puts them in collision course with the state and other groups. In Pakistan, there is permanent unrest among different ethnic groups and provinces, besides the confrontation between Islamists and moderates. The Islamists prop up the Islamic political consciousness by politicising already existing religious traditions and practices and by resisting change and modernisation. While propagating puritan life style and the meticulous

observance of the prescribed code of conduct, the Islamist extremists isolate the liberal Muslims from the faithful (*momin*) and try to coerce them into submission. In pursuit of this ideology, stress is laid on construction of mosques, acquisition of land for congregational prayers and graveyards, building of *madrassas*, teaching of Islamic theology, enforcement of their injunctions at gun-point, censuring the veneration of *ziarats* (shrines) and sufis, closure of places of entertainment, exclusion of music and fine arts, strict observance of *hadith* or tradition, indoctrination of Muslim minds at all levels, making religion and politics essentially complementary to each other and negating the achievements of democracy, secularism and modernization.

Though Pakistan was created on 14 August 1947 following the partition of the Indian sub-continent in the name of Islam, its founder Mohammad Ali Jinnah later assured that the new state would provide full rights to the non-Muslim minorities. However, soon after the death of M.A. Jinnah on 11 September 1948, his successors made every effort to make Pakistan a monolithic religious state. The Constituent Assembly adopted the Objectives Resolution moved by the first Prime Minister of Pakistan, Liaquat Ali Khan on 12 March 1949, which stated that the future constitution of Pakistan would be modeled on the ideology and faith of Islam. Outlining the relationship between Islam and the state of Pakistan, Liaquat Ali Khan stated that, "Pakistan came into being as a result of the urge felt by the Muslims of the sub-continent to secure a territory, where Islamic ideology and the way of life could be practiced and demonstrated to the world. A cardinal feature of this ideology is to make Muslim brotherhood a living reality". All the constitutions of Pakistan (1956, 1962, 1973) underline the need to strengthen "the bonds of unity among the Muslim countries". The constitution of 1973, which decreed that "sovereignty over the entire Universe belongs to Almighty Allah alone", enjoined upon the state to promote "observance of the Islamic moral standards". It was during General Zia-ul-Haq's tenure that major steps towards Islamisation of government were taken. He not only inducted extremist Islamist elements into the security agencies, but also introduced infamous Blasphemy laws, provided legal basis for collection of *Zakat* (charity), established the federal *Shariah* courts, Islamic Ideological Council and the *Salat* system (facilitating five prayers daily) in government offices, meetings etc.⁴ The present Pak army chief, General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani underlined in his lecture to policemen in Peshawar in 2009, "Pakistan was founded in the name of Islam by our forefathers..."

and each one of us should work for strengthening the country and should make a commitment towards achieving the goal of turning the country into a true Islamic state".⁵

It is the ideological training, upbringing and brainwashing in the fanatical *madrassas* which moulds and shapes young receptive minds. The extremists and gun-wielding *jihadis* are produced in thousands of *madrassas* and terrorist training camps that exist in Pakistan. And most of the recruits come from Afghan refugee camp and poor Pak families. Thousands of *madrassas* are reported to be registered in Pakistan. There is urgent need for the reform/monitoring of such *madrassas* and the education system. Pakistan has become the hub of training and recruiting centers of extremist and terrorist groups. Even the public educational system that provides education to over 80 per cent of population, promotes the agenda of hatred, demonization of non-Muslim faiths and non-Muslim countries. According to a recent report of the US Commission on International Religious Freedom, the Islamisation of text books which began under the rule of General Zia-ul-Haque has continued. The "text books in Pakistan schools foster hatred and intolerance of minorities, the Hindus in particular. Hindus are repeatedly described as external enemies of Islam. Hindu culture and society are portrayed as unjust and cruel."⁶ History is distorted in various books. Textbooks and curriculum are not only insensitive to religious diversity and communal harmony, but these even provide incitement to militancy and violence, including encouragement of *Jihad* and *Shahadat* perspectives thus spreading prejudice, bigotry and discrimination towards un-Islamic faiths and people. The curriculum as well as textbooks emphasize the "Ideology of Pakistan". Three compulsory subjects are used to impart hate and exclusivity stressing that i) Pakistan is for Muslims alone; ii) Islamic teachings, including compulsory reading and memorization of Qur'an, are included in all subjects, hence to be forcibly taught to all the students, whatever their faith; iii) ideology of Pakistan is internalized as faith, and hate is generated against Hindus, India and the West; and iv) Students are encouraged to take the path of *Jihad* and *Shahadat*. To quote a prominent Pakistani scholar Dr. Pervez Hoodbhoy, "the education imparted to Pakistani children is flawed and encourages extremism, intolerance and ignorance". He cites from an illustrated primer for Urdu, being used by beginners, "*alif* (A) for Allah; *bay* (B) for *bandook* (gun); *tay* (T) for *takrao* (collision, shown by a plane crashing into the Twin Towers); *jeem* (J) for *jihad*; *kay* (K) for *khanjar* (dagger); and *hay* (H) for

hijab".⁷ Things considered as sinful include kites, guitar, satellite TV, carom board, chess, harmonium and wine.⁸ Thousands of Pakistani schools and *madrassas* have been churning out fiery zealots, fuelled with a passion for *jihad* and *shahadat* (martyrdom), thereby posing serious threat to Pakistan and the adjoining countries in the form of extremist and terrorist activities.

In January 2009, *Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan* issued an edict to close down all girls' school in Swat (a district of 1.7 million people in NWFP). With the result, an estimated 80,000 girls had their education cut off. Later on, 183 schools were blown up. Around one million people fled from Swat to other areas in Pakistan. So Pakistan's stratagem to create two sects 'good Taliban' and 'bad Taliban', is designed to retain its strategic assets among its proxies - the Taliban. In reality, all Taliban are bad. Only about 5 to 6,000 Taliban held the town of Swat to ransom, with no resistance from Pak law and order machinery. Young boys are brainwashed by the Taliban to become their suicide bombers. To quote Murtaza Rizvi, Editor of *Dawn*, Karachi: "The Taliban have been blowing up public infrastructure including the Swat airport power house and several tourist resorts. They have been beheading their opponents in public, destroying girls' schools and colleges, killing barbers who dare to offer a shaving service to men, imposing a dress code, systematically brutalizing women and burning down music shops... The Taliban can lay no claim to being in the mainstream of politics because it is not the ballot but the bullet on which their power rests." In July 2009, hundreds of musicians and singers fled Peshawar, due to Taliban campaign. Thus centuries old musicians' market *Dabgari Bazar* is now desolate.

Whereas the Islamist militants burnt down several historical Muslim shrines in Kashmir few years ago, the Taliban bombed in early 2009, the famous shrine of 17th century Sufi Rehman Baba, the most widely read Pashto poet on both sides of the Durand Line. On 28 May 2010 two mosques belonging to the Ahmadi sect in Lahore were attacked killing 93 persons. At least 42 persons were killed in blasts at the popular Dta Darbar shrine in Lahore on 2 July 2010. On 7 October 2010, two suicide bombers struck at the sufi shrine of Abdullah Shah Ghazi - the patron saint of Karachi on Thursday, when it was packed with thousands of devotees, killing at least 16 persons and wounding over 60 others. On 25 October 2010 shrine of Baba Farid Shakar Ganj, a 12th century Sufi saint in Punjab was bombed, killing 6 persons and injuring scores of others. Two powerful blasts ripped through the shrine of 13th century Sufi saint

Ahmed Sultan, popularly known as Sakhi Sarwar in Dera Ghazi Khan district of Punjab province killing 41 persons on 3 April 2011, when thousands of devotees were attending the celebrations to mark the saint's anniversary.⁹ One only shudders to imagine the plight of non-Muslim minorities (Hindus, Christians, Sikhs and others) under such circumstances in Pakistan. Needless to say, the jihadis by their barbaric acts of terror, bring into disrepute the religion they claim to profess. The silent majority of traditional, moderate and liberal Muslims, who practice Islam in accordance with the principles of tolerance and non-discrimination, need to shun their silence and assert and organise themselves against the extremist Islamists. On their part, the governments and secular societies need to help in preserving, restoring and emphasising the indigenous, traditional and diverse Islamic practices and institutions, as have been prevalent in different parts of the world.

Islamic fundamentalists carry out indoctrination through propaganda, persuasion and even intimidation. Writings on Islam, its doctrine, history, culture, society and politics are written and published in huge quantities, exhorting the Muslims to shun un-Islamic way of life. They call for removing what they called distortion of history. Islamic fundamentalists lay stress on fulfilling the obligations (*farz*) of *namaz* (five-times-a-day prayer), *Ramzan* fastings, *halal* and *haram* (allowed and disallowed), Haj, *zakat* (charity), ultimate faith in the Prophethood and Quran, absoluteness of Islamic ideology, congregational prayers, inseparability of religion and politics and non-territoriality of Islam. At the same time, alcoholism, dance, music, courts, judiciary, earning of bank interest and various things associated with a secular, democratic and liberal order, are publicly decried and declared un-Islamic. But the problem and dilemma of the Islamic society arises from the fact that many Islamic doctrines and practices do not conform to the political and socio-economic realities of the present day world with science, technology, modernization and globalization being order of the day.

Wahhabi social and cultural conservatism, Qutbist political radicalism, Khomeini's ideology of exporting Islamic revolution, *Jamaat-e-Islami's* pan-Islamism and *Hizb ut-Tahrir's* concept of Islamic Caliphate based on *Shariah* provided the ideological foundation of militant political Islam which in turn provided fertile base for the militarized form of Islam represented by the Taliban and Al Qaeda.¹⁰ It hardly needs to be emphasized that the Taliban, Al Qaeda and other extremist terrorist groups like *Hizb ut-Tahrir*, *Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan*, *Jaish-e-*

Mohammad, Lashkar-e-Tayyeba, Hizbul Mujahideen, Jamaat-ut-Dawwa (JuD), Harkat-ul-Jihad-ul-Islami (HuJI), Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM) etc. have been in the forefront of violence and terrorism in South Asia.¹¹

The Islamists do not agree with the modern concept of democracy and secularism. To a jihadi, Islam is his religion and his nation. To him, Islam transcends geographical boundaries, ethnicities, creed, race and all other distinctions. The rhetoric of political Islam gained popularity due to its response to growing economic disparity and discontent, corruption, political failures, moral bankruptcy of modern and western material culture and value system. The Cold War era witnessed the rise of Islamic fundamentalists to power - in Iran through Islamic revolution, in Sudan through military coup and in Algeria through democratic means. And the post-Cold War era saw the resurgence of Islam in Central Asia particularly in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, radicalization of society and politics in Bangladesh and Pakistan, and the rise of *Mujahideen* and Taliban to power in Afghanistan. The Islamic challenge is further compounded by the booming Muslim population, growing number of devout, conservative and assertive Muslim middle class alongwith their rising socio-economic profile.

It will be instructive to look at the views of Syed Ali Shah Gilani, former Amir of *Jamaat-i-Islami* of Jammu and Kashmir and a prominent Islamist secessionist leader in Kashmir, on international affairs particularly after 9/11 and his vision of Islamic solidarity. Gilani expressed his grave indignation at the Muslim world's response to US policies after 9/11 and he lashes out at the entire Muslim world "for their unconditional support to the US after 11 September 2001".¹² Gilani laments that "the thinking and action of the Islamic *Ummah* is disturbed, incoherent and deplorable".¹³ Describing the situation as "a very great tragedy for the entire *Ummah*", Gilani is dismayed as to why "they are compelled to follow the diktats of other countries inspite of the fact that they possess huge and immense material and manpower resources, oil and mineral wealth and enjoy very important strategic geographical position".¹⁴ Gilani describes Pakistan as "the fortress of Islam and Afghanistan as its most important and strongest wall".¹⁵ He wants Pakistan to "fulfil its fundamental responsibility and duty towards Islam and Muslim *Ummah* of more than a billion", which in Gilani's view, "has lost its identity after being divided into national, communal, linguistic and economic compartments".¹⁶ Gilani is one of the few Muslim separatist leaders in Kashmir who mourned Osama bin Laden's death.

Though Gilani's call to Imams across the Valley to hold prayers for bin Laden barely got any response, he led few hundred people in funeral prayers for bin Laden in Srinagar on Friday, the 6th May 2011. Gilani described Osama as 'martyr' and praise his pan-Islamic efforts against the 'US imperialism'.¹⁷

The possibility of establishing a new Islamic Caliphate running from Kashmir to Pakistan through Afghanistan, Iran and Central Asia was being discussed by the Islamist extremist groups in Kashmir at a time when the Soviet troops had withdrawn from Afghanistan and the Muslim Central Asian Republics had emerged as independent states following the disintegration of USSR. They were echoing the ideas of the Amir (Chief) of *Jamaat-e-Islami*, Pakistan, Qazi Hussain Ahmed, who speaking on Kashmir Solidarity day in Rawalpindi in February 1992 declared that "a great Islamic state, spreading from Kashmir to Central Asia would emerge after the independence of Kashmir".¹⁸ Soon after new groups like *Tehrik-i-Ahyay-i-Khilafat* (the movement for revival of Caliphate) and *Tehrik-i-Khilafat-i-Islamia* (the movement for Islamic Caliphate) announced their presence in Kashmir.¹⁹ They propounded the ideology of transnational Islam and the Caliphate. *Tehrik-i-Khilafat-i-Islamia* asserted that "Islam did not recognize nationalism or territorial patriotism. The slogans based on ethnicity, race, gender or nationalism were false... The real Islamic ideology was the ideology of Caliphate... The slogan that future of Kashmir would be decided by Kashmiris has given rise to an evil, which was distorting the Islamic identity of present movement, and reducing it to a mere democratic movement".²⁰ The *Amir* of *Lashkar-e-Tayyeba*, Hafiz Mohammad Saeed went on record saying: "Democracy is among the menaces we inherited ... These are all useless practices and part of the system we are fighting against. If God gives us a chance, we will try to bring in the pure concept of an Islamic Caliphate".²¹ One Brigadier Ali Khan and four other officers of the Pak military were detained in May 2011 for suspected links to banned group *Hizbut Tahrir* and for planning to topple the government to create an Islamic Caliphate.²²

As the *Economist* of London (July 2009) put it: "LeT (*Lashkar-e-Toiba*) though banned, is not being dismantled". Hafiz Saeed, LeT's founder, was put in house-arrest, then released for want of evidence. *Jamaat-ud-Dawa* (his trust) though banned by the UN, is operating under a new name, *Falah-e-Insaniyat*. Though Punjab government registered two cases against Hafiz Saeed for glorifying and soliciting funds for *Jihad*, he has

not been booked for involvement in Mumbai attacks. Pakistan government is steering clear of any concerted action against the main culprit of 26/11 attacks in Mumbai. Punjab government in Pakistan provided Rs. 82.77 million to *Jamaat ud-Dawa* and its institutions in the year 2009. This fact came to light when the budget was tabled in Punjab Assembly for approval.²³ Ameer Hamza, senior leader of *Jamaat-ud-Dawa* (JuD) while addressing a rally in Lahore on 30 November 2011 stated that they would train youth in *Jihad* against US and India and that the JuD would turn Pakistan into Taliban state.²⁴

The rise of Taliban to power in Kabul in September 1996, which turned Afghanistan into the centre of religious extremism, global terrorism, drugs and arms trafficking, brought the entire region into the focus of global attention. Establishment of a radical Islamist order in Afghanistan and the active involvement of armed Islamist militants in cross-border terrorism and *jihad* (holy war), whether in the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan or some other CIS countries, has adversely affected regional security, peace and stability in South and Central Asia. The crisis deepened during the Taliban period when Afghanistan was turned into the hub of international terrorism and narco-trafficking. Even though war against terror in Afghanistan was launched about ten years ago, the Al Qaeda and the Taliban are now posing even greater threat to peace and stability in Afghanistan, Pakistan and the entire region. The new disturbing trend is that the resurgent Taliban are adopting Iraq style suicide bomb attacks resulting in large scale death and destruction. Umar Fidai, aged 14 years, a teenaged would-be-suicide bomber who was arrested on 3 April 2011 when he tried to blow himself up at a Sufi shrine in Punjab province of Pakistan, revealed that upto 350 suicide bombers including Arabs, Uzbeks and Tajiks were being trained in Taliban- run camps in North Waziristan.²⁵ In June 2009, a teenage suicide bomber blew himself up in the premises of Jamia Naeemia mosque in Lahore killing Sarfaraz Naeemi, the leader of this mosque and injuring over hundred persons.²⁶ Naeemi, a prominent religious scholar of Pakistan had earlier condemned suicide bombings as *haram* (un-Islamic).²⁷ He alongwith some other clerics had issued a fatwa against suicide bombings, beheadings and other extremist acts of the Taliban.²⁸

Since early 2004, Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Waziristan areas of Pakistan have become the havens from where armed bands of Pashtun, Uzbek, Chechen, Uyghur and Arab extremists and

terrorists belonging to *International Islamic Front* (IIF) have been operating and striking at different places. These groups work for the establishment of independent Islamic Caliphate comprising Central Asia, Afghanistan and Xinjiang. During the year 2009, a record number of Pakistani civilians and security forces died in militant violence, propelling Pakistan into the ranks of the world's most perilous places. There were over 12,600 violent deaths across Pakistan, which is 14 times more than in 2006, in the spate of suicide bombings and militant attacks by the Taliban and Pakistan based *Tehrik-e-Taliban*. The Afghan Taliban, *Tehrik-e-Taliban*, *Lashkar-e-Tayyeba*, *Jaish-e-Mohammad* and Al Qaeda are closely allied and have been pursuing common anti-west and anti-India agenda. Pakistan "is now the world's suicide bomber capital, displacing Iraq and Afghanistan".²⁹ The bombers, usually in the age group of 14-17, have attacked shops, mosques, shrines, funeral processions, military installations, educational institutions and other soft targets with devastating impact. Between 2007 and 2009, about 5,500 persons were killed in 130 suicide attacks.³⁰ One 23 May 2011 a twin suicide attack on a bus killed over 80 paramilitary forces.³¹ According to an estimate by Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies in Islamabad around 5,000 youth are trained as suicide bombers.³² The bombers are indoctrinated and brainwashed about the virturism of their mission. "These young minds are convinced that the suicide attacks are for a higher religious purpose that will help them get the benefits of the life hereafter including the company of 72 virgins."³³ To quote Ayesha Siddiqi, a well known Pakistani scholar, "suicide attacks will remain a phenomenon in Pakistan as long as there is religious extremism associated with terrorism."³⁴

We have been witnessing the rapid descent of Pakistan into barbarism. To quote Pervez Hoodbhoy, Pakistan is on the brink of "clerical tsunami". Blasphemy laws are used to justify discrimination, repression and violence against religious minorities. In order to suppress the minority and arm the fundamentalists, Pakistan floated the blasphemy laws in the country. The law was first introduced by Zia-ul-Haq to change the social and political situation in Pakistan. It has been used perpetually to harass and even eliminate minorities. Governor of Punjab Salman Taseer and Minorities Minister Shahbaz Bhatti (who was a Christian by faith) were murdered in broad daylight, by the Islamist extremists just because they were opposing the infamous Blasphemy laws. What makes things worse is that these murders were openly celebrated by the extremists including several media persons and

lawyers. This only reflects the deeply embedded criminalization in the name of religion, in contemporary Pakistan. Almost none of the country's top leaders were willing to attend Taseer's funeral or condemn his killing. Soon after Taseer's assassination, *Jamaat Ahl-e-Sunnat* advised the Muslims in Pakistan to neither mourn his death nor attend his funeral.³⁵ A journalist Ansar Abbasi (of Urdu newspaper *Jang*) virtually endorsed Salman Taseer's murder by stating that the court of the people "had the right to kill any blasphemer". Pervez Hoodbhoy, a well known Pakistani writer and scholar laments that soon after the news of Taseer's assassination "hit the national media, spontaneous celebrations erupted in places; a murderous unrepentant mutineer had been instantly transformed into a national hero. Religious political parties did not conceal their satisfaction and the imam of Lahor's Badshahi Masjid declared the government's request to lead the funeral prayers. Television screens around the world showed the nauseating spectacle of hundreds of lawyers feting a murderer, showering rose, petals upon him, and pledging to defend him pro-bono."³⁶ Imam of Sultan Masjid, one of Karachi's prominent mosques declared former Minister Sherry Rehman *wajib-ul-qatl* (fit to be killed) because she had tabled a Bill in National Assembly demanding amendments to the Blasphemy law. On 30 January 2011, thousands of people assembled in Lahore at a rally organised by *Lashkar-e-Toiba*, *Jamaat ud Dawah*, *Sipah-e-Sahiba Pakistan*, *Tehrik-i-Millat-e-Jafriya*, *Jamaat Islami*, *Jamiat Ulema-e Islam Fazl*, Imran Khan's *Tehreek Insaf* and various factions of *Pakistan Muslim League (PML-N, Q, Z)*, warning the government and others against any amendment or repeal of the infamous Blasphemy laws. There have also been reports of bridge-building between various Islamist groups – the Deobandis, Ahl-Hadith and Bareilwis, in a bid to unite and consolidate the extremist forces in Pakistan.

Pakistan remains obsessed with its quest for strategic depth, employing the Taliban in Afghanistan and LeT and *Jaish-e-Mohammad* and other terrorist groups in Jammu and Kashmir and elsewhere in Afghanistan. US desperation to leave Afghanistan is viewed as an opportunity by Pakistan to strike a hard bargain. Pakistan is projecting its "indispensability" for any US plans and presence in the region. Obama's Af-Pak strategy is being used by Pakistan to press its solution to Kashmir issue as a quid pro quo for Pak support to the US operations in the region. Despite the fact that Pakistan is unstable and in deep turmoil both socially, economically and politically, its military and foreign office

seek to present a “winning” face of Pakistan. To quote a western security analyst, Shaun Gregory, “the United States seems ready to reward Pakistan’s duplicitous support for militant Islamic extremism with the huge geo-strategic prize of Afghanistan. The implications of this for India are grave indeed. India must take a stronger stand in Afghanistan and find a response which provides the United States and NATO with another way forward, which offers the people of Afghanistan an alternative to the Taliban or civil war and which denies Pakistan a strategic victory which will surely resonate across the region for generations.”³⁷ The Pakistani establishment, particularly the army and intelligence agencies, seeks to use these jihadi groups as instruments of securing Pak “strategic depth” in Afghanistan and Central Asia vis-à-vis India. This explains Pak military’s reluctance to take on Haqqani, the Afghan jihadi chief, who has been operating from North Waziristan. To quote the well known Pakistani analyst Ahmed Rashid, “the Pak army is loath to even acknowledge the presence of the Afghan Taliban leadership that is based in Baluchistan province and North Waziristan. The Pakistan army is likely to push Afghan President, Hamid Karzai to accept a Pakistani brokered deal to form a pro-Pakistan government with the Taliban in Kabul.”

Pakistan has been generating myths about its being victim of terror and that Pakistan can be a bridge between the West and the Islamic radicals. In reality the Pakistan army has come to believe that the US power has declined and that the rise of China provides Pakistan an opportunity to establish long sought primacy in Afghanistan. That explains Pakistan Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani’s advice to Afghan President Hamid Karzai during his visit to Kabul just two weeks before the killing of Osama bin Laden on 2 May 2011, to dump America and seek new allies, particularly China.³⁸ While the US is working out its exit plan from Afghanistan, the international community needs to prevent the re-emergence of Afghanistan as the hotbed of religious extremism, a haven for international terrorism and a source of regional instability. This would be possible only after dealing with Pakistan and its army and ISI combine which have been assiduously protecting their “strategic assets” in the form of dreaded terrorist groups and their infrastructure. Soon after the US military intervention in Afghanistan after 9/11, the Al Qaeda and Taliban relocated themselves into Pakistan where they received sanctuary. In the meanwhile both Musharraf and the current army chief Ashfaq Kayani have been peddling the theory of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Taliban, persuading the Americans to negotiate with the Taliban.

Terrorism when blended with the fire and zeal of *jihād* becomes a deadly mix posing a major challenge to security in South and Central Asia. One can only imagine the situation that would have been created by the Taliban, Al Qaeda and other jihadi organisations in the region, had there been no 9/11 and the consequent US-led global campaign against terrorism. The emergence of radical and violent religious movements poses serious challenge to secular and democratic polity, pluralistic social order, inter-religious harmony, security and territorial integrity of states in the region. It is high time that the academics, media, civic society, states and international community distinguish between the traditional Islam and the one propounded by the jihadis and their mentors. It may be pointed out that Sufism and moderate traditional Islam, which is syncretic, pluralistic and against political and radical Islam, has been facing the brunt of violence unleashed by the Islamist radicals, whether in Kashmir, Afghanistan or Pakistan.

The security situation in Pakistan has gone from bad to worse, with the continuing spate of violence against minorities, women, suicide bombings and targeted killings by the Pakistan based *Tehrik-e-Taliban* and other extremist and terror groups. Over two million people have been displaced in Swat, NWFP and Waziristan, which have turned into the havens of terrorist and extremist groups. The enforced disappearances, torture and killings of political dissidents, human rights defenders, and opponents of the regime, discriminatory laws against religious minorities and women are order of the day. Not only the non-Muslim minorities like Hindus and Christians are being targeted, but the non-Sunni Muslim sects like Shias and Ahmadis are also threatened. Those Sunni Muslims who do not subscribe to the Wahhabi/Salafi school of Islam, are also targeted. In September 2011, at least 29 Shia pilgrims were gunned down in Mustung district, about 50 kms. from Quetta in Baluchistan while they were returning from Iran.³⁹ In February 2012 18 Shias from Gilgit-Baltistan were targeted by gunmen. Later in August 2012, another 22 Shias were shot dead in broad daylight in Mansehra area of Khyber Pukhtoonkhwa after they were identified as Shias on the basis of their identity cards on their way to Gilgit.⁴⁰ The events in Pakistan have demonstrated that by using the extremist ideology and terrorism as the tools to expand the strategic, ideological and even economic frontiers in South and Central Asia, the patron state has brought peril to itself and insecurity and instability in South Asia. Developments in neighbouring Pakistan, which has been the source of ideological

inspiration, extremism, secessionism and infiltration of terrorists in Kashmir, have begun to dent the popular and idealised view of Pakistan as being "God's own country". According to Nirupama Subramaniam, former correspondent of *The Hindu* in Islamabad, "even modern, enlightened, liberal and secular Pakistanis would go all Islamic and religious, when it comes to an issue such as Kashmir, and would tout *jihad* as legitimate".⁴¹ The Lal Masjid siege, removal of Chief Justice of Pakistan Supreme Court, declaration of emergency followed by violent protests, Benazir Bhutto's assassination, militancy in Swat, unabated terrorist attacks including suicide bombings in FATA and even the urban centres of Pakistan killing civilians and security forces alike, political turmoil and uncertainty have brought home the bitter reality in Pakistan and potential threats to its integrity due to political and extremist violence. So much so Pakistan's Parliament for the first time recognized the threat from extremism and terrorism, when a joint session of Pakistan's parliament unanimously passed a resolution on 22 October 2008 stating that "extremism, military and terrorism in all forms and manifestations pose a grave danger to the stability and integrity of the nation state".

That Pakistan has been the main global-terrorist base after the 2001 US military campaign in Afghanistan, is borne out by the circumstances of Osama bin Laden's safe presence in the heart of Pakistan for over seven years. To quote Bruce Riedel, "Pakistan has more terrorists per square mile than any place else on earth and a nuclear armoury growing faster than any place else on earth".⁴² With Osama's death on 2 May 2011 in Abbotabad, Pakistan exposed its complicity in global terrorism represented by Osama bin Laden, Al Qaeda and allied organizations. That Osama lived in a safe palatial house adjacent to Pakistan Military Academy in Abbotabad, which is just 60 miles away from the ISI headquarters in Islamabad, has ripped apart Pak denials on Osama's presence in Pakistan. Abbotabad is a garrison town with numerous army formations including Army's 2nd Artillery Division, Mountain Warfare School, Baloch and Frontier Forces Regimental Training Centres. Pakistan's army chief Ashfaq Kayani and ISI chief Shuja Pasha belong to the Baloch and Frontier Force respectively.⁴³ Amrullah Shah, former intelligence chief of Afghanistan has confirmed that when he informed former Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf in 2007 about the Afghan intelligence reports on Al Qaeda chief Osama bin Laden's safe hideout in an area close to Abbotabad, Musharraf not only denied it but was outraged at this suggestion.⁴⁴ Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the

US Joint Chiefs of Staff and a strong advocate of close ties with Pakistan, accused Pakistan's Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) of having "a long standing relationship with a militant network that is supporting, funding, training fighters that are killing Americans".⁴⁵ Mike Mullen in his last official appearance before the US Senate Armed Services Committee on 22 September 2011, testified that the "Haqqani network is a strategic arm of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence."⁴⁶ WikiLeaks cables pertaining to Guantanamo Bay actually reveal that the US has all along listed Pakistan's ISI as a 'terrorist' organization alongside the Al Qaeda, Hezbollah, Hamas, etc.⁴⁷ Yet USA seeks to "buy Pakistani cooperation with aid: \$20 billion worth since 9/11 alone."⁴⁸

That the Islamist ideology and terrorists have been used as tools by Pakistan to expand its strategic, ideological and even economic frontiers in South and Central Asia, is a major cause of conflict and instability in this region. In the words of a well known Pakistani scholar, "The reason so many Islamic radicals from all over the world congregated or passed through Pakistan was the strategic decision by Pakistan rulers to use *jihad* as an instrument of influence in Afghanistan and Kashmir."⁴⁹ The extremist Islamist groups have now begun to devour Pakistan itself. The *jihadi* groups openly defy government in Pakistan and pose serious threat to its law and order and social equilibrium. The Pak-US campaign against terrorism in Afghanistan and on the Pak-Afghan border in the aftermath of 9/11, did not deter the Taliban or its sympathizers in Pakistan. Local religious extremists groups like *Sipah-e-Saheba* (SSP) and *Lashkar-e-Jhangvi* (LeJ), both of which are rabidly anti-Shia, are notorious as sectarian terrorists for killing Shias in Karachi and elsewhere. That a large number of Al Qaeda and Taliban terrorists, while fleeing from Afghanistan following the US-led campaign not only returned to *madrassas* in Pakistan but merged with the above stated local extremist groups, makes the situation even more dreadful. As per reports from Pakistan, the training of Islamist terrorists has been continuing in Mansehra and other camps in Pakistan. One Zulfikar Ali who did field survey/ interviews in Mansehra writes, "All the major militant organisations – *Hizbul Mujahideen*, *Al-Badr Mujahideen*, *Harkatul Mujahideen* and others began regrouping in April 2005. At least 13 major camps in the Mansehra region were revived in May 2005."⁵⁰ He also reported about a 13 year old Mohd. Akbar of Peshawar, who got killed in action. "Hundreds of young boys between the age of 13 and 15 years make ready cannon for violent militant campaigns."⁵¹ A newspaper report listed 55 training

camps for the *jehadis* spread all over Pakistan with 29 such camps located in Pak-occupied Kashmir, 15 in NWFP, 3 in Northern Areas, 7 in Punjab and 1 in Sindh.⁵² These training camps send out *jehadis* to not only Kashmir and other parts of India but to target worldwide. One of the London suicide bombers, Shehzad Tanveer was believed to have got his training at a camp in Muridke near Lahore.⁵³

After 9/11, Al Qaeda focused on Pakistan building alliances with the Pakistani Taliban, *Lashkar-e-Tayyeba* and other terrorist groups, because Pakistan is “the strategic prize in the Islamic world, home to what will soon be the fifth largest nuclear weapons arsenal on the globe”.⁵⁴ Admiral Robert Willard, chief of the US forces in the Pacific told the US Senate Armed Services Committee that *Lashkar-e-Tayyeba* “is no longer solely focused on India and has declared jihad on America and is expanding its reach to Europe and other continents”.⁵⁵ Osama’s death brought only temporary setback to the terrorist groups, which are in tact and likely to launch reprisal attacks across the world. So the international community needs to hunt the dreaded terrorists like Ayman-al-Zawahri, the Egyptian deputy of bin Laden, Saif-al-Adel of Egypt, Hafiz Muhammad Saeed, the Amir of *Jamaat-ud-Dawa* and *Lashkar-e-Tayyeba*, Maulana Masood Azhar, founder of *Jaish-e-Mohammad*, Dawood Ibrahim who runs an extensive criminal and drug trafficking network in South Asia, Mullah Omar, Zia-ur-Rahman Lakhvi, the military commander of *Lashkar-e-Tayyeba*, Yusuf Muzammil, a senior operations commander of LeT, Ilyas Kashmiri, top ranking leader of *Harkat-ul-Jihad-al Islami* linked to Al Qaeda and LeT, Sajid Mir of LeT, Omar Saeed Sheikh, Syed Salahuddin, the head of *Hizbul Mujahideen* and scores of others, who are operating openly from within Pakistan. In the words of Thomas W. Simons, former US Ambassador to Pakistan (1996-1998), “Islamism may be receding in the Arab world, but in Pakistan it is still a wave of the future.”⁵⁶ Simons cautions that the American resolve should not diminish with the death of Osama bin Laden.

Six Ds are required to pull Pakistan out of the present imbroglio and save the country as well as the region from further death and destruction: i) Decentralisation of powers in Pakistan, which is controlled by military and the ISI mainly from Punjab; (ii) Demilitarization of Pakistan as almost half of the territory is controlled by military with substantial proportion of total budget being spent on defence; (iii) De-Islamisation – politics/state needs to be separated from religion. There should be equal treatment of Ahmadiyas and minorities and blasphemy

laws be abolished; (iv) Democratisation in Pakistan – Sindh, Baluchistan, NWFP and Gilgit-Baltistan need to be given their rights; (v) Denuclearization of Pakistan as there is serious threat of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal going into the hands of Taliban and Islamist extremists; and (vi) Dismantling and destruction of terrorist networks and infrastructure in Pakistan is necessary for the success of any campaign against international terrorism.

(1) There has to be de-centralisation of powers wielded by the Federal government, by curtailing the operations of Pak Army, ISI and other federal agencies in various provinces – NWFP, Sindh, Baluchistan, Gilgit-Baltistan and Pak-occupied Kashmir. There needs to be equitable redistribution of central revenues, and allocation of adequate resources to these provinces for their socio-economic development taking into account and commensurate with the share of gas, electricity and other revenues generated by these provinces. Punjab never accepted Pakistan as a multi-ethnic state, which necessitates equal political rights, greater autonomy for the smaller provinces and a more equitable distribution of funds. Pak military is used as a strong tool to safeguard Punjabi interests in Pakistan. Over 50 per cent funds go to Punjab, 14 per cent to Sindh, 12 per cent to NWFP, 5 per cent to Baluchistan. There is lack of political and democratic culture. Islamabad controls the provinces by a policy of (i) divide and rule, (ii) economic dependence; (iii) co-optation by involving non-dominant elite like greedy tribal chiefs, feudal drug tycoons, corrupt intellectual and politicians through favours and other privileges.

(2) The Pakistani establishment, particularly the army and intelligence agencies, which have been using the jihadi and terror groups as instruments of securing Pak strategic depth against India in Afghanistan and Central Asia, need to be left with their primary task of guarding Pakistan's borders and maintaining law and order. They should not be allowed to interfere in and dominate the country's foreign policy / relations particularly with the neighbouring countries. This will usher in a process of peace within the country and in the sub-continent. The flawed concept of 'strategic depth' against India, needs to be replaced by a policy of mutual co-existence, peace and security.

(3) On the ideological plane, modern, liberal, secular and scientific outlook is required to be imparted to the young generation through the medium of revised and restructured curricula, textbooks in schools and colleges, thereby replacing the existing ones which is replete with hate

and gun culture. The *madrassas* need to be regulated, restructured and brought within the purview of new liberal educational structures. There has to be firm control over the misuse of mosque for political purposes and for spreading hate against non-Muslim minorities and un-Islamic world.

Pakistan being a Muslim majority state, needs to revert to its traditional form of Islam, as it has fallen prey to the politicized/Talibanisation phenomenon. There has to be the de-Talibanisation of civil and military services, society, culture, politics and all other institutions in Pakistan.

There is urgent need to remove the infamous Blasphemy laws and anti-Ahmediya provisions in Section 298 of the Pakistan Penal Code, which have institutionalized the process of targeting non-Muslim minorities in Pakistan. Population of Hindus has declined from 23% in 1947 to less than 2% now. The systematic state-sponsored religious discrimination against Hindus and Christians (including forced conversions, economic deprivation, Hindu bonded labour, kidnapping of Hindu girls etc.) has to be stopped and made criminal offence.

(4) That the international community has been greatly worried over the possibility of Pakistan's nuclear and fissile materials falling in the hands of terrorists, was revealed in a set of WikiLeaks cables. Mariots Leslie, a senior British Foreign Office official was quoted to have told the US diplomats in September 2009 that, "the UK has deep concerns about the safety and security of Pakistan's nuclear weapons".⁵⁷ Earlier the US Ambassador in Pakistan Anne Patterson had briefed Washington, "Our major concern is not having an Islamic militant steal an entire weapon but rather the chance someone working in government of Pakistan facilities could gradually smuggle enough material out to eventually make a weapon."⁵⁸ Repeated terror attacks on Kamra base, about 40 kms. from Islamabad, where some of Pakistan's nuclear warheads are stored and which is home to F-16 jet fighters and a factory that builds Mirage and Chinese made JF-16 fighter jets, underscore these concerns. It was in 2007 when a suicide bomber hit at the airbase entrance. In 2008 militants fired rockets into the base and in 2009 a suicide bomber blew himself up on an approach road. And in August 2012, within hours of US Defence Secretary's statement that Washington's biggest fear was that Pakistan's nuclear weapons would fall into the hands of terrorists, heavily armed terrorists stormed the high-security Kamra base.⁵⁹

(5) Given the fact that Osama bin Laden was staying in a safe palatial

house in Abbotabad for about 7 years under the very nose of Pakistan army and ISI, necessitates the dismantling and destruction of terrorist training camps, bases, and all types of infrastructure existing in Pakistan, besides seizing their assets including bank accounts, properties etc. The United Nations, international community and the US in particular need to impose and enforce sanctions against the terrorist organizations, their members and more importantly the states which are sponsoring and harbouring these terrorists. All sort of international assistance to Pakistan needs to be made dependent upon its visible action towards dismantling and destroying the terrorist networks, their bases and infrastructure.

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KASHMIR, AFGHANISTAN, INDIA AND BEYOND
*A TAXONOMY OF ISLAMIC EXTREMISM
AND TERRORISM IN PAKISTAN*

MICHAEL FREDHOLM

Pakistan has been called the epicentre of terrorism.¹ Since leaders from almost every Sunni Islamic extremist group worldwide, from the internationalist Al-Qaeda to the Afghanistan-centred Taliban, have been found on the Pakistani soil, there seems little reason to argue with the conclusion that Pakistan is indeed central to political violence and terrorism in the name of Sunni Islam.

Foreign extremist and terrorist groups had good reasons to choose Pakistan as a base. Long before international terrorism found an accommodating haven in Pakistan, the country was the breeding ground for a large variety of domestic religious groups with violent ideals. Since a detailed history of religiously inspired political violence and terrorism in Pakistan remains to be written, and credible sources for the activities of clandestine groups often are lacking, it is unlikely that anybody could say exactly how many such groups have existed in Pakistan, and how many remained active at any given moment. Credible sources suggest a total of well over a hundred extremist groups committed to violence.² Although they were in most cases tolerated, often even encouraged, by the Pakistani state as means of leverage against neighbouring countries such as India and Afghanistan, their presence eventually, when their power began to rival that of the state, became a threat to the sovereignty of Pakistan and its viability as a unified country.

That Pakistan is the home of indigenous Islamic militant groups is undisputed. But how to understand their goals and objectives? How to make sense of such a vast array of militants, of every conceivable sectarian allegiance and ideology? Can an outsider even begin to understand them?

Many researchers seemingly give up, satisfying themselves with the conclusion that Pakistan contained large numbers of militants and extremist groups because parts of the country were “unpoliced” and because the situation in the country was “deteriorating.”³ In effect, they suggest a deterministic view of Pakistan, in which bad things happened because the situation was already bad. Yet, various individual leaders in Pakistan actively chose to form militant groups, and they did so for specific purposes, not all of which were compatible.

To know the allegiances and objectives of the Pakistani militant groups will not only enable the outsider to understand them, but may possibly also enable the identification of which means can be used to neutralize their negative influences on Pakistani politics and society. The purpose of this study is thus an attempt to identify those factors which distinguish any given militant group from the others and to identify the key goals for which each group was established.

THE TAXONOMY OF PAKISTANI MILITANT GROUPS

A key factor in understanding any Pakistani militant group is, as will be shown, its relationship to the state. While many of the early groups were established to serve the state, through ideology or armed support, others have ended up as what can only be termed allies of the state. In recent years, groups in opposition to the state (rivals for power) have emerged as well.

The second key factor in understanding any Pakistani militant group is its sectarian allegiance. Which Islamic sect does it adhere to? Deobandi, Barelvi (traditionalists who venerate saints; Sufi), *Ahl-e Hadith* (*Wahhabi*), or Shia? This will not only affect the group’s relationship to the state but also determine with which other groups it can comfortably associate.

Then there is the issue of for which activities the group was established. Some groups follow the state’s agenda in preaching, militant activities, or both. Others follow an independent agenda. Many groups follow the state’s agenda in certain geographical regions but an independent one in others.

This means that the geographical scope of the group also becomes an important factor in assessing it. As will be shown, a militant group’s geographical scope may be Pakistan, Afghanistan, Kashmir, India, or global, or any combination thereof.

By combining these various factors in a chart, it becomes possible

to undertake comparative studies of the groups, thus identifying the salient factors of each in comparison to the others. In effect, a taxonomy of groups will be established. However, the relationships between different Pakistani groups have in the last decade grown so complex that one chart is not enough. To fully understand their taxonomy, the researcher will also have to take a chronological, or historiographical, approach (Figs. 1-8). For each group was formed in a context, dependent on the time and place of its establishment.

MAUDUDI, THE *Jamaat-e Islami*, AND THE IDEOLOGICAL FOUNDATION OF PAKISTAN

Islamic extremism in Pakistan can be said to have begun with the *Jamaat-e Islami* (JI, "Islamic Society"), founded in 1941 by Sayyid Abul Ala al-Maududi (1903-1979) in what was then British India. When India was partitioned upon independence in August 1947, Maududi moved to Pakistan where he re-established the organisation.⁴ Maududi favoured an Islamic form of totalitarianism, an Islamic state led by a uniformly indoctrinated, disciplined, and cohesive government cadre with no latitude for disagreement or debate within the ranks of government at any level. With regard to the scope of authority of this Islamic state, Maududi concluded: "Its sphere of activity is co-extensive with human life . . . In such a state no one can regard any field of his affairs as personal and private." He admitted that there was a resemblance between the utopian Islamic state that he described and the fascist and communist states of the real world but assured his audience, without going into too many details, that the similarities were superficial and that the state he proposed, unlike the latter, bad forms of totalitarianism, in fact was a good form of totalitarianism.⁵ Maududi argued that Islam was self-sufficient, separate from, and indeed opposed to Western capitalism as well as socialism. He regarded the West as morally decadent and corrupt. Since the West was opposed to Islam, he argued, it was permissible and even obligatory to struggle against Western influences, and in extension the West and any secular society. Yet Maududi did believe that there could be compromise between Islam and the non-Islamic world, which set him apart from more radical Muslim thinkers such as his contemporary, the Egyptian extremist writer Sayyid Qutb.⁶ In 1953, Maududi was sentenced to death for militant activities. Subsequently amnestied, he died in exile in the United States in 1979.⁷

The JI continued to grow. It soon became a political mass movement, with millions of supporters. Based at Lahore, the JI was from 1987 led by Qazi Hussain Ahmed (b. 1938), a Pashtun who had been in charge of the movement's Afghan affairs during the 1970s.⁸ Its aim was the full Islamicisation of Pakistani society. The organisation began to receive official patronage after the 1977 military coup of General Muhammad Zia ul-Haq (1924-1988). What followed was a process that has been referred to as state Islamicisation, in effect turning political Islam, Islamism, into yet another form of Islam.⁹ The ideology of the JI in many ways became the ideology of Pakistan (Fig. 1). Numerous high-ranking Pakistani military officers became linked with the JI. Although not in itself directly engaged in terrorism and irregular warfare, the movement, which always advocated *jihad* to create an Islamic transnational state, inspired and supported the more violent groups that emerged later.¹⁰ Saudi Arabia reportedly became the major financial backer of the organisation.¹¹ In the early 2000s, several individuals linked to Al-Qaeda, including Khalid Sheikh Muhammad, the principal mastermind of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, were captured at the homes of leading JI members.¹²

The JI always glorified those of its members who took part in combat, for instance in Bangladesh in 1971: "Thousands of Bangali workers of Jamaat organized themselves under the banner of Al-Badar and Al-Shamas and fought against Indians and Bangali secessionists together, in a heroic manner, proving that Muslims are brothers."¹³ The movement also promoted an alternative history of Pakistan, for instance, noting that an "election campaign ridiculed ideology of Pakistan Islam, Patriotism, Morality and nobility. Copies of the Holy Quran were set at fire in Lahore and Multan. Anarchies ruled."¹⁴ In this discourse, the issue of having an election (whether flawed or not) was of no interest; the emphasis was that the election campaign ridiculed Islam and morality - and resulted in the burning of the Quran, a heinous crime in the eyes of many Muslims.

SECTARIAN DISPUTES AND ISLAMIC MOBILIZATION

While the Pakistani state's interest in Islamic extremism intensified under Zia ul-Haq, it began already in 1974 under Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (1928-1979), under whom a law was passed declaring Ahmadis as non-Muslims.¹⁵ There were already many Islamic groups in the

country, and sectarian differences grew increasingly strong, and increasingly violent. Deobandi groups became particularly prominent among the Sunni Muslims, but there were also Barelvi (Sufi) and *Ahl-e Hadith* (*Wahhabi*) organisations. The Shias too formed their own religious groups and parties, in particular following the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran. Sectarian differences turned members of these groups increasingly antagonistic towards those who did not share their beliefs.¹⁶

Extremism in Pakistan was boosted by the vast resources pumped into the country during the 1980s to fuel the Afghan groups fighting the Soviet Union. After 1988, however, when widespread insurgency broke out in Indian Kashmir,¹⁷ most Pakistani extremist groups turned to, or were indeed founded for, the struggle for a united Kashmir under Pakistani rule. It appears that the Kashmir issue soon became the prime cause also for Pakistan's Afghanistan and, eventually, Taliban policy. Most Pakistani extremist groups had camps for military training in Taliban-controlled parts of Afghanistan, even though their chief interest was in Kashmir and most of the groups maintained headquarters in Muzaffarabad, near the border between Pakistan-controlled Azad ("Free") Kashmir and Indian Kashmir.¹⁸ Pakistan in the autumn of 1988, following an initiative from the then Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Director-General Hamid Gul, instructed all Pakistani legations to issue special tourist visas to any Muslim expressing an interest to study in a Pakistani *madrasah* (religious boarding school) and to fight in the Afghan or Kashmiri *jihad*. Paid airline tickets were often provided as well. A lack of proper travel documents, or indeed any travel documents at all if the recruit was wanted for terrorism and offered a false name, did not prevent the trip to Pakistan.¹⁹

One key front for *jihad* support during the war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan was the already existing international Muslim organisation generally known as the *Tabligh* ("Revelation;" the organisation is also known variously as *Jamaat-e Tabligh*, *Jamaat al-Tabligh*, and *Tablighi Jamaat*). The *Tabligh* grew from a group of a few dozen Muslims doing preaching and missionary work in 1926 in the region of Mewat, near Delhi, India. This movement, founded by Maulana Muhammad Ilyas (1885-1994) and formally established in 1927, had by 1988 grown into a loosely organised but well-funded global mass movement which attracted over one million Muslims from ninety countries for its annual conference in Raiwind, near Lahore, Pakistan.

Most members were Deobandis. By the late 1990s, the annual Raiwind meeting was the second largest congregation of Muslims after the annual pilgrimage to Mecca. The *Tabligh* also maintained a European headquarters in Britain (in Dewsbury, a suburb of Leeds) as well as a major office in Paris. By the mid-1980s, the *Tabligh* was devoting considerable attention to the recruiting of young men for the Afghan *jihad* in North Africa. Most fighters were recruited on university campuses and colleges, where Islamic extremism by then was spreading rapidly. Others were recruited in the prisons, where members of illegal Islamic extremist parties could be found. Many were offered free trips to Pakistan for religious studies. After a six-week period of religious education, the students would be approached and offered the opportunity for military training.²⁰ In 1988, the *Tabligh* held a convention in Chicago, Illinois, attracting over 6,000 Muslims from around the world.²¹ In 1990, a similarly huge convention was held in Dallas, Texas.²²

The *Tabligh* remained active in the recruitment of fighters for the *jihad* and the delivery of supplies to *jihad* groups throughout the world also after the Soviet war. They may, for instance, have been involved in the war in Chechnya, from their two religious establishments near Baku, the capital of Azerbaijan.²³ The *Tabligh* was also the organisation which through its system of mosques in Western countries originally recruited American Taliban John Walker Lindh and British shoe bomber Richard Reid.²⁴ Following the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan, affiliation with the *Tabligh* became a key means for extremists to justify international travel for terrorist purposes, for instance in the January 2008 bomb plot in Barcelona, Spain.²⁵

The *Tabligh*'s branches in Pakistan and Bangladesh became particularly radical and allowed themselves to be used for the recruitment of volunteers for terrorism including suicide bombings. The trend towards the radicalisation of the *Tabligh* was accelerated in the 1990s when its Pakistani branch was headed by Lieutenant General Javed Nasir, Director-General of the ISI in 1992-1993. Nasir, a Kashmiri by birth and a Deobandi by sectarian allegiance, led the Pakistani branch of the *Tabligh* for several years, both during his term as Director-General of the ISI and after his forced retirement. Nasir rose to fame for organising a secret airlift of weapons to the Bosnian Muslims, in defiance of the United Nations arms embargo, for which he in 1993 was removed from the ISI along with dozens of other Zia-era *jihadist* officers by then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif (b. 1949), allegedly under American pressure. Nasir also

took a personal interest in sending *Tabligh* missionaries to South-East Asia.²⁶

From this state of sectarian mobilisation, it was only a small step to set up indigenous Deobandi groups in support of the Pakistani state.²⁷ Whether the inspiration came from representatives of the state, such as the ISI, or from religious leaders is immaterial; the two sides shared ideals and desires for what kind of state Pakistan should become. Although many details remain murky, a number of sectarian groups were soon created to do the dirty work for the Pakistani state, which henceforth could operate on two levels, formally through the representatives of the state and diplomacy and informally through the religious militants. These groups can be divided into two general types: those that supported the state, and in particular the ISI, in fighting foreign enemies, and those that aimed to purify Pakistan from influences from Shia or Ahmadi thought, or that of any other religious minority.

THE DEOBANDI AFGHAN WAR HAKAKATS
(Harakat ul-Jihad al-Islami, Harakat ul-Mujahidin,
AND Harakat ul-Ansar)

The first modern, militant extremist group in Pakistan was founded in 1979/1980 to participate in the Afghan war as part of the American-led effort to fight the Soviet Union. It was Deobandi in sectarian allegiance. At first, the group was called the *Jamaat ul-Ansar ul-Afghanin* ("Society of the Helpers of the Afghans").²⁸ It was one of several similar groups founded from individual mosques or madrasahs, or under encouragement from the ISI. The group changed its name into the *Harakat ul-Jihad al-Islami* (HuJI, "Movement of Islamic Jihad") at some point during the early 1980s (Fig. 1).²⁹ In 1983, a faction of the group under Maulana Fazlur Rehman Khalil, a Pashtun, split and in 1984 formed a new group, the *Harakat ul-Mujahidin* (HuM, "Movement of Mujahidin").³⁰ After a number of similar splits, the factions again merged in 1987 (or 1989³¹) and then, after new splits, yet again in June 1993, when two factions of the group (HuM and HuJI) began to operate as a unified military organisation under the revived name *Harakat ul-Ansar* ("Movement of Helpers"), named after the first supporters of the Prophet Muhammad.³² The group was based in Pakistan (Muzaffarabad and Rawalpindi) and Taliban-controlled eastern Afghanistan (eventually also in Kandahar³³). It began operations in Kashmir from 1993, or possibly already from 1991,

when the first group of HuM and, separately, the first group of HuJI fighters reportedly went there.³⁴

In 1992, the HuJI established a branch in Bangladesh, which eventually became increasingly independent.³⁵ There the HuJI maintained connections with the *Islami Oikya Jote* (IOJ, Islamic Unity Front) party alliance which at times formed part of the coalition government.³⁶

Meanwhile, the HuJI remained active in Pakistan, possibly still under the somewhat undefined leadership of Maulana Qari Saifullah Akhtar.³⁷ The HuJI was also active elsewhere. Indeed, by the early 2000s the HuJI claimed to have been the first group “to send out a call to mujahideen in India, Bangladesh, Burma, Iran, Philippines, Malaysia, Africa, Britain, Ireland, Fiji, America, most Arab States, and Central Asia, to come together under the green jihadi flag and participate in practical jihad.” The group claimed to have participated in *jihad* in first Afghanistan, then Kashmir, Burma, Tajikistan, Chechnya, Palestine, and Central Asia. Indeed, the group’s motto was “*Harakat ul-Jihad* - the second defence line of every Muslim country.” Interestingly, the group’s literature then also claimed that the *Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan* (IMU) constituted a part of the HuJI. This notion of affiliation is unlikely then to have been fully shared by the IMU leadership, although the two groups certainly cooperated. Most of the claims can presumably be regarded as mere contacts, not real affiliations.³⁸

With the *Harakat ul-Ansar* designated a terrorist organisation by the United States in October 1997 due to the kidnapping and killing of five Western tourists in Kashmir in 1995, the group resumed the name *Harakat ul-Mujahidin* (HuM) in 1998. Responsibility for the kidnappings was claimed by a previously unheard of group known as Al-Faran (“The Delightful”), which was believed to be a fictitious front organisation for the *Harakat ul-Ansar*.³⁹

The HuM was led by Fazlur Rehman Khalil, one of the Islamic extremist leaders who, on behalf of the *Harakat ul-Ansar* (the faction of which was in the process of again changing its name into HuM), together with Osama bin Laden set up the *World Islamic Front* for jihad against Jews and Crusaders in early 1998. In a concluding *fatwa*, the signatories authorised and called for attacks on Americans, military and civilians, and their allies throughout the world, concluding that this was an individual duty for every Muslim.⁴⁰

While the HuM was mainly involved in Kashmir, it was also

associated with the hijacking in December 1999 of an Indian passenger airliner which was then flown to Taliban-held Kandahar, Afghanistan. India was forced to release HuM leader Maulana Masood Azhar and two followers in exchange for the surviving hostages.⁴¹

Fazlur Rehman Khalil stepped down in February 2000 in favour of his second-in-command, Maulana Farooq Kashmiri.⁴² This was probably in connection with the formation of yet another faction, the *Jaish-e Muhammad* (see below).⁴³ In May 2001, the HuM threatened to attack New York, Washington, DC., and the White House if the United States did not change its policies towards the Muslim world.⁴⁴ Fazlur Rehman Khalil spent October 2001 to January 2002 in Afghanistan with seventy of his men, of whom only fifteen made it back alive.⁴⁵ Despite this, and although having signed the 1998 *fatwa* together with Osama bin Laden, Fazlur Rehman Khalil continued to live openly in Rawalpindi, not far from the Pakistan Army General Headquarter, until about 2004 or soon thereafter, when he moved to an equally public residence in the Islamabad suburb of Golra Sharif.⁴⁶ The HuM was banned on 12 January 2002 but changed its name to *Jamiat ul-Ansar* ("Society of Helpers"). The group was again banned on 20 November 2003.⁴⁷ However, neither ban was implemented in Pakistan-held Kashmir, nor for that matter in the Federally Administered Northern Areas (FANA) and Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).

THE DEOBANDI ANTI-SHIA GROUPS
(*Jamiat-e Ulama-ye Islami, Sepah-e Sahaba Pakistan,*
AND *Lashkar-e Jhangvi*)

A number of Deobandi clerics in 1949 set up a political party, the *Jamiat-e Ulama-ye Islami* (JUI, "Society of Islamic Scholars"). In 1981, the party split into two main factions, the largest of which became led by Fazlur Rahman.⁴⁸ By 2001, the JUI remained divided into several factions, led respectively by Fazlur Rahman, Ajmal Qadri, and Sami ul-Haq (b. 1937), with the latter serving as the party's secretary general. The party remained politically isolated until Pakistan's 1993 elections, when it became part of the ruling coalition under Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto (1953-2007). The JUI then established close links with the army, the ISI, and the Interior Ministry. Soon the JUI was closely involved in Afghanistan, in 1994 guiding and nurturing the emergence of the Taliban movement. In 1996, the Taliban handed over control of a number of

training camps to the JUI and several of its many breakaway factions. These factions became the chief recruiters of Pakistanis and others for the Taliban forces. It has been estimated that as many as between 80,000 and 100,000 Pakistanis trained and fought in Taliban units in Afghanistan between 1994 and 1999, independently of those regular Pakistani troops who also reportedly served with the Taliban.⁴⁹

The factions of the JUI continued to have political significance and certainly operated in support of violent activities. However, there were also splinter groups that were keen to engage in genuine combat. Two such Deobandi Punjabi splinter groups of the JUI were the *Sepah-e Sahaba Pakistan* (SSP, "Pakistan Army of the Companions of the Prophet") and the *Lashkar-e Jhangvi* (LeJ, "Army of Jhangvi"). The SSP was founded in September 1984 as the *Anjuman-e Sepah-e Sahaba Pakistan* ("Society of the Pakistan Army of the Companions of the Prophet") by Maulana Haq Nawaz Jhangvi (1952-1990), head of the Punjab branch of the JUI, with funding from Saudi Arabia and Iraq. His purpose was to combat the Shia minority in Pakistan, the presence of which Jhangvi and his associates detested - not least for business reasons since rivalry between Sunni and Shia businessmen in Jhangvi's hometown Jhang had led to violent confrontations and financial losses (Fig. 2).⁵⁰ The SSP maintained offices in several countries, including the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Bangladesh, Britain, and Canada. The SSP was later led by Maulana Muhammad Azam Tariq (killed in October 2003), with Abdul Khaliq Siddiqi as secretary-general. By the late 1990s, the SSP fought alongside the Afghan Taliban against the *Northern Alliance* and is believed to have been responsible for the massacre of Shia Hazaras and Iranian diplomats in Mazar-e Sharif in August 1998.⁵¹

The SSP produced no less than seven armed factions, each under the control of different SPP leaders. The *Lashkar-e Jhangvi* (LeJ, "Army of Jhangvi") was formed by Riaz Basra in 1994 as an armed faction of SSP and changed its name in 1996 in honour of Jhangvi (who died in a revenge killing in 1990) and to protest against what the faction regarded as the excessively moderate views of the SSP. Riaz Basra, like Azam Tariq, maintained close ties with the Taliban as well as Osama bin Laden, and many of their followers joined the Taliban army. In 1998, the two leaders, being accused of the killings of large numbers of Pakistani Shias, took refuge in Kabul. Riaz Basra was killed in May 2002.⁵² His successor, Muhammad Ajmal (a.k.a. Akram Lahori), was arrested in July 2002.⁵³ The LeJ was banned already on 14 August 2001, then again on 12 January 2002.⁵⁴

The SSP was banned on 12 January 2002. Renamed as *Millat-e Islamiya Pakistan* party (“Islamic Nation Pakistan”), it was banned also under the new name in November 2003.⁵⁵ Following the death of Azam Tariq, leadership of the SSP was assumed by Maulana Muhammad Ahmed Ludhianvi. The party was again renamed, this time as the *Ahl-e Sunnat Wal Jamaat* (“People of the Beaten Path and Society”).⁵⁶

NEW DEOBANDI MILITANT GROUPS: *Jaish-e Muhammad*

The *Jaish-e Muhammad* (JeM, “Army of Muhammad”) was founded in January or February 2000 (Fig. 6) as an essentially Punjabi offshoot of HuM by Maulana Masood Azhar (b. 1968), the Islamic cleric with close links with Osama bin Laden who was released from an Indian jail following the December 1999 hijack of an Indian passenger airliner. Although most Pashtuns in HuM remained with the mother organisation, many HuM members, reportedly three quarters, and numerous HuJI members followed Masood Azhar into the new organisation. It was based at Peshawar and Muzaffarabad in Pakistan. The group also had close ties to the SSP.⁵⁷

The JeM split into at least two factions in June 2003 after violent clashes over the control of a lucrative Karachi mosque.⁵⁸ In what clearly was a case of rivalry over funding, Maulana Abdullah Shah Mazhar launched a new Karachi-based faction of the group under the name *Tehrik ul-Furqan* (“Movement of Believers”). As a result, Masood Azhar in July 2003 expelled the rival from his organisation. This was not the end of the story. On 25 September 2003, following months of gunfights between the two factions in Karachi, the breakaway faction in Karachi reformed under Abdul Jabbar, hitherto commander of the JeM’s military operations. Abdullah Shah Mazhar remained among its members but in a less prominent position. The breakaway faction now referred to itself as the *Jamaat ul-Furqan* (“Society of Believers”). This was a name of high significance for the extremists, since it was associated with the December 2001 attack on the Indian parliament which took Pakistan and India to the brink of war.⁵⁹

The name adopted by Abdullah Shah Mazhar may in fact have been Masood Azhar’s idea in the first place. The JeM had been banned on 12 January 2002. There is some evidence that Masood Azhar, in anticipation of the ban, may have renamed the JeM as *Tehrik ul-Furqan* already in October 2001. Since he lost control of this name, he instead changed the

name of his organisation into *Khudam ul-Islam* ("Servants of Islam") and continued as before. However, the group (both factions) was again banned on 20 November 2003, both under the name *Khudam ul-Islam* and the name *Jamaat ul-Furqan*.⁶⁰

Neither ban was implemented in Pakistan-held Kashmir, or for that matter in the FANA and FATA. However, following the December 2003 suicide attacks on Pakistan's ruler Pervez Musharraf (b. 1943), the *Khudam* offices were closed.⁶¹ Even this uncharacteristically strong reaction failed to prevent the group from continuing its militant operations, although it at least by 2008 had begun shifting its focus from Kashmir to Afghanistan.⁶²

THE ALLY OF THE STATE, *the Ahl-e Hadith Organisation Lashkar-e Tayyiba*

In addition to the Deobandi organisations, there also existed several *Ahl-e Hadith* (*Wahhabi*) organisations in Pakistan.⁶³ Of these, the most influential was the *Markaz ud-Dawa wa'l-Ershad* ("Center for Proselytising and Guidance"). It was established in 1986 by Hafiz Muhammad Saeed (b. 1947), a professor at Lahore's University of Engineering and Technology, with the assistance of Abdullah Azzam (1941-1989), a Palestinian global *jihadi* and associate of Osama bin Laden.⁶⁴ This organisation early on formed a militant branch known as *Lashkar-e Tayyiba* (LeT, "Army of the Pure; Army of Medina").⁶⁵ It remains unclear exactly when the militant branch was formed. According to one LeT communiqué, the group was formed in Afghanistan on 22 February 1990 (Fig. 3).⁶⁶ However, there were also claims that the group was formed by the aforementioned Hafiz Saeed already in 1988, so that it had taken part in the *jihad* against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan before the Soviet withdrawal in 1989.⁶⁷ Yet others claimed that the militant branch instead was formed in 1991 by Maulana Zaki ur-Rehman Lakhvi (born c. 1961), a veteran from the anti-Soviet Afghan *jihad*, with the purpose to engage in *jihad* in Kashmir.⁶⁸ Still others claimed that the LeT was active in Kashmir already in early 1990. With regard to Kashmir, there is little evidence of LeT participation before 1993, but by then, the group was conducting operations in Kashmir.⁶⁹

Such conflicting claims were not unusual in Pakistani groups. Usually, the earliest date claimed was no more than a desire to show that the group, or at least those who eventually would found it, took part in the anti-Soviet *jihad* in Afghanistan, a key event in *jihadist*

mythology. It was also quite common to find different dates of establishment associated with different leaders. In most cases, such claims only showed that different leaders created armed factions of their own which eventually merged. In the case of LeT, even the date of the group's first operation in Kashmir was disputed, which may indicate that it first was based in Pakistan-held Kashmir and only operated in Indian Kashmir later.

Since the parent organisation of the LeT was *Ahl-e Hadith*, that is, *Wahhabi* in sectarian allegiance, a new headquarters was built with primarily Saudi funding in the late 1980s.⁷⁰ The headquarters, located at Muridke southwest of Lahore, covered a vast area, was sealed off, and was in effect autonomous of Pakistani law. From 1994, the LeT was based at the Muridke headquarters. The group also enjoyed the use of Afghan training camps associated with Osama bin Laden.⁷¹ While Hafiz Saeed remained overall leader of the movement, military operations were led by Zaki ur-Rehman Lakhvi.⁷²

On 24 December 2001, Hafiz Saeed announced that he would step down as head of the LeT and that the *Markaz al-Dawa wa'l-Ershad* would change name to *Jamaat ud-Dawa* (JuD, "Society of Proselytising"). He would remain head of this organisation, while Maulana Abdul Wahid Kashmiri would assume the leadership of the LeT, which henceforth, he claimed, would limit its administration to Pakistan-controlled Kashmir, with Zaki ur-Rehman Lakhvi in charge of military affairs as before. He also noted that the JuD would continue to finance the LeT and would continue to accept donations for this purpose.⁷³ These preparations having been concluded, the Pakistani government banned the LeT on 12 January 2002.⁷⁴ Hafiz Saeed was briefly placed under house arrest.⁷⁵ In 2002, the LeT announced that it was formally moving its base to Indian Kashmir.⁷⁶ This was an exaggeration; its command structure only relocated to Muzaffarabad in Pakistan-held Kashmir.⁷⁷ The ban on the LeT was obviously not implemented in Pakistan-held Kashmir, nor for that matter in the FATA and FANA.

Since the international community was preoccupied by the Al-Qaeda, it took several years before the LeT was formally recognized as an international terrorist group. On 2 May 2005 the organisation was added by the United Nations Security Council to the list of terrorist groups known to support Al-Qaeda under UN Resolution 1267 concerning Al-Qaeda and the Taliban and associated individuals and entities. The JuD was added in December 2008.⁷⁸ This did not prevent

the Punjab Government in Pakistan from giving Pakistani Rupees 82,770,000 (more than \$1 million) in financial support to the JuD in fiscal year 2009.⁷⁹ Indeed, the JuD was never formally banned in Pakistan, where its various wings continued to operate, under the LeT's easily recognisable black-and-white flag bearing a scimitar, through a charitable organisation, *Falah-e Insaniyat Foundation* ("Humanitarian Welfare"), registered in Lahore on 19 April 2007.⁸⁰ Following the UN listing, the JuD also began to use, among others, the names *Tehrik-e Hurmat-e Rasool* ("Movement for the Defence of the Honour of the Prophet") and *Tehrik-e Tahafuz Qibla Awal* ("Movement for the Safeguarding of the First Centre of Prayer").⁸¹

For Abdullah Azzam, the Afghan *jihad* had been only the beginning. He demanded that no Muslim rest until all lands that once had been under Muslim rule would be returned to Islam, including places as diverse as Spain, Burma, and the Philippines.⁸² The ideology of the LeT and JuD was significantly influenced by Azzam. It emphasised that armed *jihad* was compulsory for all Muslims. The group's literature even specified which formerly Muslim lands would have to be conquered and restored to Islam. This was a long list beginning with Andalusia in Spain, continuing with most of South Asia, including Nepal and Burma, Jerusalem, Bulgaria, Hungary, Cyprus, Sicily, Niger, former Soviet Central Asia, Chinese Xinjiang, and ending with "French lands up to ninety kilometres from Paris and the jungles and forests of Switzerland."⁸³ Individuals perceived as having offended Islam and the Prophet Muhammad would also have to be killed. For this reason, the JuD in 2006 reportedly issued a *fatwa* calling upon Muslims to kill Pope Benedict XVI.⁸⁴

The LeT claimed to have dispatched fighters to numerous countries for *jihad*, including Bosnia, the Philippines, Somalia, and (since 2000) Israel.⁸⁵ Despite being banned, the unreformed LeT continued to expand its activities. On 30 March 2003, Hafiz Saeed called for *jihad* against the American forces in Iraq.⁸⁶ From 2008, LeT also became increasingly active in Afghanistan, fighting against Coalition and Afghan security forces there.⁸⁷ LeT members were arrested in Iraq, Afghanistan, and from 2003 in the United States.⁸⁸ Two Americans of Pakistani and Bangladeshi origin, respectively, were in 2006 arrested in the United States and eventually sentenced to prison for terrorism for their contacts with, among other groups, the LeT.⁸⁹ In a possibly unrelated event, Hafiz Muhammad Hamid, brother of Hafiz Saeed, was deported with his

family from the United States on 3 June 2007.⁹⁰ In Canada, 18 people alleged to be members of a LeT cell in Toronto were arrested in 2006, accused of planning a whole series of attacks including truck bombs, hostage taking, and the assassination of the Canadian Prime Minister.⁹¹

By then, the LeT network had already grown to encompass not only South Asia but also the Middle East (Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Syria, Iraq), Europe (Britain, France, and Germany), North America (the United States and Canada), and South East Asia (Indonesia and Thailand).⁹² By 2010, there were reports that the LeT was expanding its ongoing South Asian operations in Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives.⁹³

The LeT has enjoyed particularly close relations with the ISI. According to the testimony in a British court of a Briton who had trained with the LeT, by 2000 at the latest ISI officers screened and trained foreign recruits in LeT camps.⁹⁴ By November 2001, the group, likely with the support of the ISI, began to send foreign recruits back to their native countries, among them certainly the United States and France. Several returnees have since been arrested, among them several in Virginia in 2003 and a Frenchman, the Afro-Caribbean convert Willie Brigitte, later in the same year. Brigitte was arrested in Australia where he had proceeded to join forces with an Australian extremist group, then deported back to France.⁹⁵ Since Brigitte also seems to have engaged in conventional intelligence collection against the Australian Army, this suggests yet another level of cooperation between the LeT and ISI.⁹⁶

The close cooperation with the ISI also became evident in the devastating Mumbai attacks on 26 November 2008. Not only did signals intelligence and the testimonies of survivors suggest ISI involvement, there was also a star witness: one of the planners of the operation, an American of Pakistani origin, David Headley.⁹⁷ Faced with this deluge of information, as well as increasing American pressure, the Pakistani government reportedly acknowledged that the LeT and Zaki ur-Rehman Lakhvi were responsible for the attacks.⁹⁸ The LeT had employed Headley to work with LeT operatives and serving or retired Pakistani military officers in the planning phase of several acts of terrorism, including the Mumbai attacks.⁹⁹ Headley, who attended training in LeT camps on several occasions from 2002 onwards, later testified to the personal involvement of LeT military leader Zaki ur-Rehman Lakhvi and LeT overall leader Hafiz Saeed in the preparations. A certain Major Iqbal, who based on his activities was likely a serving ISI officer, also participated and in addition, offered to pay for the expenses of Headley's

reconnaissance activities. The involvement of Major Iqbal offered further insight into the links between the ISI and LeT. In 2006, Headley was stopped at a checkpoint in the FATA and questioned by Pakistani security forces. Headley then mentioned his connection to LeT. As a result, Headley was soon afterwards contacted by Major Iqbal, who henceforth became his military handler. The Major and his associates began to train Headley in advanced intelligence collection methods of the type known to have been used by the ISI.¹⁰⁰

In addition to the Mumbai operation, the LeT also ordered Headley to take part in the planning phase of a terrorist attack against the *Jyllands-Posten* newspaper in Denmark (in revenge for the cartoons of Muhammad, published in *Jyllands-Posten* on 30 September 2005).¹⁰¹ By October 2008, the LeT had decided to attack the Danish newspaper and so informed Headley and Major Iqbal.¹⁰² In early November 2008, LeT ordered Headley to begin the reconnaissance phase of the planned attack against the newspaper. Headley traveled to Denmark in January 2009 to scout the building of the *Jyllands-Posten* newspaper, and a nearby synagogue, in preparation of a terrorist attack. After his visit to Denmark, Headley returned to Pakistan, where he met his handlers in late January or more probably February 2009. He found that the political climate had changed. Major Iqbal was concerned with the attention the Mumbai attacks had received and instructed Headley to lay low, since the investigation into the Mumbai attacks was intense. Headley's LeT handler, in a separate meeting (in probably March¹⁰³), informed Headley that the plan to attack *Jyllands-Posten* was put on hold because of the increased scrutiny of LeT after the Mumbai attacks.¹⁰⁴ To summarise, events seem to have happened in the following order: In 2008, the LeT came up with the idea to attack the Danish newspaper. The ISI agreed to the operation. Headley was dispatched to Denmark. However, the Mumbai events caused a political fallout for the Pakistani state, so in January or February 2009, the ISI instructed Headley to lay low. Within a few weeks, the ISI also persuaded the LeT to put the plan on hold. The conclusion would then be that the LeT was free to suggest operations, but it was the ISI which made the final decision.

Despite the overwhelming evidence, the LeT never acknowledged its involvement in the Mumbai attacks. This was in contrast with previous terror attacks in India, carried out under - for Pakistan - more favourable international conditions. The LeT had, for instance, claimed responsibility for the attack on 22 December 2000 on the Red Fort in New Delhi, which

killed several Indian soldiers.¹⁰⁵ To the LeT, the attack may have symbolised the reconquest of the capital of the Moghul empire. It has since been celebrated on the occasion of at least one Muslim festival in Lahore.¹⁰⁶

A further sign of the accommodating relations between the LeT and ISI was that Hafiz Saeed appeared to have accepted a level of control by the Pakistani government on his organisation's activities. As far as can be ascertained, the LeT never attacked Pakistani interests, anywhere. The organisation also openly declared its stance against terrorism on Pakistani soil. On 6 July 2010, Hafiz Saeed went so far as to declare on television, his first ever TV interview, that suicide attacks in Pakistan, regardless of purpose, were illegal (*haram*) according to Islamic law.¹⁰⁷

PAKISTANI-LED MILITANT GROUPS IN KASHMIR

Hizb ul-Mujahidin AND *Al-Badr*

The *Hizb ul-Mujahidin* (HM, "Mujahidin Party"), for most of the 1990s Kashmir's main insurgent group, was founded in 1989 (Fig. 3). The group was for many years led by Syed Salahuddin.¹⁰⁸ It was established by the ISI and the JI as a pro-Pakistani movement to compete with the *Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front* (JKLF), an indigenous insurgent group then fighting for independence but currently dormant since calling a cease-fire in 1994. The HM, regarded as the militant wing of the JI, was based in Muzaffarabad, Rawalpindi, and Islamabad. The party was divided into a public *Tanzimi* (political) wing and a clandestine *Askari* (military) wing which was engaged in terrorism in Kashmir. The military wing was organised along army lines into units. While engaged in operations, members were often dressed in military uniforms. Its commanders were distinguished by having formal military ranks. Being the chief extremist party active in Kashmir, all foreign groups that operated there depended on the HM for logistic support. Syed Salahuddin was also the leader of the *United Jihad Council*, a Pakistani charitable organisation set up in 1999 to support the *jihad* in Kashmir. The HM banned (and violently enforced) a wide set of vices including cinemas, cable television, beauty parlours for women, and the production and consumption of alcoholic drinks. The party also established its own news agency, Kashmir Press International, based in the Pakistani city Rawalpindi, and acquired the support in the United States of Ghulam Nabi Fai's Kashmir American Council.¹⁰⁹ The party also claimed to have groups in several Arab

countries and Britain. British and European Muslims collectively formed the largest foreign donor, through the Islamic Mission Britain which collected funds for both the HM and JI.¹¹⁰

Al-Badr Mujahidin was founded in 1998 in Peshawar as a Deobandi offshoot of the HM (Fig. 5), as a result of a quarrel between different factions within the HM over funding and arms supplies. In 1997, the rivalry led to violence. The faction that would become the *Al-Badr* broke with the JI and HM and named itself after the Battle of Badr in 624, when the Prophet Muhammad and reportedly 313 Muslims defeated a more numerous Meccan force. By 1999, the group began to engage itself in Kashmir and went on a fund-raising tour in Pakistan with a “fifty-foot model of an Islamic atom bomb” and several martyr displays in what the group called *Karavan-e Kashmir* (“Kashmir Caravan”). Under the leadership of Bakht Zamin Khan (a lawyer from the Northwest Frontier Province, NWFP, in 2010 renamed the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province, KPP), the *Al-Badr* grew into a substantial force.¹¹¹ *Al-Badr* claimed to have had training camps in Afghanistan. Relations with the Taliban remained tense, however, until *Al-Badr* in 1999 asked Osama bin Laden to intervene in their support. *Al-Badr* had an office in Quetta and participated in *jihād* activities in Afghanistan as well, at least by 2001.¹¹² About 70 members of *Al-Badr* were reportedly arrested following Musharraf’s ban on several extremist groups in January 2002.¹¹³

RIVALS OF THE STATE: THE FIRST PAKISTANI TALIBAN

A fundamentally new type of extremist movement arose in the NWFP in 1989 (Fig. 3). This was the *Tehrik-e Nifaz-e Shariat-e Muhammad* (TNSM, “Movement for the Enforcement of the Law of Muhammad”).¹¹⁴ Founded by Sufi Muhammad (b. 1931), who until 1981 had been a member of the JI, the TNSM was a tribally based group which rose to prominence in 1990 with a large-scale protest demanding the immediate introduction of Islamic law, followed by an armed uprising for the same purpose in 1994. Among the movement’s demands were that road traffic should drive on the right instead of the left side of the road, since Islamic law demanded it, and that all government officers should be bearded. There were frequent allegations that the TNSM leaders were in league with smugglers and timber merchants, since their protests facilitated smuggling.¹¹⁵

The TNSM again revolted in April 2001, and was until its

proscription on 12 January 2002 very prominent in the Pashtun areas of Pakistan, especially in Malakand. Unlike other Pakistani extremist groups, the movement was not involved in Kashmir. Its members wore a uniform white *shalwar kameez* (long shirt and baggy trousers, the Pakistani national dress) with a black turban and carried black and white flags, as did the Afghan Taliban.¹¹⁶ By late October 2001, the TNSM tribal army, reportedly comprising around 10,000 men mostly from Swat, Buner, Shangla, Dir, and Malakand Agency, assembled at the village Leghari, around seven kilometres from the Afghan border. The TNSM leaders planned to enter Afghanistan to assist the Taliban in the ongoing war. However, many were unarmed or only poorly armed. As a consequence, the local price of used Kalashnikovs rose from Pakistani Rupees 6-7,000 to 10-11,000 (that is, from just above \$100 to more than \$180). The price of new Kalashnikovs rose from Pakistani Rupees 11,000 to 17-18,000 (from \$180 to more than \$300). The price of a pack of 10 bullets rose from Pakistani Rupees 50 to 70 (from about 85 cents to \$1.20). Likewise, local supplies of black and white cloth soon ran out, as the militants procured black or white turbans, the typical attire of Taliban soldiers.¹¹⁷ Those who eventually crossed into Afghanistan mainly died or disappeared. A TNSM spokesman later admitted that around three thousand fighters had gone missing. Survivors claimed that over five thousand had died, while thousands remained in Afghan prisons or were being held for ransom in Afghanistan.¹¹⁸ Sufi Muhammad returned to give himself up for arrest in Pakistan to avoid being killed in revenge by his own tribesmen. In his place, a certain Maulana Muhammad was appointed interim leader.¹¹⁹ Sufi Muhammad renounced violence and was released in 2007. However, he quickly reneged and was again arrested in 2009.¹²⁰

EXTREMISM AND PAKISTANI MILITARY STRATEGY

Up to the 2001 attack on the United States, the extremist groups shared goals, objectives, and values with the leaders of the Pakistani state. Pakistan was unique in this way; only Saudi Arabia comes close and if so, only with regard to the spread of Wahhabism. In every other Muslim country, the activities of its extremists were a source of concern, not a source of pride and satisfaction that they served the interests of the state.

The activities of Pakistani extremists in Kashmir tied down large Indian military forces and resources there, which indeed was one of the

chief reasons why Pakistan was unwilling to suppress the extremist movements. However, by facilitating the activities of militants in Kashmir and Afghanistan, Pakistan promoted internal sectarianism and armed militancy on its own territory as well as damaged its international standing, two acts that threatened the cohesion of Pakistani society and statehood.¹²¹ The extremist groups, when not deployed in Kashmir or Afghanistan, were likely to turn inward, which increased violence and turmoil inside Pakistan and undermined internal order. Signs inside Pakistan indicated growing sectarian tension and unrest, alongside the steady Islamicisation of society.¹²²

The Islamicisation of Pakistan also turned the country into a safe haven for foreign Islamic extremists. They did not hesitate to bring their own struggles into Pakistan. On 19 November 1995, the Egyptian embassy in Islamabad was almost destroyed in a suicide truck-bomb attack executed by *Islamic Jihad*, under the leadership of Ayman al-Zawahiri, who later became Osama bin Laden's lieutenant and ideologue in the Al-Qaeda. Fifteen people died, more than sixty were injured.¹²³

General Pervez Musharraf, who assumed power in the 12 October 1999 military coup, himself seemed to have been involved in the training of Arab Afghans during the Afghan war as well as the infiltration of guerrillas into Indian Kashmir. He was also reputed to have had ties to Osama bin Laden, criminal syndicates involved in narcotics trafficking in the NWFP, and a number of military officers who had close links with the HuM.¹²⁴ Whether this made Musharraf a closet extremist or a man uniquely qualified to deal with the problem was in 2001 anybody's guess. Musharraf had lived in Turkey as a child. He knew Turkish, admired the founder of secular Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1881-1938), and drank alcohol.¹²⁵ However, Musharraf never took decisive action against the extremists. While he handled the anti-American demonstrations with a minimal loss of life and sacked a number of high-ranking military officers regarded as too close to the militants, he seemed more uncertain on how to deal with the various extremist organisations. A few militant groups were banned, but others suffered no government interference. Certain extremist leaders were detained, but by no means all or even the majority. Musharraf's hesitation was clearly shown when he in early October 2001 first detained the influential extremist leader Fazlur Rahman, then had him released, only to detain him again after a few days.¹²⁶ When in spring 2002, Pakistan made an attempt, obviously without putting too much effort into it, to freeze the accounts of several

banned extremist organisations, the government effort secured the equivalent of less than a hundred dollars.¹²⁷

Some twenty per cent of the Pakistani army was made up of Pakistani Pashtuns, of whom many would be reluctant to confront their cousins in Afghanistan or elsewhere.¹²⁸ Many were high-ranking officers such as former army chief General Abdul Waheed and the head of military intelligence, Lieutenant General Ali Kuli Khan, who both were involved in the Taliban movement. Besides, most operational ISI field officers involved with the Taliban were Pashtuns.¹²⁹ Furthermore, it has been estimated that approximately 30-35 per cent of the military officers in Pakistan had sympathies with the *jihadi* movement.¹³⁰

The exact number of militants belonging to the multitude of Pakistani extremist groups was unknown to Western observers, although the Indian government estimated that 3-4,000 fighters were active in Kashmir at any given time. Much larger numbers remained in Pakistan, which boasted an estimated forty to fifty thousand *madrassahs* (religious boarding schools),¹³¹ of which an estimated 10 to 15 per cent (about five to six thousand) espoused extremist beliefs and continuously taught and inspired the spiritual obligation to engage in *jihad* against the enemies of Islam.¹³² The *madrassah* which created the Taliban, Dar ul-Ulum Haqqaniyyah, located in Akora Khattak outside Peshawar and headed by Sami ul-Haq, in 2000 expanded its capacity to house 500 foreign students, from Afghanistan (nearly half of the student body), Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Russia, and Turkey. By 2001, the number of foreign students was reportedly a thousand, most of them from Iran and Afghanistan. The *madrassah* maintained particularly close links to the HuM and HuJI. The Haqqaniyyah had traditional ties with the University of Medina, Saudi Arabia.¹³³ The madrasahs and extremist movements were funded from private sources, often of the same type (or the same) that funded the Arab Afghan *jihadi* movement. The families of killed extremist fighters often received financial assistance either from the militant groups or something like the *Shuhda-e Islam* ("Martyrs of Islam") Foundation, founded in 1995 by JI for this purpose. Other Islamic charities as well were suspected of giving financial assistance to militants, among them the Pakistani non-governmental organisation called *Ummah Tamir-e Nau* (UTN, "Foundation for Reconstruction"), which until the 2001 war had offices also in Taliban-controlled Kabul.¹³⁴

Many extremist fighters were well educated and and came from families that were not particularly poor. However, Pakistani terrorist

groups typically targeted poor or low-income families with strong religious views in the recruitment of suicide bombers. Many families chose to “bequeath” (*waqf*) a pre-teen or teenage son to the cause of God and *jihād*. This brought immense honour and prestige and a sum of from a hundred to two hundred thousand Pakistani Rupees (approximately \$1,600-3,300). The boys then spent from six to twelve months in special training camps for indoctrination. They were told that they would feel no pain when detonating their suicide vests and would immediately be flown to paradise by angels.¹³⁵

Many extremists would fight for one or two seasons and then return home, but without severing their links with the extremist movement. While their first goal was to liberate Kashmir from the rule of infidels, they then no doubt wished to rebuild Pakistan as a proper Islamic state, as they saw it. It was also common for the extremists to hire criminals to carry out acts of violence. The groups also sometimes turned to petty or organised crime themselves. As in the Arab Afghan *jihadi* movement, the various extremist movements shared *madrassahs*, training camps, and members.¹³⁶

The extremists’ ambition to achieve full control over the government of Pakistan had probably more to do with domestic reasons than any serious plan to gain an international role. However, Pakistan’s frequent references to its “Islamic bomb” no doubt inspired them in regard to what could be achieved against neighbouring, and perhaps more distant, states regarded as enemies of Pakistan and Islam. Although Pakistan until the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States tolerated and even encouraged Islamic extremist groups such as the Afghan Taliban, Islamic extremism posed a severe threat to Pakistan. Facing a tough ultimatum from President George W. Bush, Musharraf declared Pakistan’s support for the United States against Osama bin Laden and Afghanistan-based Islamic terrorism. Yet, Musharraf knew that were the Pakistani government decisively to rally behind the United States in an extended military campaign, it might fall victim to the very Islamic extremism that it had nurtured elsewhere - which could lead to violent popular unrest, civil breakdown, and eventually the destruction of the state. The West persuaded the Pakistani government to turn against its former disciples. For this, a price would have to be paid. The internal cohesion of Pakistan remained at risk, and the decision soon cost lives lost in violent street demonstrations. The five to six thousand religious seminaries that espoused extremist beliefs and continuously taught and

inspired the spiritual obligation to engage in *jihad* against the enemies of Islam did not meekly abide any government reaction against them. The inherent conflict between secular rulers and Islamic extremists, no longer possible for the Pakistani government to sidestep, remains unresolved.

THE POST-2001 PAKISTANI TALIBAN DEFY THE PAKISTANI STATE

When the Taliban were defeated in 2001-2002 in Afghanistan, the survivors among them and their various hangers-on among foreign extremists from Al-Qaeda and other groups took refuge on the Pakistani side of the border, well aware that they there were untouchable. Taliban leader Mullah Omar moved to Quetta in Baluchistan with his personal followers. He was given the use of a safe house owned by the JUI and additional support provided by the ISI. Henceforth, he would for a number of years quite openly lead the Afghan Taliban from this sanctuary.¹³⁷ Others including the Al-Qaeda moved to the NWFP and FATA. Waziristan became one of their chief strongholds, as did presumably Bajaur. After the 2002 elections, the JUI party came to power in the NWFP and Baluchistan. Several JUI mullahs, who had earlier fought with the Afghan Taliban and in some cases knew Mullah Omar personally, now found themselves members of the provincial assemblies of the two provinces. They were accordingly well placed to assist the Taliban through the use of the provincial state machinery. Although this alliance of Islamic parties suffered a dramatic decline in the 2008 elections, by then they had already facilitated the establishment of insurgents from Afghanistan in their respective areas.¹³⁸

Al-Qaeda was not the only foreign group that began to make use of Waziristan. Among the various groups that acquired bases there was the *Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan* (IMU), which soon allied itself to local militants. Already in June 2002, Pakistani security forces killed six alleged IMU members in South Waziristan and Kohat after they had killed a policeman and an intelligence officer. Further conflicts soon followed. A general Pakistani offensive followed from late 2003 onwards, and the fighting with Pakistani security forces around Wana in South Waziristan became particularly severe in March 2004.¹³⁹

South Waziristan was dominated by the Mehsuds, a powerful local tribe. However, the chief power-brokers among the Mehsuds by then were no longer traditional tribal leaders but young Taliban-supporters who soon came into conflict with the Pakistan Army. The Mehsud Taliban

then found the battle-hardened Uzbeks of the IMU very useful as allies, and the IMU henceforth became as closely allied to the Pakistani Taliban as it had been to the Afghan Taliban. The Mehsuds also made good use of the IMU in their rivalry with the Wazirs, many of whom were hostile to the Mehsuds.¹⁴⁰ The Pakistan Army at first attempted to negotiate with the Mehsuds, as it had done with other extremists in the past. A first peace accord, known as the Shakai agreement, was concluded in April 2004 in Shakai in South Waziristan. Nek Muhammad Wazir (1975-2004) promised not to use Pakistani soil as a base for militancy aimed against any other country.¹⁴¹ This was only the first in a string of agreements in which the Pakistan Army attempted but failed to pay off the extremists. In November 2004, a deal was arranged in which the Pakistan Army handed over about \$540,000 to pacify the militants.¹⁴² This too was ignored by the extremists. So was the next South Waziristan peace agreement, a written accord in Sararogha in February 2005. The Taliban leader Abdullah Mehsud (1974-2007), who had fought with the Taliban in Afghanistan and spent two years imprisoned at Guantanamo, disowned it.¹⁴³ Next, but not last, came the 5 September 2006 peace agreement between the Pakistan Army and the Taliban in North Waziristan.¹⁴⁴ For the Pakistan Army, these various peace accords were attempts to pay off the militants. For the latter, each new accord was interpreted as a new surrender by the Pakistani security forces. After all, it was the officers of the government forces who went to the militants to sue for peace, not the other way round. In tribal symbolism, this signified that it was the Pakistan Army which admitted defeat, a symbolism that cannot have been unknown to the leadership of the government forces.

Abdullah Mehsud was killed in July 2007.¹⁴⁵ He was followed by Baitullah Mehsud (1974-2009) who in December 2007 formed the *Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan* (TTP, "Movement of Pakistani Taliban"), which he then led from its formation until his death (Fig. 7). The IMU supported the TTP in its various activities, for instance by sending fighters to Swat when the Mehsud ally Maulana Fazlullah began his militant activities there in 2005. The IMU also retained its international networks. This soon made Waziristan more easily connected to the outside world and global politics than it arguably had ever been before. The IMU networks also ensured that a steady stream of new recruits, from all parts of the Muslim world, began to trickle into Waziristan.¹⁴⁶ Baitullah Mehsud in December 2007, in his first television interview, announced that his

ultimate aim was to attack the White House in Washington, D.C., New York, and London.¹⁴⁷ This was not idle talk; in January 2008, more than a dozen men of Pakistani origin were arrested in Barcelona, Spain, as they were preparing suicide attacks. The men, eleven of whom were subsequently convicted, had trained in Pakistan and were sent to Europe by Baitullah Mehsud with instructions to commit acts of terrorism. The TTP claimed responsibility for the plot, justifying it because of Spain's involvement in Afghanistan.¹⁴⁸

Baitullah Mehsud died in August 2009 in a CIA drone attack.¹⁴⁹ The new TTP leader, Hakimullah Mehsud (b. 1981), in the following year realized Baitullah's dream to attack New York. Hakimullah Mehsud sent a TTP wannabe terrorist to the United States, who on 1 May 2010 attempted but failed to explode a car bomb in Times Square in New York.¹⁵⁰ Before this, the TTP claimed responsibility for the coordinated assault and suicide attack on the American consulate in Peshawar on 5 April 2010.¹⁵¹

In South Waziristan, the TTP early on became divided into two factions, based on the Mehsud and Wazir tribes respectively. The latter became led by Maulavi Nazir Ahmed, a Wazir, best known as Mullah Nazir (b. 1975),¹⁵² who reportedly fought with the Afghan Taliban from 1995. Mullah Nazir began to enforce Islamic law in his area in 2006, in 2007 allied with the Pakistan Army against Uzbeks and others in South Waziristan, but in February 2009 joined Baitullah Mehsud and Hafiz Gul Bahadur, another Wazir leader but with territory in North Waziristan (see below), in a short-lived alliance named the *Shura Ittihad ul-Mujahidin* (Council of the Mujahidin Union). Then, after the death of Baitullah Mehsud in August 2009 which resulted in renewed fighting between the supporters of the two factions, Mullah Nazir agreed to let the Pakistan Army attack the Mehsuds through his territory.¹⁵³ Hakimullah Mehsud then assumed control over the Mehsuds.¹⁵⁴

As noted, the key Wazir leader in North Waziristan was Hafiz Gul Bahadur (b. 1961). A veteran of the anti-Soviet *jihad* in Afghanistan, he was also reportedly a descendant of the renowned Faqir of Ipi who was fighting for an independent Pashtunistan in the mid-twentieth century. Hafiz Gul Bahadur was close both to the Al-Qaeda and Mullah Omar's Afghan Taliban at Quetta, and following the accession to power of Hakimullah Mehsud, he again became a key leader within the TTP.¹⁵⁵

In comparison to Mullah Nazir and, in particular, Hafiz Gul Bahadur, the Mehsud leaders were men of a different background.

Although they called themselves Taliban to gain increased respect and prestige, their armed militants were fundamentally criminal gangs. They displaced or killed the traditional tribal leadership and established themselves as an alternative source of power.¹⁵⁶ While tribal affiliations certainly played a role, allegiances were transient in nature. Although many of the Mehsud fighters and leaders can be assumed to have been deeply religious, Islam was to a significant extent used as a mere pretext for their activities. Men like Baitullah and Hakimullah Mehsud were in effect charismatic dropouts, in their twenties when they gained power and had few prior achievements behind them except the legitimacy they had gained by fighting in Afghanistan with the Taliban. Some witness reports suggest that Baitullah and Hakimullah in fact had spent more time as petty criminals in Karachi than with the Afghan Taliban, but having failed to gain a reputation in the city, had chosen to return to Waziristan.¹⁵⁷ Hakimullah Mehsud admitted in his 2009 autobiographical notes that he attended a secular school in addition to his *madrassah* training, but he neither denied nor confirmed any connection with Karachi, instead emphasising his tribal credentials. He claimed to have fought with the Taliban since about 2003, when he was 24 years old.¹⁵⁸

As a result, the Waziristan TTP became a major player in organised crime. One lucrative source of income was the proceeds from protection rackets and kidnappings. Most of the kidnapped were local notables. However, in 2008 the TTP abducted no less than three diplomats. Pakistan's ambassador to Afghanistan, Tariq Azizuddin, was kidnapped in Khyber Agency in February 2008 on his way to Kabul. Whoever kidnapped him, he then appears to have been transferred into the custody of the TTP, since he was released in May only after negotiations with the TTP.¹⁵⁹ Next was Afghanistan's ambassador designate to Pakistan, Abdul Khaliq Farahi, who was kidnapped in September 2008 near his residence in Peshawar. He was only released in November 2010.¹⁶⁰ Then followed the former commercial attaché at the Iranian Consulate in Peshawar, Heshmatollah Attarzadeh, who was kidnapped in November 2008 and rescued or ransomed in March 2010.¹⁶¹ The various branches of the TTP cooperated in the kidnapping trade. So as to avoid rescues of the kidnapped individuals by their tribal followers, the TTP commanders would switch those kidnapped in Bajaur to Waziristan and vice versa, where another branch of the TTP would take control. Ransoms collected were shared between the participating TTP commanders.¹⁶² Under Baitullah, the TTP also engaged in the hijacking of cars in Waziristan,

both from government and civilian owners and in at least one case from the United Nations. Under his leadership, the TTP also engaged in several robberies, including as far away as in Karachi, where the group likely had followers among the many Mehsuds who had migrated there to find work opportunities.¹⁶³

THE HAQQANI NETWORK

While the Mehsuds dominated South Waziristan, other militant groups took similar control over other parts of the FATA. In North Waziristan, the most influential group was an organisation of quite different character, known among Western analysts as the *Haqqani Network* (Fig. 6). This was a fundamentally autonomous wing of the Afghan Taliban movement based in Miram Shah, the administrative centre of North Waziristan, and named after its leader, Jalaluddin Haqqani.¹⁶⁴ The Haqqani network was, despite its name, a distinct military and political organisation created by Jalaluddin Haqqani during the 1980s and which after the war against the Soviet Union remained a source of power in the borderlands shared by Afghanistan and Pakistan.¹⁶⁵ In comparison to the young Mehsud leaders, with their background in petty crime and violence, the mature Haqqanis were experienced, educated in theology, and had a sophisticated understanding of international trade and politics. Their patriarch, Jalaluddin Haqqani, had earned the name Haqqani as a honorific title as a result of his studies at the prestigious Dar ul-Ulum Haqqaniyyah madrasah.¹⁶⁶ He spoke excellent Arabic, as did his son Sirajuddin, and both had first-rate connections in the Arab world. The Haqqanis could discuss the intricacies of Islamic theology in the language of the Prophet, and kept a low profile by avoiding Western journalists, thus for decades also avoiding the taint of international terrorism, despite close links to Al-Qaeda.¹⁶⁷ In comparison, Baitullah Mehsud was eager to express his ambition to attack New York and London to foreign journalists, yet could only give interviews in his native Pashto, since he did not know any Arabic.¹⁶⁸ Baitullah Mehsud died young, while Jalaluddin Haqqani survived three decades of warfare.

The Haqqanis enjoyed the use of their own Uzbek militants. In 2002, several IMU members broke away to work more closely with Al-Qaeda against its global rather than regional enemies. They established their own organisation, the *Islamic Jihad Union* (IJU). The IJU had its headquarters and ran training camps in North Waziristan, unlike those

of the IMU which were located in South Waziristan. While the IMU turned towards the Mehsuds for protection, the IJU instead became the junior partner in an alliance with the Haqqani network and Al-Qaeda.¹⁶⁹

Despite its apparent focus on global *jihad*, the IJU true to its allegiance to Waziristani militants remained engaged in hostilities with Pakistani security forces. In October 2006, three Pakistanis trained and supported by the IJU went so far as to attempt improvised explosive devices (IED) attacks on government targets in the Pakistani capital of Islamabad.¹⁷⁰ In October 2007, the Pakistan Army launched an offensive against Uzbek fighters in North Waziristan. The IJU was also active elsewhere in Pakistan. The group claimed to have attacked Pakistani military targets in Swat in late 2007.¹⁷¹

WANNABE TALIBAN AND CRIMINAL GANGS WITH ISLAMIC PRETENTIONS

In Khyber Agency, several minor extremist groups emerged: the *Amr bi'l-Maruf wa Nahi an al-Munkar*, *Ansar ul-Islam* and *Lashkar-e Islam*. All were fundamentally criminal gangs formed and led by pious individuals from outside the region and independent of most tribal affiliations. They all operated on both sides of the border and used Islam as a pretext for their activities. All employed dedicated FM radio broadcasts that aimed to convince the listeners of the group's religious credentials. Many also claimed to be Taliban to gain increased respect and prestige.

The *Amr bi'l-Maruf wa Nahi an al-Munkar* ("Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice"), so named after the religious police of the Afghan Taliban government and the religious police of Saudi Arabia, was formed in 2003 by Haji Namdar (1968-2008), a local who had spent ten years in Saudi Arabia as a migrant worker and during this time overheard so many religious discussions that having returned home, he appointed himself a guardian of religious purity. The formation of the TTP inspired him to intensify his activities. Haji Namdar thus became a rival of the TTP, which subsequently had him killed. He was succeeded by one Haji Hukam Khan.¹⁷²

The *Ansar ul-Islam* ("Helpers of Islam") was formed in 2004 or 2005 by Pir Saifur Rehman, a Barelvi preacher who came from Afghanistan but reportedly had lived in the Khyber Agency since 1977 and who at first enjoyed the support of Haji Namdar. In 2006, he was forced out of the region and reportedly moved to Punjab. The group then became led by Qazi Mehbub ul-Haq.¹⁷³

The *Lashkar-e Islam* ("Army of Islam") was established in 2004 or 2005 by Mufti Munir Shakir, another extremist preacher but one reportedly of the Wahhabi persuasion, in opposition to Pir Saifur Rehman. Shakir, who previously had lived outside the region, probably in Karachi, was also forced out in 2006, then arrested in 2007.¹⁷⁴ Shakir was replaced by Manghal Bagh Afridi, a former bus conductor (in his own words, he was in the transport business with several vehicles of his own¹⁷⁵). His organisation was fundamentally a criminal gang which posed as a religious movement. The group made substantial profits from smuggling and kidnappings, which made it a force to be reckoned with in the Khyber as well as in neighbouring cities such as Peshawar. By 2009, Manghal Bagh also maintained cordial relations with TTP leader Hakimullah Mehsud.¹⁷⁶

In Bajaur, a branch of the TTP was led by Maulana Faqir Muhammad (born c. 1970, reportedly killed in an air strike in March 2010). Faqir Muhammad was reportedly close to Al-Qaeda and other foreign extremists in the area, as well as with the Afghan Taliban.¹⁷⁷ In 2008, he famously told a reporter that "(i)f we get hold of nuclear weapons - which we hope to get very soon - then we will safeguard them until Allah Almighty guides us when and against whom to use them."¹⁷⁸ In 2008-2009, a dispute over funds arose within Faqir Muhammad's TTP, which resulted in several breakaway factions, including one called *Jaish-e Islami* ("Islamic Army") under Waliur Rehman, who in addition enjoyed the support of the JUI faction of Fazlur Rahman.¹⁷⁹ Another was henceforth called *Tehrik-e Taliban al-Jihad* ("Movement of Jihad Taliban"), under Salar Masood and Ismael Khan.¹⁸⁰ Finally, there was the *Karwan-e Niamatullah* ("Niamatullah's Caravan"), a group appropriately led by Haji Niamatullah. A powerful group in the mid-2000s, it fragmented and virtually disappeared in 2008-2009.¹⁸¹ Other groups too existed in Bajaur, including the HuJI which maintained a presence there.¹⁸² So did the Qari Zia Group. This was a faction of the Afghan Taliban led by Qari Ziaur Rehman from Kunar province in Afghanistan, a commander associated with Mullah Omar and the Afghan Taliban at Quetta. However, he was reportedly killed in March 2010 in a fight with the Pakistan Army, after which his group faded away.¹⁸³

There were also Taliban groups in the NWFP, or KPP as the province in 2010 was renamed following a provincial assembly resolution in 2003. There Maulana, or Mullah, Fazlullah of Swat headed an extremist madrasah. The son-in-law of Sufi Muhammad, he early on became the

leader of the Swat branch of the TNSM.¹⁸⁴ Then, inspired by the Afghan Taliban, he rose to prominence in 2005 by ordering his followers to shut down music shops and barber shops, forbid local people from sending their daughters to school, and insisted of the full application of his understanding of Islamic law. From 2006, he also aired extremist sermons and propaganda from local radio stations so that he soon became known as Mullah Radio. Then he and his followers began to terrorise the locals through beheadings and other acts of terrorism. As a result, Pakistani security forces in late 2007 moved into Swat to deal with the situation.¹⁸⁵ This changed little, and by 2008, Swat women had to cover themselves fully. Locals, including women, first adored Maulana Fazlullah. "He was mesmerizing, a great orator. We can't speak like him" a Swat woman later explained her feelings about Fazlullah, feelings which she said then changed as the beheadings began.¹⁸⁶

In February 2009, the Swat Taliban of Mullah Fazlullah first secured control of the region in a peace accord with the Pakistan army, then lost most of the territory when the army subsequently launched a three-month campaign against them.¹⁸⁷

THE STATE BANS ITS ALLIES AND SUPPORTERS; NETWORKS GROW INCREASINGLY LOOSE

Meanwhile, developments had also occurred on the extremist scene in Punjab. On 13 December 2001, Islamic extremists carried out an attack on the Indian Parliament in New Delhi. India accused the JeM and LeT of having carried out the operation. Both countries mobilized and there was a distinct risk of war. Pakistani police on 30 December 2001 reported the arrest of Hafiz Saeed, the head of the LeT, and more than a dozen members of this group and JeM.¹⁸⁸

But more was to follow. On 12 January 2002, Pakistani leader Musharraf in a speech, which some diplomats politely referred to as historic, stated that Pakistan no longer would cultivate extremism. Musharraf also unveiled plans and new regulation to eradicate terrorism and extremism from Pakistani society, conceded to most of the demands made by India since the attack on the Indian parliament, and announced an immediate ban on several *jihadi* organisations (the JeM, LeT, SPP, LeJ, HuM, and TNSM were affected by the ban), their leaders were detained, and in case of Indian Muslims, but not Pakistani citizens, reportedly extradited to India. More than 700 people were detained,

including hundreds of Pakistan-based Kashmiri militants, many of whom were members of two banned groups.¹⁸⁹ Eventually as many as 2,000 militants were arrested, of whom about half remained in custody by late May 2002.¹⁹⁰

This, however, only resulted in the formation of new militant groups. Disgruntled members of the banned organisation joined in loosely based networks, under a number of charismatic leaders, to continue the struggle. However, since they henceforth were operating against the interests of the Pakistani state, the new groups, unlike the old, recognized organisations, did not have the luxury to form permanent associations with known headquarters. They became terrorist groups, pure and simple.

Some members from the banned groups in October 2001 joined with other extremists, including perhaps fugitive elements of Al-Qaeda and possibly even the Taliban, in a new coalition of extremist organisations known as *Lashkar-e Omar* ("Army of Omar"). The new coalition declared *jihad* against President Musharraf and declared that Pakistan was an infidel country (in its words, belonged to the house of *kufir*). The group was likely responsible for, among others, attacks on churches and the bombing of the American consulate in Karachi on 14 June 2002.¹⁹¹

In 2002, a similar loose outfit known as the *Harakat ul-Mujahidin al-Alamiya* ("Movement of Global Mujahidin") was formed under Muhammad Imran and Asif Zaheer. The group was suspected of several 2002 terror plots in Karachi, including a failed one to assassinate Musharraf.¹⁹² In the early 2000s, it was believed that this name would henceforth be used for the entire HuM movement, or even that the new group would administer the other, banned factions.¹⁹³ However, nothing came out of this and there was likely few links between the original HuM and the new group.

Yet another similar group, recruited from the same loose networks but under different charismatic leadership, was the *Muslim United Army*, under first Asif Ramzi (killed 2002), then one Sheikh Ahmed.¹⁹⁴

Then came *Brigade 313* (so named after the number of companions of the Prophet Muhammad at the celebrated Battle of Badr in 624). This was a loose alliance which consisted of the same or yet more disgruntled members of the banned groups, but this time probably with links to the HuJI. Reportedly formed in late 2001 to avenge the American attack on Afghanistan, the group was later linked to the 25 December 2003 two-person suicide attack on Musharraf.¹⁹⁵ The *Brigade 313* was led by Ilyas

Kashmiri (1964-2011), a HuJI veteran from the Afghan war and a former field commander in Kashmir.¹⁹⁶ There were also claims that Ilyas Kashmiri was first the operational chief of the HuJI in Pakistan-held Kashmir, and then Al-Qaeda's head of military operations.¹⁹⁷ However, the very vagueness of these asserted allegiances were indicative of how individual extremists moved from group to group, depending on personal circumstances and loyalties.

Yet another new group was *Jundullah* ("Army of God").¹⁹⁸ This group, founded in 2003 by Attaur Rehman who had a master's degree in statistics from Karachi University, consisted of educated middle-class professionals, including lawyers and doctors, who had a background within the JI and had trained in South Waziristan. Attaur Rehman had fought with the Afghan Taliban and had after their expulsion from Afghanistan assisted Al-Qaeda in organising a support network in Karachi. Indeed, Jundullah was formed in response to the arrest of several Al-Qaeda operatives including Khalid Sheikh Muhammad. On 9 June 2004, Jundullah struck against a senior military commander in Karachi. Jundullah also carried out lethal attacks on the American consulate, a Christian group, and a peace concert. Yet more disturbing, Karachi police estimated that Jundullah was only one out of two dozen similar, unknown groups operating in Karachi with membership taken from well-educated Pakistanis with no previous connection to madrasahs or extremists.¹⁹⁹ Although Attaur Rehman and the other members of the first Jundullah in Karachi were soon apprehended, by 2010 a second Jundullah was reportedly at work in Karachi and Lahore, this time attacking Shia Muslims. Certain associates of Attaur Rehman suspected of involvement in the first Jundullah were acquitted and released in 2006, and at least one of them later shifted his activities to South Waziristan, suggesting a link with the TTP.²⁰⁰ At least with regard to the group's choice of operations, one could sense a certain similarity to the LeJ.

Although the American invasion of Afghanistan and the perceived acquiescence of the Pakistani government had shocked many extremists, what really turned them against the state was the July 2007 affair of the Red Mosque (or Lal Masjid) in Islamabad. The Red Mosque had developed into a major stronghold of Islamic extremism and militancy. The mosque was subsequently found to contain a substantial arsenal ranging from sophisticated personal weapons and RPGs to homemade bombs. In July 2007, an armed confrontation took place between extremists and government forces, in which the mosque's leader,

Maulana Abdul Rashid Ghazi, was killed and more than a hundred people died.²⁰¹ In response, Osama bin Laden in an audio message released on 20 September 2007 urged the Muslims in Pakistan to wage *jihād* against President Musharraf, declaring him and his soldiers “apostates” - his first direct threat against Musharraf - and vowed that Al-Qaeda would take revenge.²⁰² In 2010, Al-Qaeda produced its first video in Urdu, in which the group offered religious reasons to motivate all Muslims not only to fight the Pakistani President but also the entire Pakistani state and army, the members of both of which were branded as apostates and infidels.²⁰³

Since the various outfits that had taken up arms against the Pakistani state were Punjabi groups, they eventually became popularly known as Punjabi Taliban, in imitation of the Pakistani Taliban along the border with Afghanistan. The term Punjabi Taliban was since about 2009 widely used for those militant extremist groups that originated and chiefly operated from Punjab. However, there was no unified Punjabi Taliban command as such, and whether its members used the term remained unclear.²⁰⁴ What was certain, however, was that members of the various extremist groups, whether banned or not, were maintaining increasingly close alliances. No longer was a member of one group restricted to its particular ideology or leadership. Individuals moved between groups on an individual basis and so did weapons, tactics, methodology, ideology, funding, and even training.²⁰⁵ The evolution of the extremist groups in Pakistan thus followed the same pattern of development that characterised extremist groups elsewhere, away from centralised command towards fluid networks of like-minded individuals. The trend away from centralised command was presumably aggravated by the many quarrels and rivalries that for decades were displayed by the various groups and sects.²⁰⁶

This also meant that the established trend of Pakistani extremist groups operating in distinct geographic and functional spheres, as explicitly or implicitly directed by the Pakistani state, had broken down. So had the practice of separating Pakistanis who wanted to fight in Kashmir and Afghanistan from foreign extremists who desired a global *jihād*.

By early 2010, a splinter faction of LeJ known as *Lashkar-e Jhangvi al-Alamiya* (“Global Army of Jhangvi”) was active in North Waziristan. Operating under the name *Asian Tigers*, this group in March 2010 kidnapped two former ISI agents, including the old *jihadi* hero from the

Soviet Afghan war, Colonel Imam. Accused of spying, the two ISI men were executed, the latter in February 2011 upon orders of none less than Hakimullah Mehsud.²⁰⁷ Clearly, the much younger Hakimullah Mehsud had little regard for heroes of previous *jihadi* wars.

CONCLUSION

The Pakistani state for years tolerated armed extremist groups because they were regarded as strategic assets. It was believed that the extremist groups could be controlled, assigned suitable outlets for their energy and ambitions, such as Afghanistan or Kashmir, and thus support the state. A taxonomy of the main extremist groups, as presented here, shows the activities and areas of operation intended for each of them. Unfortunately for Pakistan and the world, most extremists were not content to act as the state's pawns. They began to expand their activities. This too is evident from the taxonomy, when analysed from a historiographical perspective. Under international pressure since 2001, the Pakistani state and its security forces made half-hearted attempts to curb the activities of the most violent extremist groups. These efforts did not succeed. Except for a few aged, high-level extremist leaders, such as Hafiz Saeed of the LeT, who had come to appreciate the privileged standing in society afforded them through the state's tolerance of their activities, the new government policy only angered the extremists.

In particular, the young generation of militant leaders reacted violently, as exemplified by Attaur Rehman. This resulted in a reckless growth of new militant groups. They did not fit into the neat pattern of the old taxonomy, so the Pakistani state knew not how to deal with them. While most of the old groups had been supportive of the Pakistani state, and the LeT had been content to remain the junior partner, under ISI control, in an alliance with the state, the new groups did not. Yet worse, ambitious newcomers such as Hakimullah Mehsud and his associates managed to combine organised crime with religious extremism and fervour into what can only be described as a cult that valued nothing higher than violence and death. These young men respected none of the professed ideals of the Pakistani state, except the duty of everlasting *jihad*. A dilemma thus emerged for the Pakistani state and its security forces: there was no longer anybody among the most radical extremists who would take orders. The man in uniform, that is, the Pakistan Army, was no longer supreme. Since the extremists controlled vast tracts of

Figure 1
Major Islamic Extremist and Terrorist Groups in Pakistan, 1980 – Undermining Afghanistan

State relationship / Sectarian Allegiance	Preaching (State Agenda)	Militant Activities					
		State Agenda			Independent Agenda		
		Pakistan	Afghanistan	Kashmir	All India	Pakistan	Global
Ideological Foundation	Ji						
Support (primarily abroad) / Deobandi	HuJi	HuJi					
Support (primarily sectarian, anti-Shia, Deobandi)							
Ally / Wahhabi							
Rival							
Explanation: Ji – <i>Jamaat-e Islami</i> ; HuJi = <i>Harakat ul-Jihad al-Islami</i>							

Figure 2
Major Islamic Extremist and Terrorist Groups in Pakistan 1984 – Sectarian Violence

State relationship / Sectarian Allegiance	Preaching (State Agenda)	Militant Activities					
		State Agenda			Independent Agenda		
		Pakistan	Afghanistan	Kashmir	All India	Pakistan	Global
Ideological Foundation	Ji						
Support (primarily abroad) / Deobandi	HuJI						
Support (primarily sectarian, anti-Shia, Deobandi)	SSP	SSP					
Ally / Wahhabi							
Rival							
Explanation: Ji – <i>Jamaat-e Islami</i> ; HuJI = <i>Harakat ul-Jihad al-Islami</i> ; SSP= <i>Sepah-e Sahaba Pakistan</i>							

Figure 3
Major Islamic Extremist and Terrorist Groups in Pakistan 1989 – Undermining Kashmir

State relationship / Sectarian Allegiance	Preaching (State Agenda)	Militant Activities				
		State Agenda		Independent Agenda		
		Pakistan	Afghanistan	Kashmir	All India	Pakistan
Ideological Foundation	Ji/HM			HM		
Support (primarily abroad) / Deobandi	HuJI, HuM					
Support (primarily sectarian, anti-Shia, Deobandi)	SSP					
Ally / Wahhabi	LeT					
Rival						TNSM

Explanation: Ji – *Jamaat-e Islami*; HM = *Hizb ul-Mujahideen*; HuM = *Harkat ul-Mujahideen*;
HuJI = *Harakat ul-Jihad al-Islami*; SSP = *Sepah-e Sahaba Pakistan*; LeT = *Lashkar-e Tayyeba*
(now *Jamaat ud-Dawa*); TNSM = *Tehrik-e Nifaz-e Shariat-e Muhammadi*

Figure 4
Major Islamic Extremist and Terrorist Groups in Pakistan 1993 – Undermining Kashmir

State relationship / Sectarian Allegiance	Preaching (State Agenda)	Militant Activities					
		State Agenda			Independent Agenda		
		Pakistan	Afghanistan	Kashmir	All India	Pakistan	Global
Ideological Foundation	Ji/HM			HM			
Support (primarily abroad) / Deobandi	HuM, HuJI		(HuJI, HuM)	HuM, HuJI			
Support (primarily sectarian, anti-Shia, Deobandi)	SSP	SSP					
Ally / Wahhabi	LeT		(LeT)	LeT	LeT?		
Rival						TNSM	

Explanation: Ji – *Jamaat-e Islami*; HM= *Hizb ul-Mujahideen*; HuM= *Harkat ul-Mujahideen*; HuJI = *Harakat ul-Jihad al-Islami*; SSP= *Sepah-e Sahaba Pakistan*; LeT= *Lashkar-e Tayyeba* (now *Jamaat ud-Dawa*); TNSM= *Tehrik-e Nifaz-e Shariat-e Muhammadi*; ()= no longer active

Figure 5
Major Islamic Extremist and Terrorist Groups in Pakistan 1998 – Undermining Kashmir and Attempted Control of Afghanistan

State relationship / Sectarian Allegiance	Preaching (State Agenda)	Militant Activities					
		State Agenda			Independent Agenda		
		Pakistan	Afghanistan	Kashmir	All India	Pakistan	Global
Ideological Foundation	Jl/HM			HM			
Support (primarily abroad) / Deobandi	HuM, HuJI	HuM	HuM, HuJI, al Badr	HuM, HuJI, HuJI?	HuM, HuJI?		HuM HuJI?
Support (primarily sectarian, anti-Shia, Deobandi)	SSP / LeJ	SSP/LeJ	SSP/ LeJ				
Ally / Wahhabi	LeT		LeT	LeT?			LeT
Rival						TNSM	

Explanation: JI – *Jamaat-e Islami*; HM= *Hizb ul-Mujahideen*; HuM= *Harkat ul-Mujahideen*; HuJI = *Harakat ul-Jihad al-Islami*; SSP= *Sepah-e Sahaba Pakistan*; LeJ= *Lashkar-e Jhangvi*; LeT= *Lashkar-e Tayyeba* (now *Jamaat ud-Dawa*); TNSM= *Tehrik-e Nifaz-e Shariat-e Muhammadi*

Figure 6
Major Islamic Extremist and Terrorist Groups in Pakistan 2002 –
Disaffected Rivals to Statepower Appear

State relationship / Sectarian Allegiance	Preaching (State Agenda)	Militant Activities					
		State Agenda			Independent Agenda		
		Pakistan	Afghanistan	Kashmir	All India	Pakistan	Global
Ideological Foundation	JJ/HM			HM			
Support (primarily abroad) / Deobandi	HuM, HuJI	(HuM)		HuM, HuJI, Al-Badr	HuM HuJI		HuM HuJI?
Support (primarily sectarian, anti-Shia, Deobandi)	SSP/LeJ JeM	SSP/LeJ			JeM	JeM	JeM, et al.
Ally / Wahhabi	LeT	LeT?		LeT	LeT		LeT
		(TNSM)				(TNSM)	
		Haqqani Network				Haqqani Network	
Rival		AQ					AQ
		Afghan Taliban					
		IMU, IJU, et al.					IMU, IJU, et al.

Explanation: JJ – *Jamaat-e Islami*; HM = *Hizb ul-Mujahideen*; HuM = *Harkat ul-Mujahideen*;
HuJI = *Harakat ul-Jihad al-Islami*; SSP = *Sepah-e Sahaba Pakistan*; LeJ = *Lashkar-e Jhangvi*;
JeM = *Jatish-e Muhammad* (now *Khudam ul-Islam*); LeT = *Lashkar-e Tayyeba* (now *Jamaat ud-Dawa*);
TNSM = *Tehrik-e Nifaz-e Shariat-e Muhammadi*; AQ = *Al Qaeda*;
IMU = *Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan*; IJU = *Islamic Jihad Union*; () = no longer active

Figure 7
Major Islamic Extremist and Terrorist Groups in Pakistan 2007 – First Recognized Pakistan Taliban Appear

State relationship / Sectarian Allegiance	Preaching (State Agenda)	Militant Activities					
		State Agenda			Independent Agenda		
		Pakistan	Afghanistan	Kashmir	All India	Pakistan	Global
Ideological Foundation	Ji/HM			HM			
Support (primarily abroad) / Deobandi	HuM, HuJI			HuM, HuJI, Al-Badr	HuM, HuJI	HuM, HuJI	HuM, HuJI
Support (primarily sectarian, anti-Shia, Deobandi)	SSP/LeJ JeM				JeM	JeM, et al.	
Ally / Wahhabi	LeT			LeT	LeT		LeT
						(TNSM)	
		Haqqani Network				Haqqani Network	
Rival		TTP				TTP	
		AQ					AQ
		Afghan Taliban					
		IMU, IJU, et al.					IMU, et al.

Explanation: Ji – *Jamaat-e Islami*; HM = *Hizb ul-Mujahideen*; HuM = *Harkat ul-Mujahideen*; HuJI = *Harakat ul-Jihad al-Islami*; SSP = *Sepah-e Sahaba Pakistan*; LeJ = *Lashkar-e Jhangvi*; JeM = *Jaiash-e Muhammad* (now *Khudam ul-Islam*); LeT = *Lashkar-e Tayyeba* (now *Jamaat ud-Dawa*); TNSM = *Tehrik-e Nifaz-e Shariat-e Muhammadi*; TTP = *Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan*; AQ = *Al Qaeda*; IMU = *Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan*; IJU: *Islamic Jihad Union*; () = no longer active

Figure 8
Major Islamic Extremist and Terrorist Groups in Pakistan 2011

State relationship / Sectarian Allegiance	Preaching (State Agenda)	Militant Activities					
		State Agenda				Independent Agenda	
		Pakistan	Afghanistan	Kashmir	All India	Pakistan	Global
Ideological Foundation	JI/HM			HM			
Support (primarily abroad) / Deobandi	HuM, HuJI		(HuM)	HuM, HuJI, Al-Badr	HuM, HuJI	HuM, HuJI	HuM, HuJI
Support (primarily sectarian, anti-Shia, Deobandi)	SSP/LeJ	SSP/LeJ	(SSP/LeJ)				
	JeM	JeM	JeM	JeM	JeM	JeM, et al.	
Ally / Wahhabi	LeT		LeT	LeT	LeT?		LeT
Rival		(TNSM)				(TNSM)	
		Haqqani Network				Haqqani Network	
		TTP				TTP	TTP
		AQ					AQ
		Afghan Taliban					
		IMU, IJU, et al.					IMU, IJU, et al.

Explanation: JI = *Jamaat-e Islami*; HM = *Hizb ul-Mujahideen*; HuM = *Harkat ul-Mujahideen*; HuJI = *Harakat ul-Jihad al-Islami*; SSP = *Sepah-e Sahaba Pakistan*; LeJ = *Lashkar-e Jhangvi*; JeM = *Jaish-e Muhammad* (now *Khudam ul-Islam*); LeT = *Lashkar-e Tayyeba* (now *Jamaat ud-Dawa*); TNSM = *Tehrik-e Nifaz-e Shariat-e Muhammadi*; TTP = *Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan*; AQ = *Al Qaeda*; IMU = *Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan*; IJU = *Islamic Jihad Union*; () = no longer active

land, the state to its surprise found that it had lost sovereignty on its own territory. What use were Pakistan's nuclear weapons, if its most dangerous enemy was already inside the national borders? To add injury to insult, the armed groups were armed, ready, and eager to fight whoever they regarded as intruders.

History shows few if any lasting state formations, based on nothing but a religious identity. There have to be other unifying factors as well, such as a shared language, ethnic identity, or common values. Few of these are evident in twenty-first-century Pakistan. Whether Pakistan will be able to celebrate its hundred-year-anniversary as a unified state yet remains to be seen.

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 21. Cooley, *Unholy Wars*, p. 82; Ahmed, "Islamic Fundamentalism," p. 510.
 22. Simon Reeve, *The New Jackals: Ramzi Yousef, Osama bin Laden and the Future of Terrorism* (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1999), p.224.
 23. Roland Jacquard, *In the Name of Osama Bin Laden: Global Terrorism and the Bin Laden Brotherhood* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2002), p. 49.
 24. Stephen Schwartz, "Recruiters for Jihad," *Weekly Standard* (New York), 28 January 2002, pp. 21-22. An earlier success was the conversion to Islam of the British rock musician Cat Stevens, now known as Yusuf Islam. *Economist*, 3 November 2001. See also the website, www.yusufislam.org.uk.
 25. Fernando Reinares, *A New Composite Global Terrorism Threat to Western Societies from Pakistan? Making Sense of the January 2008 Suidice Bomb Plot in Barcelona* (Elcano Royal Institute, Working Paper 28, 2010).
 26. Petition filed by Lt Gen (Retd) Javed Nasir, Former Director General, Inter Services Intelligence, Pakistan, before the Anti Terrorism Court, Lahore, 23 October 2002. In his petition, Nasir also took some pride in 1983 having been the first Pakistani general with a full beard. See also Ahmed Rashid, "Pakistan and the Taliban," William Maley (ed), *Fundamentalism Reborn? Afghanistan and the Taliban* (New York: New York University Press, 1998), pp. 72-89.
 27. The emphasis on Islamic purity resulted in the formation of many additional groups and movements in addition to the JI. It was particularly Deobandi ones that grew common. One such was the *Tanzim ul-Ikhwan* ("Movement of the Brotherhood"), established in 1986. This was another Islamic mass movement, led by Maulana Muhammad Akram Awan. Deriving from the Sufi order *Naqshbandiyyah* but far more Deobandi in character, it drew its main strength from Punjab and also included numerous army officers. Many of its members fought in Afghanistan and Kashmir, often as an auxiliary source of men to *Lashkar-e Tayyeba* (see below), but the movement did not function as an independent force for *jihād*. Yet, the leadership of the movement acknowledged its participation in

- these conflicts and in 1999 formally set up what it referred to as its *jihad* wing. See Rana, *A to Z of Jehadi Organizations*, pp. 174-182. By early 2001, the movement had a major training camp near Islamabad from which it tried to influence the government. *Tribune* (Chandigarh), 11 January 2001 (www.tribuneindia.com).
28. Rana, *A to Z of Jehadi Organizations*, pp. 263-264; South Asia Terrorism Portal website, www.satp.org, run by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi. Indeed, one faction of this group, the *Jamiat ul-Mujahidin al-Alamiya* ("Society of Global Mujahidin"), has expressed the somewhat unlikely claim to have begun operations already in March 1973. Rana, *A to Z of Jehadi Organizations*, pp. 279-283. This was the foundation date of a *madrassah* in which Fazlur Rehman Khalil studied. Mariam Abou Zahab and Olivier Roy, *Islamist Networks: The Afghan-Pakistan Connection* (London: Hurst & Company, 2004), p. 27 n.2.
 29. Rana, *A to Z of Jehadi Organizations*, pp. 263-270, 581.
 30. *Ibid*, pp. 159, 244, 249-262, 580-581.
 31. South Asia Terrorism Portal website, www.satp.org.
 32. Rana, *A to Z of Jehadi Organizations*, pp. 31, 245-246.
 33. *Ibid*, p. 21.
 34. *Ibid*, pp. 245, 269.
 35. The HuJI and HuM were, e.g., suspected of attempting the assassination of the celebrated Bangladeshi poet Samsur Rahman on 18 January 1999. Police afterwards arrested one Pakistani and one South African, who told investigators that they had received financial support from Osama bin Laden for training and recruiting fighters in Bangladesh. Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism 1999* (Washington, DC: Department of State, 2000); Rohan Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror* (London: Hurst & Company, 2002), pp. 219-220.
 36. Kronstadt and Vaughn, *Terrorism in South Asia* (2004), p. 34. On terrorist groups in Bangladesh, where several Pakistani militant groups have been active in addition to the HuJI, see Mansi Mehrotra, "Terrorism in Bangladesh: A Security Threat for India," *Himalayan and Central Asian Studies*, Vol. 13, No. 4, 2009, pp. 95-119.
 37. Qari Saifullah Akhtar (b. 1958 in South Waziristan) was allegedly among the first Pakistani militants involved in the 1979-1989 Afghan war. He took control of the HuJI when the group's leader was killed fighting in Afghanistan in 1985. In the *Harakat ul-Ansar*, he was reportedly the deputy leader under Fazlur Rehman Khalil (Bahukutumbi Raman, "Why Amjad Farooqi Had to Die," *Asia Times*, 30 September 2004; www.atimes.com). In 1995, he was involved with senior military officers in a plot to overthrow the Pakistani government. The plot failed, Akhtar was arrested, but in 1996 released after testifying against his co-conspirators. He then moved to Kandahar in 1996 where he joined Mullah Omar and the Taliban. He fled from Afghanistan in late 2001. Being implicated in two attempts to assassinate Pakistani President Musharraf in December 2003, Akhtar fled to first Saudi Arabia, then Dubai where he in August 2004 was detained and deported to Pakistan, where he was held without trial until May 2007. He was reportedly implicated in the failed October 2007 suicide attack in Karachi that aimed to assassinate the leading opposition politician Benazir Bhutto, which led to another period of detention from February to June 2008. He was then reportedly a key leader in the September 2008 Marriott Hotel suicide bombing in Islamabad. In 2010, he was again detained in Pakistan from August to December. Bill Roggio, "Pakistan Releases Top Al Qaeda-linked Terrorist Leader," *Long War Journal* (www.longwarjournal.org), 4 January 2011. Akhtar has been associated with a group known as *Harakat ul-Jihad al-Islami al-Alamiya* ("Movement of Global Islamic

- Jihad*”).
38. Rana, *A to Z of Jehadi Organizations*, pp. 265-283, 485. The global claims are reprinted on p.268.
 39. In July 1995, six foreign tourists (of American, British, German, and Norwegian origin) were kidnapped and, except one who escaped, eventually killed by what was referred to as the Al-Farhan, believed to be a wing of the *Harakat ul-Ansar*. Victoria Schofield, *Kashmir in the Crossfire* (London: I. B. Tauris & Co, 1996), pp. 281-282; Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda*, pp. 213-214; Rana, *A to Z of Jehadi Organizations*, pp. 219, 246-247.
 40. In February 1998, Osama bin Laden chaired a meeting in Afghanistan with several other Islamic extremist leaders, including Ayman al-Zawahiri, head of *Egyptian Islamic Jihad*; Abu Yassir Rifai Ahmad Taha, head of *Egypt's Islamic Society*; Fazlur Rehman Khalil, the leader of the Pakistani extremist movement *Harakat ul-Ansar* (“Movement of Helpers”); Sheikh Abdul Salam Muhammad, a leader of HuJI in Bangladesh; and Sheikh Mir Hamzah, secretary of the *Jamiat-e Ulama-ye Pakistan* (“Society of Pakistani Religious Scholars”). For the full text of the fatwa, see Reeve, *New Jackals*, pp. 268-270; FAS Intelligence Resource Program (www.fas.org). The *Jamiat-e Ulama-ye Pakistan* was established in 1948 but later split into several factions. Rana, *A to Z of Jehadi Organizations*, pp. 354-9.
 41. On 24 December 1999, Indian Airlines flight IC-814 was hijacked by men associated with the HuM and flown to Afghanistan. On 30 December 1999, India agreed to release HuM leader Maulana Masood Azhar and two followers in exchange for the hostages. Bergen, *Holy War*, pp. 208-212; Rana, *A to Z of Jehadi Organizations*, pp. 35-44; Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism 1994* (Washington, DC: Department of State, April 1995). The two followers were Mushtak Ahmed Zargar, leader of *Al-Umar*, an extremist group in Kashmir, and Ahmad Omar Said Sheikh (b. 1973), a British citizen of Pakistani origin who had studied at the London School of Economics. The latter claimed to have been recruited by the ISI in London in the mid-1990s, was jailed following a bungled kidnapping of several Western tourists in 1994, may have served as a financial adviser to Al-Qaida, and was involved in the kidnapping and murder of the American journalist Daniel Pearl on 23 January 2002. Roland Jacquard, *Les archives secrètes d'Al-Qaida: Révélation sur les héritiers de Ben Laden* (Paris: Jean Picollec, 2002), p. 85 n.7; *Times of India*, 10 October 2001; Rana, *A to Z of Jehadi Organizations*, pp. 45-56. Omar Sheikh was subsequently found guilty and sentenced to death. Judgement of the Anti-Terrorism Court, Hyderabad, Sindh, Pakistan, in the Daniel Pearl case, 15 July 2002.
 42. Rana, *A to Z of Jehadi Organizations*, p. 258.
 43. Kenneth Katzman, *Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2001* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 10 September 2001), p. 15.
 44. Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda*, p. 209; citing a 2 May 2001 HuM statement.
 45. Rana, *A to Z of Jehadi Organizations*, pp. 255, 258.
 46. See, e.g., Kronstadt and Vaughn, *Terrorism in South Asia* (2004), p. 12; AP, 15 June 2011. Fazlur Rehman Khalil was reportedly placed under house arrest in August 2002. Rana, *A to Z of Jehadi Organizations*, p. 258.
 47. Rana, *A to Z of Jehadi Organizations*, pp. 23, 262. HuM's offices in Punjab and Sindh remained open until February 2002, while those in the NWFP and Pakistan-held Kashmir remained open until April 2002. The group maintained a website, www.harkatulmujahideen.org.

48. Rana, *A to Z of Jehadi Organizations*, pp. 157, 160-167.
49. Ahmed Rashid, "The Taliban: Exporting Extremism," *Foreign Affairs*, November/December 1999, pp. 22-35; Rashid, *Taliban*, pp. 187, 194-195.
50. Rana, *A to Z of Jehadi Organizations*, pp. 193-203, 211-213, 582-583.
51. Zahab and Roy, *Islamist Networks*, 24-5, 56.
52. Rashid, *Taliban*, 92; Rana, *A to Z of Jehadi Organizations*, 203-211, 583.
53. Rana, *A to Z of Jehadi Organizations*, 207; South Asia Terrorism Portal website, www.satp.org.
54. South Asia Terrorism Portal website, www.satp.org.
55. *Ibid.*
56. See, e.g., *Express Tribune*, 3 May 2011 (<http://tribune.com.pk>). The term *sunnah*, here translated as Beaten Path, signified the worldwide community of Muslims. The new name of the SSP was in the mid-1990s used by a small extremist group (*Ahl-e Sunnah W'al Jamaat*) of Sunni Muslims from Iran, then based at Herat under Taliban protection and vehemently opposed to Shia Islam. Rashid, *Taliban*, p. 203.
57. Zahab and Roy, *Islamist Networks*, pp. 28-32; Rana, *A to Z of Jehadi Organizations*, pp. 30, 214-244, 485; *Economist*, 18 January 2003. The Jaish-e Muhammad maintained a website, www.jaish-e-muhammad.org. For a reported narrative of Masood Azhar's life in his own words, see Rana, *A to Z of Jehadi Organizations*, pp. 29-40. Following the ban of the JeM, Masood Azhar was eventually placed under house arrest, although he was released in early 2003.
58. Zahab and Roy, *Islamist Networks*, pp. 31-32.
59. *Daily Times*, 22 November 2003 (www.dailytimes.com.pk).
60. *Ibid.*
61. Rana, *A to Z of Jehadi Organizations*, pp. 23-26, 264, 579-580.
62. That JeM bases for operations in Afghanistan were established under the protection of the TTP (see below) was confirmed by TTP spokesman Maulavi Omar in May 2008. Claudio Franco, *The Tehrike-e-Taliban Pakistan: The Bajaur Case* (NEFA Foundation, 2009), p. 3.
63. The *Ahl-e Hadith* or *Wahhabi* organisations in Pakistan formed a loose but interconnected group. Oldest was probably the *Jamiat-e Ahl-e Hadith* ("Society of the People of the Prophetic Tradition"), formed in 1918 or 1919 and led by Maulana Muhammad Hussein Sheikhpuri. Rana, *A to Z of Jehadi Organizations*, pp. 301, 346-347. Then there was the closely related *Markaz-e Jamiat-e Ahl-e Hadith* ("Center for the Society of the People of the Prophetic Tradition"), formed in 1956 and since 1997 led by Sajid Mir. *Ibid.*, pp. 298, 301, 303-306, 348-349, 350-351, 582. Yet another was *Jamiat-e Ulama-ye Ahl-e Hadith* ("Society of the Islamic Scholars of the People of the Prophetic Tradition"), formed by Abdul Qadir Khamosh. *Ibid.*, pp. 302, 349. There also existed several factions of these various groups. *Ibid.*, pp. 316, 345-51. International branches existed as well. The Pakistani *Jamiat-e Ahl-e Hadith* and *Markaz-e Jamiat-e Ahl-e Hadith-e Pakistan* both appear to have had close links with a British subsidiary, the *Markazi Jamiat Ahl-e Hadith UK*. The British branch also maintained a book publisher in Birmingham, with websites, www.salafipublications.com; www.salafibookstore.com. There was also a branch of the organisation in the United Arab Emirates. Martin Riexinger, *Sanâ'ullâh Amritsarî (1868-1948) und die Ahl-i-Hadîs im Punjab unter britischer Herrschaft* (Würzburg: Ergon, 2004), pp. 576-577 with notes.
64. Rana, *A to Z of Jehadi Organizations*, pp. 301, 315-327, 339-342; Zahab and Roy, *Islamist Networks*, p. 32.

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65. Rana, *A to Z of Jehadi Organizations*, pp. 315-342, 485, 580. *Tayyiba* ("pure") was an appellation of the holy city Medina. The *Lashkar-e Tayyiba* relied on the website maintained by its parent organisation, www.markazdawa.org (defunct after 2001), and could be reached through the email address markazdawa@hotmail.com.
 66. Evan Kohlmann, *Lashkar-e-Taiba* (Global Terroralert website, www.globalterroralert.com, 2004); citing LeT's *Taiba Bulletin*, 22 April 2001. The document cited has since been republished as *Lashkar-e-Taiba (LET): Eleven Years of Lashker-e-Taiba* (NEFA Foundation).
 67. Rana, *A to Z of Jehadi Organizations*, p. 58.
 68. *Ibid*, p. 302.
 69. It has been suggested that the LeT claims to have been responsible for the 25 January 1990 assassination of five Indian Air Force officers in Indian Kashmir. Rana, *A to Z of Jehadi Organizations*, pp. 318, 329. However, LeT's *Taiba Bulletin*, 22 April 2001 (since republished as *Lashkar-e-Taiba (LET): Eleven Years of Lashker-e-Taiba* (NEFA Foundation)) does not list this as a LeT claim, only a significant incident in the history of the *jihad* in Kashmir.
 70. One of the sources of funding, or at least one of its facilitators, was Sheikh Abu Abdul Aziz (b. 1942 in Saudi Arabia), subsequently known as Barbarossa because of his henna-dyed beard and notoriety for displaying the severed heads of Serbs while fighting in Bosnia in the early 1990s. Evan Kohlmann, *Lashkar-e-Taiba* (Global Terroralert website, www.globalterroralert.com, 2004). On Barbarossa, see Cooley, *Unholy Wars*, pp. 202, 223; Reeve, *New Jackals*, p. 169; Jacquard, *Osama Bin Laden*, pp. 68, 70. Barbarossa seems to have been arrested in Saudi Arabia in early 1996, where he operated under the name Mahmud Abdul Aziz. Bodansky, *Bin Laden*, p. 170.
 71. Rana, *A to Z of Jehadi Organizations*, pp. 318-319, 321-322, 332.
 72. Zaki ur-Rehman Lakhvi was born circa 1961 and known as "Chacha." He was detained in Pakistan on 11 March 2006, and again on 8 December 2008. *Indiaserver.com* (www.india-server.com), 21 July 2009; South Asia Terrorism Portal website, www.satp.org.
 73. Rana, *A to Z of Jehadi Organizations*, pp. 59-60, 317, 328. The organisation then operated a website, www.jamatuddawa.org. Earlier it had also used the websites, www.dawacenter.com and www.jamatdawa.org.
 74. See, e.g., *Washington Post*, 14 January 2002. Rana, *A to Z of Jehadi Organizations*, p. 328, wrongly suggests 13 January.
 75. Hafiz Saeed was on 30 December 2001 placed under house arrest (*International Herald Tribune* (Tokyo), 1 January 2002), where he remained until 31 March 2002. He was then taken back into custody on 15 May 2002, although the government subsequently denied that this had happened. He was again placed under house arrest on 31 October 2002 (*Daily Times*, 12 November 2002 (www.dailytimes.com.pk)), but was ordered released on 18 November 2002 (www.globaljihad.net; South Asia Terrorism Portal website, www.satp.org) and certainly enjoyed freedom of movement by early 2003 (*Economist*, 18 January 2003). Yet another period of house arrest followed from 17-20 February 2006 due to the LeT protests against the Muhammad cartoons published in Denmark in September the previous year (*USA Today*, 17 February 2006 (www.usatoday.com); South Asia Terrorism Portal website, www.satp.org). In conjunction with this, Hafiz Saeed was again detained on 10 August 2006, but released in October 2006 (*Economist*, 21 October 2006). Next period of (this time clearly unenforced) house arrest began on 11 December 2008 and lasted until 2 June 2009 (*New York Times*, 13 December

- 2008; *Economist*, 6 June 2009).
76. Rana, *A to Z of Jehadi Organizations*, p. 60.
77. Peter Chalk and Chris Fair, "Lashkar-e-Tayyiba Leads the Kashmiri Insurgency," *Jane's Intelligence Review* 14: 11 (November 2002), 14-18. Among the group's spokesmen were first Abdullah Muntazir and then the group's information secretary, Yahya Mujahid. Bergen, *Holy War*, p. 39; *International Herald Tribune* (Tokyo), 1 January 2002.
78. See, e.g., Bill Roggio, "UN Declares Jamaat-ud-Dawa a Terrorist Front Group," *Long War Journal*, 11 December 2008 (www.longwarjournal.org). Aliases of the group including *Al-Mansoorain* and others were included as well.
79. *Economic Times* (India), 17 June 2010.
80. *TimeWorld*, 13 May 2009 (www.time.com).
81. *Oneindia News* (<http://news.oneindia.in>), 2 January 2009; Bill Roggio and Kaushik Kapisthaham, "Banned Pakistani Terror Group Re-emerges under New Name," *Long War Journal*, 15 January 2009 (www.longwarjournal.org).
82. Bergen, *Holy War*, pp. 52-53.
83. Rana, *A to Z of Jehadi Organizations*, pp. 298-301; citing a 1999 JuD publication. The LeT called its centre in Lahore "Dar ul-Andalus" because its goal was worldwide.
84. Bahukutumbi Raman, "Kill Pope, Says Lashkar Fatwa," *Rediff India Abroad* (www.rediff.com), 3 October 2006; citing *Ausaf*, 18 September 2006. First published as Bahukutumbi Raman, "LeT Issues Fatwa to Kill the Pope," *International Terrorism Monitor*, Paper 133 on the website of the South Asia Analysis Group (www.saag.org), 2 October 2006. Raman retired circa 2002 from his position as Additional Secretary, head of the counter-terrorism division of the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India.
85. Rana, *A to Z of Jehadi Organizations*, pp. 334-335.
86. *Daily Times*, 31 March 2003 (www.dailytimes.com.pk).
87. The LeT was implicated in the 8 October 2009 attack on the Indian Embassy in Kabul, which killed 17 people, the 15 December 2009 attack in front of Heetal Hotel, then home of nearly two dozen Indian engineers, which killed 8, and the 26 February 2010 suicide attack on two guesthouses in Kabul frequented by Indians, which killed at least 16 people. *New York Times*, 9 October 2009, 16 December 2009, 27 February 2010, 16 June 2010. In comparison, the LeT was not implicated in the 7 July 2008 attack on the Indian Embassy in Kabul, which was believed to be the work of the Haqqani network (see below), which provided the manpower, and the ISI's S Wing, which directed intelligence operations outside of Pakistan, was tasked to provide support to three major insurgent groups in Afghanistan (the Quetta Shura Taliban, *Hizb-e-Islami* of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, and the Haqqani network), and planned the operation. *New York Times*, 1 August 2008, 25 March 2009. That LeT bases for operations in Afghanistan were established under the protection of the TTP was confirmed by TTP spokesman Maulavi Omar in May 2008. Claudio Franco, *The Tehrike-e-Taliban Pakistan: The Bajaur Case* (NEFA Foundation, 2009), p. 3.
88. See, e.g., National Counterterrorism Center, *Counterterrorism Calendar 2010* (www.nctc.gov), p. 116.
89. They were Syed Haris Ahmed and Ehsanul Islam Sadequee, who in 2005 also attempted to set up an "Al-Qaida in Northern Europe" based in Sweden, together with a Swedish national of Serbian origin, Mirsad Bektasevic. FBI press release, 14 December 2009.
90. He first came to the United States in 2000 for a Harvard conference, then stayed

- on as imam of the mosque in Worcester, Massachusetts. His other brother, Hafiz Muhammad Masood, was also in the United States and reportedly risked deportation. *Daily Times*, 7 June 2007 (www.dailytimes.com.pk).
91. Anon., *The Rise of Lashkar-e Tayyiba: A Magnet for American Jihadists* (Washington, DC: IPT, www.investigativeproject.org, 2010). The IPT was founded by Steven Emerson in 1995.
 92. Indonesia: Kronstadt and Vaughn, *Terrorism in South Asia* (2004), p. 12 n.51. Britain: *Sunday Telegraph*, 8 February 2009 (www.telegraph.co.uk). France, Qatar, Syria, and Thailand: Sebastian Rotella, *Pakistan and the Mumbai Attacks: The Untold Story* (np: ProPublica Investigative Reporting, 2011). Saudi Arabia, Germany: South Asia Terrorism Portal website, www.satp.org. For the remaining countries, see sources already mentioned in footnotes.
 93. Admiral Robert Willard, Commander of the US Pacific Command, to the Senate Armed Services Committee, 26 March 2010, not in his prepared (but delayed) speech but in response to a question, as reported by several South Asian news agencies. See, e.g., *South Asia Monitor* (Society for Policy Studies, New Delhi; www.southasiamonitor.org), 29 March 2010. Other sources have corroborated this trend. See, e.g., *Terrorism Monitor* 8: 38 (Jamestown Foundation, 21 October 2010).
 94. Rotella, *Pakistan and the Mumbai Attacks*. The Briton mentioned presumably refers to Omar Khyam, considered by prosecutors to be the ringleader of the group involved in the so-called Crevice Plot.
 95. See, e.g., *Wall Street Journal*, 4 December 2008 (<http://online.wsj.com>); Rotella, *Pakistan and the Mumbai Attacks*.
 96. Brigitte (b. 1968) located and married an Australian convert to Islam, Melanie Brown. She was in the Australian Army, where she belonged to the 7 Signal Regiment which was responsible for electronic warfare. This regiment supported the Defence Signals Directorate (DSD) which was the Australian national agency responsible for signals intelligence and information security. According to her testimony, Brigitte knew of her military specialty and assignment already before the marriage. He also knew about, and expressed an interest in, the Joint Defence Facility Pine Gap in which the DSD cooperated with the American national signals intelligence organisation, the NSA, and which was used, among other tasks, to monitor ballistic missile launches. Transcript of Brown's testimony to the French judge Ricard, 9 February 2004 (Australian Broadcasting Corporation website, www.abc.net.au). The monitoring of ballistic missile launches was not a traditional concern of terrorist groups but something that would surely have interested the ISI, tasked as it was to safeguard the Pakistani nuclear weapons programme.
 97. Government of India, *Mumbai Terrorist Attacks (Nov. 26-29, 2008)*, document handed to Pakistan by the Indian government on 5 January 2009 and posted online by *The Hindu*; Rotella, *Pakistan and the Mumbai Attacks*. The star witness, David Coleman Headley, b. 1960 as Daood Sayed Gilani, had changed his name to hide his Muslim identity. Headley was arrested in Chicago in October 2009 and in March 2010 pleaded guilty to all charges.
 98. *Daily Times*, 19 July 2009 (www.dailytimes.com.pk).
 99. United States of America vs. David Coleman Headley, Plea Agreement 09 CR 830-3 (Northern District of Illinois, 18 March 2010).
 100. United States of America vs. Tahawwur Hussain Rana, Government's Santiago Proffer 09 CR 830 (Northern District of Illinois, 11 April 2011). On methods used by the ISI, see Abu Abdullah bin Adam, *Class Notes from the Security and Intelligence Course* (Waziristan, 2011).

101. United States of America vs. David Coleman Headley, Plea Agreement 09 CR 830-3 (Northern District of Illinois, 18 March 2010).
102. United States of America vs. Tahawwur Hussain Rana, Government's Santiago Proffer 09 CR 830 (Northern District of Illinois, 11 April 2011).
103. United States of America vs. David Coleman Headley, Plea Agreement 09 CR 830-3 (Northern District of Illinois, 18 March 2010).
104. United States of America vs. Tahawwur Hussain Rana, Government's Santiago Proffer 09 CR 830 (Northern District of Illinois, 11 April 2011).
105. Rana, *A to Z of Jehadi Organizations*, pp. 330-331.
106. Zahab and Roy, *Islamist Networks*, p. 35. According to LeT's *Taiba Bulletin*, 22 April 2001 (since republished as *Lashkar-e-Taiba (LET): Eleven Years of Lashker-e-Taiba* (NEFA Foundation)), the Red Fort "is the same fort from where Muslims controlled the sub-continent, and which later became the main target of East India Company's machinations and it is same fort from where India's declaration of independence was made on 15 August 1947."
107. *PakistanTime.net* (www.pakistantime.net), 6 July 2010.
108. Syed Salahuddin's real name was Muhammad Yusuf Khan; he was generally referred to as Pir Sahib. Rana, *A to Z of Jehadi Organizations*, p. 90.
109. Rana, *A to Z of Jehadi Organizations*, pp. 433, 436-459, 485, 579. The HM was reportedly founded in November 1989 in Sopore by its first commander, Muhammad Ahsan Dar, who eventually was arrested in India. See also South Asia Terrorism Portal website, www.satp.org. The HM maintained a website, <http://hizbulmujahideen.org>. The organisation could also be contacted by e-mail: hizbulmujahideen@usa.net.
110. Rana, *A to Z of Jehadi Organizations*, p. 447.
111. See *Ibid.*, pp. 67, 111, 433, 459-468, 485, 580. Al-Badr traced its origin to a group with the same name that existed in East Pakistan (present Bangladesh) already before it became independent in 1971. The group also claimed to have participated in the war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989, and the war in Kashmir from 1989. Claiming to have been the largest and most active militant group in Kashmir, Al-Badr in 1990 joined the HM in Kashmir but retained a separate identity in Pakistan until 1997. Most of these claims were doubtful at best, or outright false.
112. *Ibid.*, pp. 111, 462, 464.
113. See, e.g., *Washington Post*; *International Herald Tribune*; *Wall Street Journal Europe*, 14 January 2002.
114. Ahmed Rashid, *Descent into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia* (New York: Viking, 2008), p. 419 n.13. Amir Rana first suggested that the TNSM was founded in 1990, then contradicted himself and also settled for 1989. Rana, *A to Z of Jehadi Organizations*, pp. 159, 184. The TNSM was also sometimes referred to as *Tanzim-e Nifaz-e Shariat-e Muhammad*, with fundamentally the same meaning. The reference to the laws of Muhammad suggests that the TNSM was not a Wahhabi organisation. Saudi Wahhabites would not have used the name of Muhammad. Sana Haroon, "Enjoining Virtue and Preventing Vice': The Moral Directives of the Taliban in the Swat Valley in History and the Present," *Rethinking the Swat Pathan*, Conference, School of Oriental and African Studies, London, 11-12 June 2010.
115. Rana, *A to Z of Jehadi Organizations*, pp. 182-90.
116. Anon., "In the Shadow of the Taliban," *Economist*, September 2001; Rashid, *Descent into Chaos*, p. 419 n.13. Another prominent leader was Pinda Khan.

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117. *Nation* (Lahore), 1 November 2001.
118. International Crisis Group (ICG), "Pakistan: Madrasas, Extremism and the Military" (Islamabad/Brussels, *ICG Asia Report 36*, 29 July 2002), pp. 21-22.
119. Rana, *A to Z of Jehadi Organizations*, p. 190. This may be a reference to the late Maulana Faqir Muhammad, who was close to Sufi Muhammad and led one branch of the TNSM. See, e.g., Hassan Abbas, "A Profile of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan," *CTC Sentinel* 1: 2 (January 2008), pp. 1-4.
120. Charles P. Blair, *Anatomizing Non-State Threats to Pakistan's Nuclear Infrastructure: The Pakistani Neo-Taliban* (Washington, DC.: Federation of American Scientists, 2011), p. 42.
121. Jessica Stern, "Pakistan's Jihad Culture," *Foreign Affairs* 79: 6 (2000), pp. 115-126.
122. Rashid, *Taliban*, 186-7, pp. 194-195.
123. Reeve, *New Jackals*, pp. 166-167, 236; Bergen, *Holy War*, pp. 200-201.
124. Jane's Sentinel: Pakistan, 14 November 2000.
125. Ishtiaq Ahmed, presentation on "Pakistan in Crisis," Centre for Pacific Asia Studies (CPAS), Stockholm University, 6 February 2002. See also Pervez Musharraf, *In the Line of Fire: A Memoir* (London: Simon & Schuster, 2006).
126. RFE/RL, 9 October 2001.
127. ICG, *Pakistan: Madrasas*, pp. 21-22.
128. Rashid, *Taliban*, p. 26.
129. Rashid, "Pakistan and the Taliban," p. 86; Rashid, *Taliban*, p. 262 n.7.
130. Ahmed, *Pakistan in Crisis*.
131. Strictly speaking, the plural of *madrassah* would be *madaris*.
132. Stern, *Pakistan's Jihad Culture*, pp. 115-126.
133. Stern, *Pakistan's Jihad Culture*, p. 123; ICG, *Pakistan: Madrasas*, p. 11. For more information on Haqqaniyyah, see, e.g., Jeffrey Goldberg, "The Making of a Terrorist," *New York Times Magazine*, 25 June 2000; Rana, *A to Z of Jehadi Organizations*, p. 528.
134. The president of UTN, Bashiruddin Mahmood, one of Pakistan's leading nuclear scientists as well as a radical Muslim, was in late 2001 held in detention for some time in Pakistan due to his links with the Taliban. Although the UTN officially assisted the Taliban government with flourmills, school textbooks, and road repair, evidence left in the organisation's Kabul office when its personnel fled together with the Taliban indicated that it was involved in various biological weapons projects, including the use of anthrax. *Economist*, 24 November 2001. On Mahmood, see also *Washington Post*, 23 November 2001.
135. Faryal Leghari, "Gulf-Pakistan Counter-Terrorism Challenges," in Faryal Leghari (ed), *Gulf-Pakistan: Strategic Relations* (Dubai: Gulf Research Center, 2008), pp. 135-91, on p. 160, citing a Pakistani top counter-terrorism expert who wished to remain anonymous. The indoctrination described closely parallels the one supplied by LeT leader Hafiz Saeed to the participants in the 2008 Mumbai attacks. According to the testimony of David Headley, who was there, Hafiz Saeed explained that "being shot would feel like a pin prick, blood stains would be like rose petals, and that angels would come down to take their souls." United States of America vs. Tahawwur Hussain Rana, Government's Santiago Proffer 09 CR 830 (Northern District of Illinois, 11 April 2011). On the recruitment of militants and suicide bombers, see C. Christine Fair, "Militant Recruitment in Pakistan: Implications for Al Qaeda and Other Organizations," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 27: 6 (2004), pp. 489-504; and in particular C. Christine Fair, "Who Are Pakistan's Militants and Their Families?" *Terrorism and Political Violence* 20: 1 (2008), pp. 49-65; Victor

- Asal, C. Christine Fair, and Stephen Shellman, "Consenting to a Child's Decision to Join a *Jihad*: Insights from a Survey of Militant Families in Pakistan," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 31: 11 (2008), pp. 973-994.
136. Stern, *Pakistan's Jihad Culture*, pp. 115-126.
137. Rashid, *Descent into Chaos*, pp. 242-243, 250. In June 2003, Mullah Omar constituted a Taliban leadership council, with four new committees for military, political, cultural, and economic affairs, respectively. *Ibid.*, pp. 247, 438 n.16. The large Quetta suburb Pashtunabad became a particular Taliban stronghold, since the Taliban were allowed to buy or force out the local residents. *Ibid.*, p. 249. Quetta also became the Taliban logistics centre, where they in the summer of 2003 purchased nine hundred motorbikes, arms and ammunition (some of it imported from the Gulf states), long-range walkie-talkies, and several hundred Thuraya satellite telephones imported from the Gulf states since Thurayas bought in Pakistan were believed to be monitored by the CIA. *Ibid.*, p. 250. The Taliban at Quetta henceforth became known as the *Quetta Shura Taliban*. This was a designation used by Western analysts for the Taliban under Mullah Omar, since they formed an identifiable faction and were based at Quetta. However, to the Taliban, the *Quetta shura* was a regional command within the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, commanded by the Emirate's leader, Mullah Omar.
138. The elections took place on 18 February 2008. *Economist*, 22 March 2008.
139. Michael Fredholm, "From the Ferghana Valley to Waziristan and Beyond," *Islam, Islamism and Politics in Eurasia Report* 22 (Monterey Terrorism Research and Education Program, Monterey Institute for International Studies, 2010).
140. See, e.g., Fredholm, "From the Ferghana Valley."
141. See, e.g., D. Suba Chandran, *Peace Agreement in Waziristan: New Beginning or a False Dawn?* (New Delhi: Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS), IPCS Issue Brief 37, September 2006). Nek Muhammad Wazir was killed in a drone strike in June 2004. On him, see, e.g., Blair, *Anatomizing Non-State Threats*, p. 33.
142. K. Alan Kronstadt and Bruce Vaughn, *Terrorism in South Asia* (Congressional Research Service, 2005), p. 31.
143. See, e.g., Chandran, *Peace Agreement in Waziristan*.
144. *Dawn*, 6 September 2006 (www.dawn.com). See also, e.g., Chandran, *Peace Agreement in Waziristan*.
145. See, e.g., Chandran, *Peace Agreement in Waziristan*. On Abdullah Mehsud, see Bill Roggio, "Pakistani Taliban Commander Abdullah Mehsud Killed during Raid," *Long War Journal* (24 July 2007).
146. Fredholm, "From the Ferghana Valley."
147. Syed Manzar Abbas Zaidi, "A Profile of Baitullah Mehsud," *Long War Journal* (September 2008); *Pakistan Policy Blog* (<http://pakistanpolicy.com>), 29 January 2008; with link to original Al-Jazeera video.
148. Even so, there were no signs that the TTP directed the operation, or did much in support beyond training and dispatching men. The ringleader had acted as *Imam* of a Barcelona mosque. Of the eleven convicted for the plot, ten were born in Pakistan and one in India. Six were legal residents in Spain. All four designated suicide bombers arrived a few months before the planned attacks, from Pakistan, Sweden, Germany, Portugal, and the Netherlands. The fifth designated suicide bomber, unbeknownst to the others an informant to the French intelligence services and the one who alerted the security forces, arrived from France. Reinares, *A New Composite Global Terrorism Threat*.
149. *Hürriyet Daily News*, 27 August 2009 (www.hurriyetaidailynews.com).

150. Hakimullah Mehsud first advertised his intention to attack the United States in an April 2010 video, then claimed responsibility in a second video. He dispatched the American TTP recruit Faizal Shahzad, who executed the attack, to New York with orders to undertake an act of terrorism, but as before there were no signs that the TTP actually directed the operation. See, e.g., *Dawn*, 3 May 2010; Madeleine Gruen, "Target: America"—*Attempted Bombing in Times Square* (NEFA Foundation, 2011); NEFA Foundation, *The 2007 London and 2010 Times Square Car Bomb Plots* (NEFA Foundation, 2010).
151. *New York Times*, 5 April 2010.
152. Anon., "Question Mark of South Waziristan: Biography and Analysis of Maulvi Nazir Ahmad," *Critical Threats* (www.criticalthreats.org), 17 July 2009.
153. Gretchen Peters, *Crime and Insurgency in the Tribal Areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan* (West Point: Harmony Program, Combating Terrorism Center, 2010), pp. 70, 82. Since both Nazir and Bahadur enjoyed the support of the JUI faction controlled by Fazlur Rahman, some have suggested that this formed part of a Pakistani government policy to neutralise rivals for power in Pakistan while still supporting those who fought the American-led coalition in Afghanistan. Claudio Franco and Javed Afridi, *Competing Voices within the Taliban Leadership in Pakistan* (NEFA Foundation, 2009). Such a policy presumably existed; yet, tribal and personal rivalries may have been a more important cause for the infighting.
154. Peters, *Crime and Insurgency*, p. 83.
155. Sadia Sulaiman and Syed Adnan Ali Shah Bukhari, "Hafiz Gul Bahadur: A Profile of the Leader of the North Waziristan Taliban," *Terrorism Monitor* 7: 9 (Jamestown Foundation, 2009); Anand Gopal, Mansur Khan Mahsud, and Brian Fishman, *The Battle for Pakistan: Militancy and Conflict in North Waziristan* (Washington, DC: New America Foundation, 2010), pp. 1, 13-15; Peters, *Crime and Insurgency*, pp. 69, 80.
156. Abbas, "Profile of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan," pp. 1-4.
157. Mariam Abou Zahab, "Kashars against Mashars: Jihad and Social Change in the FATA," *Rethinking the Swat Pathan*, Conference, School of Oriental and African Studies, London, 11-12 June 2010.
158. Claudio Franco and Javed Afridi, *An Analysis of Hakimullah Mehsud's Handwritten Autobiographical Notes* (NEFA Foundation, 2009); *Translation of Hakimullah Mehsud's Autobiographical Handwritten Notes* (NEFA Foundation, 2009).
159. BBC News, 11 February 2008 (www.bbc.co.uk); GEO TV (Pakistan), 17 May 2008.
160. Reuters, 22 September 2008; BBC News South Asia, 14 November 2010.
161. CBS News, 30 March 2010.
162. Peters, *Crime and Insurgency*, p. 76.
163. *Daily Times*, 22 January 2008 (www.dailytimes.com.pk); *Guardian*, 10 January 2009; Peters, *Crime and Insurgency*, p. 86.
164. Gopal, Mahsud, and Fishman, *Battle for Pakistan*; Peters, *Crime and Insurgency*; Don Rassler and Vahid Brown, *The Haqqani Nexus and the Evolution of al-Qa'ida* (West Point: Harmony Program, Combating Terrorism Center, 2011).
165. The Haqqani network was recognised as a *tanzim* (movement, organisation) by foreign *jihadis* no later than 1994 and possibly earlier. Rassler and Brown, *Haqqani Nexus*, p. 7.
166. Rassler and Brown, *Haqqani Nexus*, p. 7.
167. The position of power and influence achieved by the Haqqanis in the border area between Afghanistan and Pakistan (Loya Paktia and FATA) through warfare, smuggling, and plain ability to negotiate a complex political landscape was, interestingly enough, paralleled by the political emergence of the 16th-century

- Sadozai Abdali Pashtuns, a descendant of whom in 1747 formed the Afghan Durrani Empire. The early Sadozai Abdalis established a position of power and influence through a network of relatives and associates who controlled the trade route Multan-Kandahar-Herat. Christine Noelle-Karimi, Presentation, *Rethinking the Swat Pathan*, Conference, School of Oriental and African Studies, London, 11-12 June 2010. The Haqqanis, if they survive the present upheavals in Afghanistan and Pakistan, would accordingly seem to have a potentially great future as landowners and political power-brokers (khans) ahead of them.
168. See, e.g., Baitullah Mehsud's first television interview in December 2007. *Pakistan Policy Blog* (<http://pakistanpolicy.com>), 29 January 2008; with link to original Al-Jazeera video.
169. Fredholm, "From the Ferghana Valley."
170. *Dawn*, 4 November 2006.
171. IJU communiqué, 19 December 2007 (www.sehadetvakti.com). See, e.g., Fredholm, "From the Ferghana Valley."
172. Anon., *NEFA Exclusive: An Interview with Haji Namdar* (NEFA Foundation, 2008); Magnus Norell (ed.), *Militancy in the Pakistani Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Afghanistan* (Stockholm: FOI, 2010), pp. 68, 70-71.
173. Magnus Norell (ed.), *Militancy in the Pakistani Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Afghanistan* (Stockholm: FOI, 2010), pp. 68-69, 115-116.
174. *Ibid*, pp. 68-69, 113-14.
175. Anon., *NEFA Exclusive: An Interview with Mangal Bagh (Lashkar-e-Islam)* (NEFA Foundation, 2008).
176. Peters, *Crime and Insurgency*, pp. 69-73.
177. Abbas, "Profile of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan," pp. 1-4; Peters, *Crime and Insurgency*, pp. 69, 73-74, 76-77; *Terrorism Monitor 7: 4* (Jamestown Foundation, 2009); Claudio Franco, *The Tehrike-e-Taliban Pakistan: The Bajaur Case 1-3* (NEFA Foundation, 2009). The latter work also reprints the 9 March 2009 Bajaur peace agreement with Faqir Muhammad.
178. Carol Grisanti, NBC News World Blog, 6 May 2008 (<http://worldblog.msnbc.msn.com>).
179. Franco and Afridi, *Competing Voices*, pp. 2-4; *Daily Times*, 13 August 2008 (www.dailytimes.com.pk); *Terrorism Monitor 7: 4* (Jamestown Foundation, 2009).
180. Peters, *Crime and Insurgency*, p. 76; Franco, *Tehrike-e-Taliban Pakistan: The Bajaur Case 3*, pp.3-7.
181. *Terrorism Monitor 7: 4* (Jamestown Foundation, 2009).
182. Peters, *Crime and Insurgency*, pp. 69, 77.
183. Peters, *Crime and Insurgency*, pp. 69, 78; Franco, *Tehrike-e-Taliban Pakistan: The Bajaur Case 3*, pp.6-7.
184. See, e.g., interview with Sufi Muhammad. *Pakistaniat* website, <http://pakistaniat.com>, 19 March 2009.
185. *Terrorism Monitor 7: 4* (Jamestown Foundation, 2009).
186. Anita M. Weiss (University of Oregon), "Crisis and Reconciliation in Swat through the Eyes of Women," *Rethinking the Swat Pathan*, Conference, School of Oriental and African Studies, London, 11-12 June 2010. It was reportedly Maulana Fazlullah who introduced the cumbersome *burqa* for the first time in Swat; previously local women had worn only the traditional Pashtun *chader*, a large shawl-like headscarf that fell to cover about three-quarters of the body, covering the face or not as desired.
187. Peters, *Crime and Insurgency*, p. 59.

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188. *International Herald Tribune* (Tokyo), 1 January 2002. In reality, Hafiz Saeed was only placed under house arrest.
189. See, e.g., *Washington Post*; *Financial Times*; *International Herald Tribune*; *Wall Street Journal Europe*, 14 January 2002. Musharraf also banned several Shia organisations, unconnected to Sunni Islamic extremism. Among them was the *Tehrik-e Jafaria Pakistan* ("Movement for the Shia of Pakistan"), since 1993 the name of the originally so named *Tehrik-e Nefaz-e Fiqh-e Jafaria* ("Movement for the Defence of Jafari (Shia) Law"), formed in 1979 inspired by the Iranian Islamic Revolution. The party was later renamed *Millat-e Jafaria Pakistan* ("Shia Nation of Pakistan"). Rana, *A to Z of Jehadi Organizations*, pp. 403, 405-14, 582. Another was the *Sepah-e Muhammad* ("Army of Muhammad"). *Ibid.*, pp.414-417.
190. *Economist*, 19 January 2002; AP, 28 May 2002.
191. Rashid, *Descent into Chaos*, p. 154; Rana, *A to Z of Jehadi Organizations*, pp. 159, 283-284; South Asia Terrorism Portal website, www.satp.org. The group also used the names Al-Saiqa and Al-Qanoon.
192. Zahab and Roy, *Islamist Networks*, p. 67; South Asia Terrorism Portal website, www.satp.org.
193. Rana, *A to Z of Jehadi Organizations*, p. 282.
194. Zahab and Roy, *Islamist Networks*, p. 67; South Asia Terrorism Portal website, www.satp.org.
195. Rana, *A to Z of Jehadi Organizations*, pp. 10-13, 18. An earlier *Brigade 313* existed in Kashmir and was controlled by the HuJI.
196. *Newsweek*, 23 October 2010 (www.newsweek.com). Muhammad Ilyas Kashmiri was born in Pakistan-controlled Kashmir in 1964. He lost an index finger and an eye during the Soviet Afghan war. According to a statement issued by the spokesman of *Brigade 313*, Kashmiri was killed in a drone attack on 3 June 2011. In Kashmir, he had once formed an outfit known as the *Jammu Jehadi Council*. This alliance reportedly consisted of HuJI's *Brigade 313* and the LeT, HuM, *Al-Badr* and *Tehrik ul-Mujahidin*. Rana, *A to Z of Jehadi Organizations*, 480-81. The *Tehrik ul-Mujahidin* was an *Ahl-e Hadith* group active in Kashmir. *Ibid.*, pp. 302, 306-315, 485, 581.
197. Peters, *Crime and Insurgency*, p. 77.
198. Not to be confused with the *Jundullah* that existed in Baluchistan. With Sunni Iranian Baluch members, the Baluchi *Jundullah* by 2007 had launched several attacks in Iran. Leghari, "Gulf-Pakistan Counter-Terrorism Challenges," p. 151.
199. Rashid, *Descent into Chaos*, p. 237; *Daily Times* (www.dailytimes.com.pk), 7 September 2010.
200. *Daily Times* (www.dailytimes.com.pk), 7 September 2010.
201. See, e.g., Leghari, "Gulf-Pakistan Counter-Terrorism Challenges," pp. 145-146.
202. *Guardian*, 21 September 2007. Osama bin Laden had already in April 2006 criticised Musharraf and the Pakistan Army for abandoning the *jihad* in Kashmir and for harming Muslims in Waziristan. Transcript, audiotape aired by Al-Jazeera, 23 April 2006.
203. Ahmad Farooq, *Jihad in Pakistan: Reasons and Motives* (NEFA Foundation, 2010).
204. Much publicity and media speculation followed from the first half of 2009, when the news media began to attribute attacks on security forces in Sindh and Punjab as the work of Punjabi Taliban. Yet, the only incident in which a group that referred to itself as the *Tehrik-e Taliban Punjab*, or used a variation of this name, claimed responsibility for an act of terrorism may have been the attack on an Ahmadi community on 28 May 2010. An SMS message was then reportedly sent to several

newspapers by somebody who claimed the attack in the name of the "TTP and its Punjabi wing." *Time*, 28 May 2010. However, this attack followed the pattern of previous LeJ attacks on religious minorities, which suggested that if any Punjabi extremists referred to themselves as Punjabi Taliban, they likely emerged out of earlier Punjabi extremist groups such as the LeJ.

205. See, e.g., Katja Riikonen, *'Punjabi Taliban' and the Sectarian Groups in Pakistan* (Pakistan Security Research Unit (PSRU), University of Bradford, PSRU Brief 55, 2010).
206. For several examples, see, e.g., Rana, *A to Z of Jehadi Organizations*, pp. 124-129.
207. *The News*, 1 May 2010 (www.thenews.com.pk); Rahimullah Yusufzai, "The Implications of Colonel Imam's Murder in Pakistan" *CTC Sentinel* 4: 4 (April 2011), pp. 18-20. Colonel Imam (real name Sultan Amir Tarar) was Pakistan's consul-general in Herat from 1994, had assisted the Taliban in taking this city in 1995, and still held the post at the time of the American-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. Zahab and Roy, *Islamist Networks*, p. 55.

PAKISTAN'S QUEST FOR STRATEGIC DEPTH *REGIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS*

ASHISH SHUKLA

MUSLIM HOMELAND

Pakistan was established as an independent country in 1947 with an explicit agenda of providing a homeland to the Muslim populace of the Indian subcontinent and to ensure their physical, economic, religious and cultural security from India. It was originally intended by Mohammad Ali Jinnah to transform the lives of the Muslims of the Indian subcontinent.¹ Leaders of the Pakistan movement propagated the idea that the new country would provide such an atmosphere where Muslims would be able to pursue their civilisational destiny without any hindrance. The early leaders were of the view that Pakistan would not be able to carve its niche in the international community, if it remains under the shadow of India. Accordingly they made all efforts to make the new country different from India. This desire of separateness resulted in the construction of an Islamic identity, which emphasised on the "Two Nation Theory" as the *raison d'être* for the creation of Pakistan.² Mohammad Ali Jinnah who at one point of time in history was regarded as "the ambassador of Hindu-Muslim Unity", ironically became the individual most responsible for the creation of theocratic Pakistan.³ He not only propagated but also saw through the implementation of the famous "Two Nation Theory" which was based on the idea that Hindus and Muslims constitute "two nations" and thus, deserve two separate states. Many leaders associated with the *Muslim League* and Pakistan movement echoed the idea of Jinnah and claimed that Muslims of the Indian sub-continent needed a separate state to pursue their civilisational

destiny. Thus, since its inception, Pakistan acquired a negative identity which was precisely anti-Indian, un-Indian and non-Indian. Pakistan remains an enigma, even after six decades of its creation, and means different things to different people.⁴ It is still struggling hard to resolve its identity crisis which has only deepened with the passage of time. Jaffrelot argues that the creation of Pakistan did not resolve the problems of South Asian Muslims but it generated new problems⁵ for them which are more complex in nature than the earlier ones.

It is worth noting here that in the British India, there were a number of Muslim scholars including Maulana Abul A'ala Maududi and Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, who were not only critical of Jinnah's "Two Nation Theory" but they also tried unsuccessfully to oppose the partition. Maulana Maududi, as early as 1938, had proposed his own version of "Two Nation Theory" but envisaged a state within a state similar to Allama Iqbal's idea of a "Muslim India within India."⁶ Maulana Azad went a step further and declared that when the creative warmth of Pakistan would cool down, the inherent contradictions would emerge.⁷ He rightly assumed that there would be separation of East Pakistan from the West Pakistan, which would certainly make Pakistan a battleground of regional contradictions and disputes, and this very situation would be used by international forces for their own partisan interests.⁸

At present, Pakistan is considered as one of the most dangerous and violent places on earth, where Muslims themselves have no hesitation to kill their fellow Muslims and radical Islamic groups, earlier patronised by Pakistani establishment for short-term political gain, are working hard to introduce revolutionary changes in the very political and social order of Pakistan by actively supporting violent and terrorist activities in the country. The spectacular rise of Taliban militia inside Pakistan, in the wake of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), has factually pushed the Pakistani state on the brink. Talibanisation is the term now being frequently used to describe the internal situation of Pakistan, especially in the tribal areas, where various militant groups have entered into some kind of cooperative arrangement which can be described as "sophisticated, interconnected and coordinated web" and are fighting with the Pakistani state. Why Pakistan reached such a critical stage? Who is responsible for the situation? Questions like these are being debated in the intellectual circles of the region and the world as well. Though, in social sciences, there has always been a state of confusion over such complex and critical issues but, if history is any guide then

Pakistan's unresolved crisis of identity should largely be held responsible for the numerous problems of Pakistan. Her perceived security threats and desire of parity vis-à-vis India, the mother country, forced it to seek "strategic depth" for herself against its supposed rival India.

CONCEPTUALISING THE DOCTRINE OF "STRATEGIC DEPTH"

Geography and location of a country plays an important role in shaping its foreign policy. It also determines the power and influence of the country in the international system. Appadorai and Rajan argue that after the World War II, USSR and USA emerged as the two undisputed superpowers of the world not by any accident, but due to their geography and population.⁹ The world, in which we live, only recognises the hard currency of economic growth and military power and is by and large dominated by the realist school of thought. For the realists, international politics is primarily anarchic or in other words there is no overarching central authority above the sovereign states.¹⁰ Within this situation, it is the very state that is solely responsible for its security, survival and protection of supreme national interest. Strategic depth, up to a certain level, is necessary for each and every state, existing in international system, for the protection of their territories from external aggression. In some instances the much needed strategic depth is geographically configured and naturally available to the states like Australia, Canada, China, Russia and United States. However, in some cases states have to make arrangements to achieve it. Israel and Pakistan come in the second category.¹¹ Strategic depth is basically a military concept which refers to the distance between actual or potential frontlines and key centres of population, logistics and industrial and military production. It intends to create necessary territorial space for an army to fall back and where reserves can be deployed and supplies can be restored. Indeed, it allows a country to withstand initial offensives and enables it to regroup to mount a counter-offensive.¹² A nation's need for strategic depth arises out of its own threat perceptions towards its adversary and by the intention of the latter towards the former as well. In most of the cases, strategic depth is provided by a buffer state, a willing ally or a trustworthy friendly country, but occasionally it is also obtained through the conduct of effective international diplomacy and by forging good political and economic relations with other countries.

PAKISTAN'S GEO-STRATEGIC LOCATION

Pakistan is situated at the meeting point between Central, South and West Asia and occupies a position of great geostrategic significance. On the west, it is bordered by Iran, on the northwest by Afghanistan, on the northeast by Peoples Republic of China, on the east by India and on the south by the Arabian Sea. Due to such strategic location, it has always attracted the attention of great powers and in many cases effectively bargained with them. Jinnah was well aware of the geo-strategic importance of Pakistan, which he bargained with the UK and USA, even before Pakistan's existence. In May 1947, Jinnah met Raymond A. Hare, Head of the Division of South Asian Affairs (Department of State), and Thomas E. Weil, Second Secretary of the US Embassy in India at his residence in Bombay.¹³ During this meeting he sought American assistance and in return assured both the visitors that Pakistan along with other Muslim countries would stand together against any Russian aggression. Venkataramani claims that soon after the partition, the government of Pakistan officially requested US to provide military assistance for the modernisation of its three forces- the Army, Air Force and the Navy.¹⁴ US initially ignored this and many other similar requests from Pakistan due to the prospective economic and other stakes in India. But very soon Washington realised that India would not join the US in its ideological fight against the communist Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and decided to go with Pakistan in the region. Kheli claims that due to Pakistan's strategic location, it was seen as directly augmenting US capability in dealing with the communist threat.¹⁵ Islamabad, soon after receiving positive signals from Washington, joined US sponsored military alliances namely South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). For Pakistan, this initial alignment resulted in close cooperation and brought much needed military support in terms of training and military hardware.¹⁶ During the Afghan *jihād*, due to its strategic location and willingness to ally with America, Pakistan became the conduit for American finance and arms to the *Mujahideen* and siphoned off a large amount of arms and finance for itself. With the withdrawal of former Soviet Union from Afghanistan, US achieved its objectives. Now Pakistan turned towards China, whom it calls the most trusted friend, for its military hardware procurements and received substantial cooperation in the area of its nuclear and missile programmes.¹⁷ Again its geostrategic

location brought substantial gains for Pakistan. These important factors prompted Mahnaz Ispahani to write that "Pakistan's location has made it strategically valuable to all the powers who have interests in the acquisition or denial of access to the lands south of the Himalayas, the Karakoram and the Hindu Kush mountains and to the waters of Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf."¹⁸

Pakistan again acquired prominence in the US Policy after the deadly 9/11 attacks. Although, immediately after the attack Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee had offered full support to the United States but Pakistan's geo-strategic location and deep ties with the Taliban again underlined Pakistan's importance for the US. Under severe international pressure and for the fear of being punished for supporting terrorism, Musharraf, the then President of Pakistan, decided to throw his lot in favour of United States which made Pakistan a frontline ally in the war on terrorism. In return US helped Pakistan with economic and military assistance.

DOCTRINE OF "ISLAMIC DEPTH"

When the creative warmth of Pakistan's creation cooled down, as assumed by Maulana Azad, the country realised the practical problems posed by the partition. The new born state very soon developed insecurities, real or imagined vis-à-vis India, which forced the Pakistani establishment, especially military strategists, to search for some territorial space to withstand any possible Indian advance. Liaqat Ali Khan, the very first Prime Minister of Pakistan, in 1948 declared that "Defence of the state is our foremost consideration. It dominates all other governmental activities."¹⁹ This statement, by the Pakistani Prime Minister, was the obvious manifestation of country's threat perception. Since then, all the successive governments, whether civilian or military have been giving top priority to this policy. From the very outset Pakistan feared a possible strategic encirclement by India through Afghanistan and started thinking of devising an effective policy to counter such move. This led to the development of the concept of "Strategic Depth". That Pakistan would lack a strategic depth, was first pointed out by General Arthur F. Smith, the Chief of General Staff in British India, almost a year before Pakistan's existence.²⁰ However, General Mirza Aslam Beg, the then Chief of Army Staff (COAS) of Pakistan is credited for the authorship of the concept of "strategic depth", because in his views this concept

found its maximum articulation. On 25 August 1988, Beg first talked about this doctrine to his formation commanders and officers at the Rawalpindi garrison.²¹ Next year in 1989, during *Zarb-e-Momin* Exercise, he clearly articulated “strategic depth” doctrine in reference to Pakistan’s relationship with its western neighbour Afghanistan.²² It was the largest ever field exercise by Pakistan army and Pakistan Air Force which involved almost three corps, two armoured brigades, two artillery divisions, one air-defence division and the Pakistan Air Force.²³ It is said that *Zarb-e-Momin*, the offensive defence exercise, was designed to test the concept of “strategic depth” under a pliant Afghanistan in the west by extending the war against India across the eastern border with a combination of covert and conventional means.²⁴ The success of the exercise established military rationale and its ability to achieve “strategic depth” on the western border in Afghanistan.

For Aslam Beg, it was a way of securing “Islamic Depth” in Afghanistan which could counterbalance the conventional superiority of the so called “Hindu India.”²⁵ He not only proposed the idea of gaining “Islamic Depth” but also detailed the way to achieve that. He suggested that by strengthening diplomatic and military relations with Afghanistan as well as the Arab world, Pakistan could get the much needed “strategic depth”. Military establishment, very keen to overcome the geographical limitations, hoped that by gaining control over Afghan territory Pakistan Army’s capability of waging a prolonged conventional war with India would substantially be enhanced.²⁶

This is not to suggest here, that the idea of Islamic depth or strategic depth was uncontested in the country. In fact, the critics had ridiculed the very idea itself. Numerous Pakistani analysts underlined the obvious lacunae of having such a depth next door, while some experts asserted that it was only Hamid Gul, ISI Chief, and Aslam Beg, COAS, who had single-handedly pushed the doctrine.²⁷ Many of them rejected the idea by claiming that it ignored the ground realities and was unreasonable. Instead of promoting the idea of gaining “strategic depth” they argued that in order to ensure greater national security, Pakistan need to ensure political stability, economic development and wider literacy at home and good friendly relations with its neighbours.²⁸

Zia’s “Sunnisation” Programme

There is no doubt that in Pakistan General Mirza Aslam Beg virtually propounded the concept of “strategic depth” but the idea of managing

the territorial space for the country was fine-tuned during Zia-ul-Haq's military dictatorship.²⁹ It would be quite unfair not to discuss the policies of General Zia-ul-Haq. Raheem-ul-Haq of Lahore, argues that the doctrine of strategic depth was an outcome of the institutionalisation of ideological guardianship mindset within the military which happened during General Zia-ul-Haq's tenure.³⁰ Ahmed Rashid, the celebrated author on matters related to Taliban and terrorism in Af-Pak region, concedes that General Zia had promoted the idea of Afghanistan offering "strategic depth" to Pakistan.³¹ Soon after overthrowing Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's elected government, Zia imposed martial law regime and in his very first address to the nation stated that Pakistan was created in the name of Islam and will continue to survive only if it sticks to Islam.³² At the same time, when Zia-ul-Haq was consolidating his hold on Pakistani politics, two important events occurred in the region- *Saur Revolution* in Afghanistan (later followed by the Soviet Intervention) and *Islamic Revolution* in Iran. Apart from Pakistan, there were several other countries including Saudi Arabia and the US which were closely watching the development in the region. The *Saur Revolution* in Afghanistan alerted United States as a prelude to the possible expansion of communism in the region. Saudi Arabia did not feel comfortable with the triumph of Shia Islam under the inspirational leadership of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the popular religious symbol in Iran which also significantly influenced Pakistan's Shia minority. Initially Sunni religious forces of Pakistan supported the Iranian revolution and thought of a similar model for Pakistan and a role for themselves but with the emergence of *Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Fiqh-e-Jafaria* (the movement for the Implementation of Jafaria Law) their attitude changed. Now they feel threatened with the demands put forward by the Shia community in Pakistan. Though, General Zia, personally a devout Sunni Muslim, was predetermined to follow an Islamic agenda but these developments worked as a catalyst and increased the speed of Islamisation or even better to say "Sunnisation" of Pakistan. In this state driven phenomenon, Zia had the support of the modernising sectors of Pakistani society including industrial elite and entrepreneurial class.³³ He redefined Army's role as the 'defender of faith'³⁴ and changed its motto from Jinnah's 'Unity, Faith, Discipline' to '*Iman, Taqwa, Jihad Fi-Sabeelillah*' meaning faith, obedience of God, struggle in the path of Allah.³⁵

Zia-ul-Haq used Islamic faith as a tool to gain political legitimacy for his dictatorship at home and also for the advancement of Pakistani

interests in the region. Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979, on the invitation of the leftist regime, proved advantageous³⁶ and provided much needed opportunity to Zia-ul-Haq to advance Pakistan's interests in the region. General Zia synchronised the efforts of Islamisation with CIA backed support for the Afghan *jihad* against the Soviets. Relying on both ethnic and Islamic cards, General Zia, in order to advance Pakistani interests in the region, pursued the policy of establishing a friendly government or in other words, as suggested by Oliver Roy, making Afghanistan a 'junior partner.'³⁷ Emerging situation in neighbouring country prompted Zia to organise the disparate Afghan groups into a potent force under effective Pakistani control.³⁸ These Afghan rebels and Pakistani militants, patronised by the state, were seen as a strategic asset and foreign policy tool that could help the Pakistani Military extend its influence in Afghanistan to achieve the dream of "strategic depth" against India.³⁹ General Zia along with ISI Chief General Akhtar Abdul Rehman pursued this policy until his death in an unexplained and mysterious air crash in 1989.

STRENGTHENING JIHADI FORCES

Pakistan's invaluable support, during holy war in Afghanistan, in terms of logistics, training, finance and recruits helped the *Mujahideen* forces in a great way to fight with the erstwhile USSR. Throughout the Afghan war Pakistan followed the policy of maintaining a permanent guardianship of the *Mujahideen* movement. This was done through the distribution of weapons (provided by CIA), issuing refugee cards and by providing other facilities in the camps inside Pakistan.⁴⁰ The holy war ended with the victory of *Mujahideen* forces and Soviets left the territory of Afghanistan after signing the Geneva Accord. Instead of becoming normal Afghanistan descended into chaos, as various *Mujahideen* groups started fighting with each other on the issue of gaining control on the levers of power. In the absence of a common enemy the conflict soon transformed into an ethnic sectarian clash particularly between Pashtuns, Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras.⁴¹

Pakistani establishment was very enthusiastic with the outcome of holy war and decided to hold and nurture Islamic terrorists as an instrument of its state apparatuses.⁴² At this very significant stage, the military establishment decided to pursue its agenda of achieving "strategic depth" through a client regime in Kabul.⁴³ However, in some

quarters there was also a hope that Benazir Bhutto, who came in power two months before the Soviet withdrawal and was extremely critical to Zia's policy of supporting Afghan resistance, would distance Pakistan from pursuing a radical Afghan policy.⁴⁴ Being well aware of the fact that ISI and military were running Pakistan's Afghan policy Benazir sought to assert civilian supremacy and after a long dispute with President Ghulam Ishaq Khan ultimately succeeded in replacing the ISI Chief Hamid Gul by Shamsur Rahman Kallu.⁴⁵ She also tried to intervene in the promotions of senior officials of the military which infuriated General Aslam Beg.⁴⁶ However, her efforts came to naught when President Ghulam Ishaq Khan sacked her government by dissolving the parliament in August 1990 on the charges of corruption, nepotism, ethnic violence and growing unemployment.⁴⁷ However, the real reason behind her removal was her attempt to challenge ISI and the military.

During her second term (October 1993-November 1996) Benazir Bhutto was conscious enough about the power and nexus of military and religious right and she deliberately avoided any confrontation with both the military establishment and religious right. This time she decided to work with religious right and to appease them she supported the emerging Taliban movement led by Pashtun ethnic groups across the border. This was equally backed by Maulana Fazalur-Rehman led *Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Pakistan* (JUI)⁴⁸ and other religious organisations such as Sunni sectarian organisation *Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan* (SSP), *Lashkar-e-Jhangvi* (LJ) and *Tehrik-e-Nifaj-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi* (TNSM). Benazir's decision was ostensibly sought to satisfy Pakistan's basic security needs in Afghanistan⁴⁹ but it was actually aimed at supporting the idea of gaining "strategic depth" vis-à-vis India. Laila Bokhari also validates this point by claiming that one of the essential reasons behind Pakistan's decision to support the Taliban movement was closely related to the national political aim of establishing "strategic depth" in the hinterland of Afghanistan.⁵⁰ It was General Naseerullah Babar, Interior Minister during Benazir Bhutto's second term, who jumped into action and actively promoted the Taliban militia.⁵¹ When Taliban established themselves in Kandahar in late 1994 and when it became evident that they were ready to capture power in Afghanistan, Pakistani establishment took a bold decision to provide all help to them. Pakistani military officers were ordered to manage logistics and fuel supplies and also to provide air support to the Taliban.⁵² General Babar created Afghan Trade Development Cell in the Interior Ministry which was ostensibly tasked

to coordinate the efforts of facilitating a trade route to Central Asia, however, it was principally aimed to provide logistic support to the Taliban.⁵³ Apart from providing logistical support, Babar worked hard to develop a workable infrastructure for Taliban such as establishing telephone network and radio stations, repairing roads, improving electricity supplies, repairing airports and also the fighter jets and helicopters that the Taliban had captured.⁵⁴ All these activities were undertaken by Pakistani technicians and engineers who went there on the orders of General Naseerullah Babar. There was one additional element this time in the doctrine of "strategic depth", which was aimed to use the Afghan territory to establish a base for training and arming of the Kashmiri militants who were waging a war against the Indian state. This high level of involvement helped the Taliban advance rapidly towards Kabul which ultimately resulted in the establishment of Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan in September 1996.⁵⁵ Taliban's supreme leader Mullah Mohammad Omar declared himself *Amir-ul-Momin* (Commander of the Faithful) of the newly emerged Islamic Emirate. Indeed, it was a strategic coup⁵⁶ for some quarters in Pakistan through which, for the first time in history, Pakistan succeeded in stalling a friendly regime in Kabul.

CONTINUATION UNDER NAWAZ SHARIF AND PERVEZ MUSHARRAF

Nawaz Sharif who was in power for two terms did not attempt to alter the policies pursued by the Pakistani establishment in regard to Afghanistan and India. In 1992, during his first term in office, he appointed General Javed Nasir, the first fully bearded general of Pakistan army who was known for his radical religious belief and his association with the *Tablighi Jamaat*, as the Director General of ISI. During his very short tenure, General Nasir expanded the ISI's covert operations beyond Kashmir and Afghanistan. It is alleged that ISI was behind the March 1993 serial bombings in Bombay (now Mumbai) which were carried out by Dawood Ibrahim.⁵⁷ Soon after, Dawood left India for Pakistan and has been living in Karachi city under the full protection of ISI.⁵⁸ In his second term as Prime Minister he continued the policy of Benazir Bhutto and extended recognition to the Taliban regime on May 25, 1997. Islamabad was so enthusiastic with the Taliban's growing influence that in 1997 it refused to send an invitation to the Burhanuddin Rabbani government, still the legitimate government for the world including UN,

for the special session of OIC at Islamabad.⁵⁹

During Nawaz's regime, the presence of ISI in Kandahar grew substantially and there were about half a dozen officers, with a string of local informers including Omar's secretariat, his ministry and foreign affairs. It was also under his regime that Pakistan's most cherished dream of gaining "strategic depth" against India came true. The period from 1996 to 2001 was the golden period of "strategic depth" for Pakistani establishment which successfully resulted in the breakup of Kabul-New Delhi axis and also isolated Shia Iran in the region. It was not a coincidence that two very important incidents happened during this period - the Kargil conflict and the hijacking of an Indian airliner IC-814 from Kathmandu (Nepal).

Kargil Intrusion

In early 1999 General Pervez Musharraf, the then COAS, decided to work on a very old military plan of capturing Kargil to alter the ground situation by severing a substantial part of Jammu and Kashmir from the rest of India. Indeed in 1987 firstly General Zia-ul-Haq was briefed about the plan which he rejected because of the fear of a full scale India-Pakistan war.⁶⁰ Benazir Bhutto was also briefed on the plan but she too had rejected it by saying that "it's doable militarily, it is not doable politically."⁶¹ The reason behind Musharraf's decision to execute the plan was based on two factors- first, Pakistan was enjoying the golden period of "strategic depth" and second, Pakistan possessed nuclear weapons. J. N. Dixit has termed Kargil intrusion as Kargil War which according to him was launched by Pakistan with premeditated planning and detailed preparation.⁶² In early 1999, disguised as Kashmiri militants, Pakistan's Northern Light Infantry moved across the Line of Control (LoC) and captured strategic mountain peaks in Mushkoh Valley, Dras, Kargil, and Batalik sectors of Ladakh.⁶³ Very soon the intruders were in a position to threaten Indian lines of communication to Ladakh and Siachen in northern Kashmir.⁶⁴ They were very close to achieve the target of interdicting the vital Srinagar-Leh highway (NH 1A)⁶⁵ when India realised their presence. Indian military response and effective conduct of diplomacy very soon isolated Pakistan internationally and under extreme international pressure Nawaz Sharif was forced to make a humiliating retreat. During his meeting with President Clinton in Washington on 4 July 1999 Nawaz Sharif signed the American prepared statement asking him "to take concrete and immediate steps for the

restoration of the LoC.”⁶⁶ There are competing claims even today on the question whether Nawaz Sharif was aware of the intrusion or not? Zahid Hussain claims that Musharraf had singlehandedly decided to go to Kargil⁶⁷ while J. N. Dixit is of the view that Nawaz Sharif was briefed about the plan in January 1999 at the GHQ in Rawalpindi.⁶⁸ General Musharraf, in his autobiography, has claimed that Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was briefed about the situation on several occasions during the conflict. According to him army briefed Nawaz Sharif in Skardu on 29 January 1999; in Kel on 5 February; at the ISI Directorate on 12 March.⁶⁹ Apart from it, Director General of Military Operations (DGMO) briefed the PM on May 17.⁷⁰ Given the details provided by Musharraf and the intensity of intrusion one cannot give Nawaz Sharif the benefit of doubt in this regard.

Kandahar Hijack

Kandahar hijack was the other important event during the period which occurred within months after Musharraf staged a coup in October 1999. On the eve of Christmas in 1999, Indian Airlines flight IC-814 was hijacked from Kathmandu within minutes after its takeoff. Before reaching Kandahar, where the entire drama ended, the plane landed in Amritsar (India), Lahore (Pakistan), and Dubai (United Arab Emirates) for refueling.⁷¹ It was discovered later that all the hijackers were Pakistani and members of *Harkat-ul-Ansar* - a group closely linked to al-Qaeda and Taliban.⁷² In a direct discussion with Indian authorities, the hijackers agreed to free the hostages and the plane in exchange of three terrorists imprisoned in Indian jails namely Masood Azhar, Mushtaq Zargar and Omar Sheikh. Jaswant Singh, the then Foreign Minister personally went to Kandahar to make a successful exchange. Though India had no formal contacts with the Taliban government, as it had not recognised the latter, but before delivering all the three terrorists Indian authorities had told the Taliban that the terrorists would be under the control of Taliban and the released terrorists would be treated as criminals. However, after the exchange Taliban gave ten hours to the terrorists and hijackers to leave Afghanistan. Bruce Riedel claims that after the successful exchange, the ISI took all the three terrorists to Pakistan, where they engaged themselves in a fund-raising tour for a new terrorist group- *Jaish-e-Muhammad*.⁷³ It is also claimed that soon after reaching Pakistan, Maulana Masood Azhar gave a series of anti-India speeches and declared that hijacking was not a crime but a *jihad*.

All the five hijackers were Pakistani citizens who were later identified as Ibrahim Athar, Sunny Ahmed Kazi, Shahid Akhtar Syed, Mistri Zahur Ibrahim and Shakir.⁷⁴ The link between the hijackers and ISI was also established with the help of intercepts of telephone calls which established the fact that hijacking plan was the work of ISI agents based in Mumbai and Dhaka. Thus, these links make it amply clear that the hijacking was planned by ISI and executed by the militants associated with *Harkat-ul-Ansar* and the process of exchange was facilitated by Taliban authorities.

TACTICAL SHIFT AFTER 9/11

Despite being in constant international isolation, due to the issues of terrorism and nuclear proliferation, Pakistan was happy to have gained "strategic depth" in Afghanistan and was enjoying its benefits. Kashmir issue was now the prime mover of Pakistan's Afghan policy⁷⁵ and Pakistan found Afghan hinterland useful for playing the dirty game of training and arming Kashmiri militants with the help of Taliban regime. But, the Pakistan-Taliban honeymoon ended in the wake of daring 9/11 event in America. US didn't take much time to declare that it will go after the terrorists at any length. Within this challenging atmosphere President Bush increased diplomatic pressure coupled with indirect threats of declaring Pakistan a terrorist state and subjecting it to severe punishment.⁷⁶ Richard Armitage, US' deputy secretary of state, threatened the ISI Chief, at that time coincidentally in the US, by saying that Pakistan would be bombed back to "Stone Age" if it refuses to align with the US.⁷⁷ Under such critical atmosphere General Musharraf, President of Pakistan, decided to throw his lot in favour of United States and officially abandoned the policy of supporting the Taliban. Taking Pakistan on board, US launched the "Operation Infinite Justice" (OIJ), later renamed as "Operation Enduring Freedom" (OEF), which resulted in the defeat of Taliban. With the defeat of Taliban, Pakistan lost its "strategic depth" in Afghanistan which marked a complete failure of Pakistan's regional strategy.⁷⁸

It is now an open secret that though, officially Musharraf ended Pakistan's support to the Taliban but the idea of having a pliant government dominated by Pashtuns in Afghanistan is still there. Under severe international pressure though, Musharraf agreed to support US led "War on Terror" against Taliban and al-Qaeda but he refused to

abandon the time-honoured security paradigm of defense against India at all costs.⁷⁹ The post 9/11 Afghan policy shift can be described only as a tactical shift, as a substantial number of members from military and ISI establishment rejected any change in their “strategic depth” policy and remained closely connected with the Taliban and facilitated their return to Pakistan’s tribal areas. Under severe international pressure, Pakistan army went after the terrorists in the tribal areas but they never targeted the top Afghan Taliban leadership including its leader Mullah Omar.

PURSUIT OF STRATEGIC DEPTH IN POST-MUSHARRAF PERIOD

After the elections of 2008, a civilian coalition government came to power but like earlier times it has almost no say in the policies related to Afghanistan, Nuclear weapons, India and Kashmir. Practically it remains under the domain of Military- the most powerful institution in Pakistan. Ahmed Rashid argues that in 2009, General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, the Chief of Army Staff, described “strategic depth” as not a military doctrine but as political justification to show Pakistan’s need for a friendly government in Kabul.⁸⁰ In January 2010, during a visit to NATO headquarters, Brussels, Kayani highlighted the fact that Pakistan’s policy remains India-centric and any Afghan policy which allows India to take any advantage, at the expense of Pakistan, was not acceptable.⁸¹ Again in February 2010, in a very rare occasion he said that “We want a strategic depth in Afghanistan but don’t want to control it... A peaceful and friendly Afghanistan can provide Pakistan a strategic depth”.⁸² It is certain that Pakistani military believes in the policy of achieving “strategic depth” in Afghanistan to counter India. Now the question arises; what is the policy of civilian government on the same issue? Though, nobody has clearly spoken about it but in late July 2010 Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani appeared on national television and announced his government’s decision to grant three year extension to the Army Chief General Kayani.⁸³ Such a dramatic move by civilian regime leaves no doubt about the endorsement of military’s “strategic depth” doctrine.

REGIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS

In the midnight of 14 August 1947, Pakistan was born as an insecure state with fragile religious and negative identity which forced it to look

for outside help in order to ensure the very survival of the state. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the father of Pakistan, was trying to secure western help even before Pakistan's existence. M. S. Venkatramani states that during a meeting with Raymond A. Hare and Thomas E. Weil at his residence in Bombay (now Mumbai), Jinnah requested for American help and in return promised to follow anti-communist agenda.⁸⁴ In order to avail military and economic aid and to satisfy her security needs in 1950s it joined western alliance system led by the United States. However, it failed to understand that western forces were not concerned with Pakistan's security but they were exploiting its geostrategic location for their own benefits. It became clear when during the 1965 war with India, US did not help Pakistan, instead stopped all military supplies and aid to both the warring countries which proved more harmful to Pakistan, as it had no other source of procuring weapons. Even at the time of 1971 war, which resulted in the emergence of Bangladesh, US did send an aircraft carrier into the Bay of Bengal but it was more in response to India's decision of signing a Friendship Treaty with erstwhile Soviet Union.⁸⁵ This war had three important consequences for the region and Pakistan; first, India established itself as the dominant power in the region; second, it intensified Pakistan's insecurity syndrome and; third, it shook the very basis of Pakistan's formation- the "Two Nation Theory".⁸⁶ Since then Pakistan realised that it could not count on any external assistance in its conflict with India.⁸⁷ So it intensified its search for reliable options for its security and in late 1980s discovered the doctrine of "strategic depth" in Afghanistan which became its second obsession after Kashmir. Thereafter, without making an honest cost benefit analysis, it devoted all its energy to secure "strategic depth" vis-à-vis India. This quest of gaining "strategic depth" in Afghanistan has had serious repercussions on regional security including its own security.

Afghanistan

Pakistan's involvement in Afghanistan has always been India centric. To deal with its mighty neighbour, in worst case scenario, it discovered the doctrine of "strategic depth" which was based on the idea that a pliant or at least a pro-Pakistan government would help overcome its geographical vulnerability. Pakistan was so obsessed with this objective that it never thought of the consequences of a strategy like this one. During Afghan holy war, General Zia-ul-Haq effectively managed various warlords who were fighting against the Soviets but in post-

withdrawal period Pakistan, without Zia, lost much of its grip over them. There emerged a situation of utter chaos in which Afghan warlords went for each other's throats.⁸⁸ At this crucial juncture Afghan President Najibullah was struggling for survival and Pakistan, instead of finding out a negotiated solution, urged *Mujahideen* forces to form a government and replace Najibullah. It called for a Pashtun dominated government, on claims that Pashtuns constituted more than 50% of the population, which was seen by many nationalist critics as promoting its own interest and not caring about the people of Afghanistan.⁸⁹ Afghans are nationalist and proud people who never accept foreign domination. Pakistan, by sponsoring Islamic militancy and by backing Pashtuns has hurt Afghans on both fronts. Its deliberate support to the Taliban not only alienated non-Pashtuns but also pushed the country to civil war. Its sponsorship of Islamic militancy and Pashtun elements eroded Afghan nationalism and consequently resulted in the victory of the Taliban forces led by Mullah Omar and his cohorts such as Mullah Mohammad Rabbani, Mohammad Ghous, Khairullah Khairkwa, Amir Khan Muttaqi etc.⁹⁰ The crack in Afghan society is evident with the fact that during troubled years Taliban were welcome only in Pashtun majority areas. Indeed, Pakistan deliberately attempted to exploit Afghanistan's ethnic mosaic for realising its own objectives in the region through cross-border clientalism.⁹¹ This is not to suggest that Pashtuns were never a prominent force and they didn't need their share in power and governance. Pashtuns were always a dominant force in Afghanistan but they were not the only ones who fought with the erstwhile Soviet Union. Other ethnic groups like Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras had also actively participated under the leadership of people like Burhanuddin Rabbani, Ahmad Shah Masood, Ismael Khan, Abdul Rashid Dostum and many more.⁹² Pakistan did not facilitate the negotiations between Pashtun Taliban and these non-Pashtun forces. After coming to power the Taliban pursued such policies in the name of Islam which had deep imprint of Pashtun culture and tradition.⁹³ It sharpened the divide further between Pashtun and non-Pashtun ethnic groups which consequently forced leaders of other ethnic groups to ask help from external powers such as India, Russia, Iran, Uzbekistan, Turkey etc.⁹⁴ It was Taliban's close connection with al-Qaeda Chief Osama bin Laden which over time antagonised Americans, especially after 9/11, to the extent that they had to launch "War on Terror" in Afghanistan. Still Pakistan's policy of "strategic depth" motivates ISI and army to be in touch with the Afghan Taliban and consider them as

strategic assets. That explains as to why they are providing safe haven to top Afghan leadership in the tribal areas of Pakistan and maintaining good ties with those militant elements that are ready to serve Pakistan's interests in the post-US withdrawal period.

India

Both India and Pakistan are deeply concerned with each other's involvement in Afghanistan. Both the countries see Afghanistan from a security lens.⁹⁵ Islamabad fears that Indian involvement in Afghanistan will result in "strategic encirclement" of already geographically vulnerable country, while New Delhi believes that after securing "strategic depth" Pakistan will use Afghanistan for its proxy war against India. Indian efforts are centered to minimise Pakistani presence in Afghanistan so that a fundamentalist regime like Taliban could not emerge again.⁹⁶ If one makes a historical analysis of the events and developments in the region one would surely conclude that India's fears look more genuine, as it has been the worst sufferer of Pakistan's policy of "strategic depth". After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, Pakistan's homegrown jihadis became unemployed which coincided with the rise of Kashmiri Muslim separatists against India. Pakistan seized the opportunity to weaken India and ISI started training and arming of Kashmiri militants⁹⁷ and also employed Pakistani jihadis to help them. Officially Pakistan denies any involvement in Kashmir insurgency⁹⁸ and claims that it only offers moral support. However, facts tell quite a different story. In the wake of insurgency in Indian Kashmir, some 10,000 fighters crossed the border to help their Kashmiri brethren.⁹⁹ Official Radio Station of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir deliberately changed its Radio programme schedules to eliminate the 'entertaining aspects' and fully concentrated on 'inspiring' programmes related to the "freedom struggle".¹⁰⁰ In such programmes Pakistani governments official views have been projected besides inciting people to take arms against India.

Central Asia

Historically Pakistan has had no connection with the Central Asian region, as it came into existence in 1947 only, while the independent Central Asian states entered into United Nations after the collapse of erstwhile USSR. In early period, Pakistani establishment was interested into a Muslim security belt stretching from Turkey to Pakistan, with Central Asia as the "buckle", to provide "strategic depth".¹⁰¹ Islamabad

was very quick and in fact, second after Turkey to recognise the Central Asian Republics in the early 1990s.¹⁰² The vicinity of these newly independent states, their Muslim population and vast energy resources, attracted Islamabad's attention whose leadership sought to portray Pakistan as a leading Islamic nation in the world. Islamabad also wanted to find some sort of support on its Kashmir cause vis-à-vis New Delhi.¹⁰³ However, very soon it became clear that Islam would not be an entrée to forming a multilateral defense arrangement and Pakistan also failed to achieve unilateral support from any of the Central Asian states for the Kashmir cause.¹⁰⁴ Islamabad's policy of "strategic depth" in Afghanistan made a profound impact on the security and stability of Central Asia. Pakistan's agenda was not limited to Afghanistan but included Central Asian states as well. Indeed Pakistan wanted to install Taliban prototypes in the Central Asian Republics so that it could reach out to global radical Islamic forces.¹⁰⁵ But to realise this objective, it was necessary to have a friendly regime in Afghanistan. In order to have a pliant or pro-Pakistan government in Afghanistan, Pakistan supported the Pashtun Taliban militia led by Mullah Mohammad Omar which drew the ire of neighbouring countries. Central Asian states feared that the advance of Taliban militia might sponsor Islamist extremism in their countries,¹⁰⁶ which became true over time. It was not a coincidence that after the establishment of Taliban government in Afghanistan, Jumaboi Khojaev alias Juma Namangani and Tahir Yuldashev announced the formation of the *Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan* (IMU) at Kabul which was primarily aimed to overthrow the government of President Islam Karimov and the establishment of an Islamic state in Uzbekistan.¹⁰⁷ Almost each and every country in the region soon started witnessing increased level of violence including Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Russia, China and India.¹⁰⁸ All the states in the region pointed fingers towards Pakistan and even the Uzbek President Islam Karimov directly accused Pakistan of training Uzbek Islamist militants.¹⁰⁹ Everyone questioned Pakistan's wisdom of supporting Taliban against other ethnic groups in Afghanistan. Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, which share borders with Afghanistan, were particularly vexed by Islamabad's policies, as many Islamist opposition groups in both the countries had ties with the Taliban and al-Qaeda and received training in Afghanistan.¹¹⁰ Taliban had also provided refuge to the dissident leaders of Islamic movement of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.¹¹¹ Thus, Pakistan's policy proved disastrous for the region.

CONCLUSION

Pakistan's unresolved crisis of identity has given birth to so many problems and its perceived security threat from India is one of them. To meet this perceived threat of security Pakistan has had a powerful army to defend the frontiers of the state. The army over time projected itself as the "Guardian of Pakistani State" and virtually hijacked country's foreign and security policies, especially its Afghanistan, Kashmir, India and later nuclear policy. After the 1971 war, which resulted in the creation of Bangladesh and shook the very foundation of Pakistani state, army realised that due to geographical vulnerability it would be almost impossible to deal with India in a conventional war. The search of a reliable and effective option to counter any possible Indian advance in future led to Aslam Beg's doctrine of "strategic depth" in late 1980s which became Pakistan's second obsession after Kashmir. Since then the Pakistani establishment, military and civilian both, has been vigorously pursuing the policy of "strategic depth" which proved counterproductive for peace, stability and security of the region. In Afghanistan it resulted in the erosion of Afghan nationalism, sharpened the ethnic divide and pushed the country into a chaos. In India the security environment became worst when Pakistani terrorist groups, encouraged by Pakistani establishment, intensified Kashmir insurgency and unleashed terror activities inside India. During the golden period of "strategic depth" situation in India became more critical, as now terrorists had also the support of Taliban and al-Qaeda. The hijacking of an Indian airliner 814, by Pakistani terrorists, from Kathmandu and the end of the drama in Afghanistan, when India released the terrorists is a case in point. As far as Central Asia is concerned it has also become the victim of Pakistan's "strategic depth" policy. Pakistan's support to Taliban militia in Afghanistan facilitated and fueled the rise of Islamic militancy in the region and countries like Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan witnessed the increased level of violence. Taliban supported and trained Islamic groups trying to destabilise the ruling regimes in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. All these problems are directly linked to Pakistan's quest for "strategic depth" in Afghanistan and Central Asia.

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THE SEMI-AUTONOMOUS TRIBAL AREAS OF PAKISTAN

CARLOS SETAS

INTRODUCTION

The North Western Frontier Province (NWFP), recently renamed Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (KP), and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), nominally adscript to the latter, constitute the smallest province of Pakistan. It has a population of around 21 million and occupies an area of 100,000 sq km. The region shares an extended border with Afghanistan to the west, limited with the Gilgit-Baltistan to the northeast, Pak administered Kashmir and Punjab to the east and Balochistan to the south. KP and the FATA are extended from north to south between the Hindu Kush mountains and the desert regions of Balochistan.

The FATA have a mainly mountainous topography. There are rugged mountains with barren slopes as in Mohmand and Khyber agencies, and rugged and complex hills and ridges as in South Waziristan. The mountain ranges are generally 1,500 to 3,500 meters high and the highest is the Sikaram peak 4,755 meters above sea level, on the Pak-Afghan border. Numerous dry and arid watercourses dissect these mountainous tracts.

The Tribal Areas comprise of seven Agencies, namely, from north to south, Bajaur, Mohmand, Khyber, Kurram, Orakzai, and North and South Waziristan, and six Frontier Regions (FRs) namely, FR Peshawar, FR Kohat, FR Banu, FR Lakki Marwat, FR Tank, and FR Dera Ismail Khan.

According to 1998 census, FATA population is 3,176,331 people, 98 percent of them being Pathans. This data does not contemplate the

important number of Afghan refugees, which increased after the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. Almost the whole population of the FATA is Sunni Muslim, although there is a very small population of Shias and Ismailis mainly in Kurram and Orakzai Agencies. The Pathan population is extremely divided along tribal lines, with one or two predominant tribes in each Agency, also divided into different sub-tribes and clans.

The FATA are the most backward areas of all Pakistan with 60 percent of its population living below the poverty line. With few or none of the natural resources being exploited, most of the population relies on subsistence agriculture, manufacture and trade of weapons, drug trafficking or smuggling across the Afghan border. Employment opportunities are non-existent, which has forced a big migration to the few industrial areas of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and to foreign countries, especially to the Middle East.

ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM

The FATA has a special regime inside the Pakistani State as well as inside KP. The FATA is a semi-autonomous region, where the executive power relies directly on the President of Pakistan, who enforces his decisions through the KP's governor. In the Agencies, administration is directed by a Political Agent (PA), a federal civil service servant who represents the governor of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa. PAs also have fiscal and judicial powers in their Agencies. Pakistan National Assembly cannot promulgate laws for the FATA, the President being the only one who can. As a part of Pakistan, the fundamental rights of FATA's population are protected by the Constitution. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of Pakistan has no jurisdiction over this region. The FATA sends twelve members to the National Assembly, but they are not represented in the KP's Provincial Assembly. In practice, the FATA are ruled by the tribal assemblies of the Pathan tribes (*jirgas*), keeping a *de facto* independence from the Central Government, with whom they maintained good relations until the invasion of Afghanistan by the US in 2001.

Long before the creation of the NWFP, the British had established an indirect rule system over the tribal areas. This region was ruled by the tribes under a, very often theoretical, British sovereignty. The system was based in the promotion by the British Indian Government of dependent elites among the tribes. To achieve this allowances and

subsidies were conceded to the *Maliks*, who distributed it among their tribesmen, in exchange for loyalty and good behaviour. These allowances were formalized by several treaties and agreements with the different tribes. One of these agreements established the provisional introduction of the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) by the colonial government in 1848. Its area of application was limited to the six frontier regions with Pathan population. Initially it was considered the introduction of British India's administrative and judicial system to the tribal areas. Nevertheless it was considered too lax to keep the troublesome Pathan tribes under control. Thus, British government enacted the FCR again in 1873 and, with small changes, in 1876. Over the years, the legislation was insufficient and new crimes and offences were added to the scope of this code. The FCR with all these modifications was enacted in 1901, in the same form that is still working nowadays.

Indian Independence Act of 3 June 1947, revoked all the treaties between the Pathan tribes and the British Government. The new Pakistani State decided not to establish troops in the FATA as a concession to the tribes, after the signing of an Adherence Treaty by two hundred *Maliks* reunited in a great *jirga*. By this treaty, signed by Mohammed Ali Jinnah as first General Governor of Pakistan, Islamabad government would keep paying the allowances and subsidies from the colonial period to the tribes. On 14 August 1947, Pakistan was officially born as an independent state, keeping the semi-autonomous status of the Tribal Areas, whose administration was the direct responsibility of the Governor General.

Although Pakistan kept its army outside of the Tribal Areas, it preserved the legal and administrative framework of the colonial period, codified in the FCR of 1901. Thus, the population of this region has had a different treatment from the people in the rest of the country. Although officially a part of Pakistan, their situation is more similar to that of a colony.

The FATA is contiguous with KP and shares with it and with the Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA)¹ a mostly Pathan population, a similar history and culture. Nevertheless, their status inside Pakistan is very different.

First paragraph of the 247 Article of Pakistan's Constitution states: "Subject to the Constitution, the executive authority of the Federation shall extend to the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, and the executive authority of a Province shall extend to the Provincially Administered Tribal Areas therein."²

Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa provincial governor is the executive authority in the FATA as the President's representative. According to the fourth and fifth paragraphs of the Article 247 of Pakistani Constitution, the President is the only one with the authority to legislate about any issue related to the FATA.

Responsibility of the administration and the general political control over the Tribal Areas is under the Ministry of States and Frontier Regions (SAFROM).³ The SAFROM, as a federal ministry, is under the authority of the Prime Minister and the Parliament. Nevertheless, in the FATA his role is irrelevant due to the fact that the executive authority relies on the President and is exercised through the provincial governor.⁴

Local administration in each of the Agencies of the FATA is headed by a Political Agent (PA). This post is filled by federal civil servants or, sometimes, local recruits. The PA has a wide authority in executive, fiscal and judicial matters and he is responsible for keeping law and order in his Agency. In order to do this, he can count on *khassadars*, or tribal policemen, and in the recruitment of local militias, called *lashkars*, as well as in the Frontier Corps, a paramilitary force which is under the control of the Army.

As a continuation of the indirect rule system from the colonial period, Pakistani State has intermediaries for the FATA administration. Islamabad keeps the *Maliks* and *Lungis* system, introduced by the British in order to create reliable local elites, whose loyalty was rewarded with a special status as well as with economic benefits in the form of allowances and subsidies.

Malik status is a traditional element of Pathan culture, and designates an influential person among the tribe, normally a tribal elder, a tribal leader, someone economically powerful and often, all of these things combined. But *Malik* status, as a heritage from the British Empire, can also be granted in a hereditary basis by the PA, with the consent of the provincial Governor. *Lungi* status is a lesser one and can be granted by the PA in a non-hereditary basis, although it uses to perpetuate in the same family. The Political Agent also can arbitrary withdraw this status if he considers that the owner is not behaving according to government interests. *Maliks* and *Lungis* receive economic privileges from the administration, depending on their cooperation in crime prosecution, keeping social peace and, in general, supporting the government. Other privileges include nomination to agency councils or other local government institutions; appointment to the *Jirga* (council of elders)

established under the FCR for adjudicating civil and criminal cases; and periodic access to the highest echelons of Government, including the Governor, the Prime Minister and the President, to represent the interests of their respective tribes.

A Political Agent has several other tools at his disposal to divide and rule the tribes, including access to secret funds to pay informers and bribe tribesmen for information that can be used to exploit local rivalries. He can also recruit *khassadars* from different tribes. In this way, the administration controls a source of employment which it can use to coerce recalcitrant tribes or individuals. This system was used by the British Government, stopping the recruitment of *khassadars* among recalcitrant tribes, causing economic harm to them.

PASHTUN CULTURE IN THE FATA

From an anthropological point of view, Pashtun tribes are divided into clans (*khels*), sub-clans and families. In spite of this great fragmentation, tribal society shares several homogeneous characteristics that provided some degree of cohesion. Social relations are based on inter-tribal links that join the families, clans and tribes in a wide network of kinship. The basic social unit, that can be very complex, is the family.

Most of the Pashtun tribes live outside the FATA. Traditionally Pathans have been divided into mountain tribes and low land tribes. The latter are typically considered more integrated in the national economic and political structures, in Pakistan as well as in Afghanistan. Mountain or hill tribes are usually presented as more warrior like, jealous of its independence and strongly conscious of personal and group honour. The inhabitants of the FATA are part of these hill tribes and are, among all the Pashtuns, the ones who keep more deeply their costumes and traditions.⁵

The Pashtun tribes of the FATA never had leaders that were able to amalgamate them. Extremely jealous of their independence, Pathans never had kings or princes. Neither have they developed a state structure. The tribes have been ruled traditionally by councils of tribal elders and *Maliks* or influential individuals. The *Maliks* have a special status inside their tribes, that implies a series of duties concerning hospitality and beneficence. Since the British Empire, the Political Agent provided a certain amount of money, as *mojib* or subsidy, to the selected *Maliks*, to help afford the expenses derived from their position.⁶

A *Malik* is respected amongst his fellow tribesmen according to his generosity and, specially, according to the quantity and quality of the weapons in his possession, and the number of men at his disposition.⁷ The possession of weapons is an honour and a matter of pride in the tribal society. A weapon is considered a symbol of status and wealth and high quality weapons provide prestige to their owners. The Afghan War provided a huge supply of modern weaponry to the tribes in FATA. In the tribal areas every adult male has a weapon.

Pashtun society is completely patriarchal and the role of women is one of dependence on men in any aspect of social relations: "Women are traditionally submissive to their husbands and divorce in tribal society is inexistent. If there is conflict between husband and wife, the former can take a new wife, if he is rich, keeping also the previous one".⁸ Winston Churchill, one century before, provides an even harder view of the role of Pashtun women among their society: "Their wives and women in general occupy no better position than that of animals. They are freely sold and bought, and it is not infrequent to sell them in exchange of weapons."⁹ This secondary role of women in the Pashtun society is based more on the *rewaj* or tradition than on religious reasons. The Islam practiced among the Pashtuns has been interpreted generally in a soft way, and completely mixed with local traditions.

The acute sense of honour has kept the Pashtun tribes in a perpetual situation of conflict, preventing the development of any unity or state entity in the region. To quote Churchill: "But during the seasons of seeding and harvest, a continuous state of fight exists in the region. Tribes fight tribes, valley dwellers against their neighbours...*khan* against *khan*...each member of a tribe has a blood feud with his neighbour. Every man's hand is against the other and all of them against the foreigners".¹⁰

Most of the descriptions of FATA Pashtun tribes' character and behavior come to us through testimonies of British officers appointed in that region since the mid-19th century until the independence of India and Pakistan in 1947. Their point of view tends to praise their fighting abilities and despise everything else. British writers from the late quarter of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century point mostly to the lack of unity amongst the tribes like in the case of the Afridis:

"Their members have good martial skills, but are rapacious, deservers of little confidence and ungovernable by nature. They keep a perpetual state of enmity with their neighbours, but are ready to join each other to defend their independence."¹¹

“When able to join they have proved themselves as formidable enemies, being a strong and manly race living in a tough terrain. But the Afridi tribe is broken for many dissensions. Blood feuds separate a house from the next, and the different sections of the tribe keep continuous enmity among themselves.”¹²

Pashtun culture is mainly oral and there were no written texts in the Pashto language until the 16th century. Nor are there epigraphic remains, sculptures or monuments of archeological value. The most valuable part of Pashto oral tradition is the *Pakhtunwali* or *Pashtunwali*, the Pashto tribes’ code of honour. In the words of Churchill: “Their ethic system, that respect treason and violence as virtues more and not as vices, has produced a code of honour as strange an inconsistent that is impossible to understand for a logical mind.”¹³

The *Pashtunwali* is an ethical system of values perfectly logical in the Pashtun tradition, although difficult to understand for other, more developed, societies. The *Pashtunwali* is a kind of non-written constitution that is followed strictly by the Pathans, especially among the hill tribes on both sides of the Durand Line. They have kept their tradition and way of living for centuries. The structure of the *Pashtunwali* has not changed over time and is based on four basic precepts: *milmastiya* or hospitality; *nanawati* or begging for pardon and protection; *badal* or revenge and *paighour* or mockery. Those who violate the code don’t have a place in Pashtun society.

Milmastiya: open-handed hospitality and protection to all who may, or may not, demand it is the greatest obligation of the *Pashtunwali*. Sometimes protection and hospitality may even be extended to an enemy as long as the enemy remains in the host’s community. The guest is provided with escorts which are called *badagra*. According to the spirit of the term *milmastiya*, the guest is never to be hurt, firstly because of the significance of the obligation under *milmastiya* and secondly because of the obligation of *badal*, which would be automatically placed upon the host.

Nanawati: meaning “begging for pardon or protection”, is not only practiced in the tribal areas, but is also practiced in other Pashtun areas of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, Balochistan and Afghanistan. However, with the passage of time, the spirit of *nanawati* has faded and the authentic practice remains only in the remote areas of Pashtun population, especially the FATA.

When a person realizes he is in the wrong by killing, injuring or insulting another person, he goes to the *hujra*, house or mosque of the

aggrieved family and throws himself at their mercy, confessing his faults and begging pardon of the person or family whose sense of honour he had injured. On such occasions the offender brings sheep or goats, the women in his family and the Quran, just to show his modesty.¹⁴

Badal: The term *badal* means revenge and, under the *Pashtunwali*, Pashtuns are obligated to seek revenge if they feel they have been wronged, regardless of the consequences. Initially, *badal* is often individually oriented and undertaken only by the victim or, in the case of a murder, by the victim's family against an individual understood to have committed the hurt or insult. However, since the Pashtun are martial and tribal, individual feuds tend to escalate to the level of families, intra-clan and even inter-clan hostility. Such feuds can last for years and sometimes for decades.

A real Pashtun is proud to open the doors of his house to guests and strangers. Offering food and drinks to the guests is considered not just a symbol of Islamic piety, but a social and moral duty. Search of revenge and satisfaction after an insult is fundamental for the ethic code of the tribal society. Retaliation is compulsory after taken offence or insult. It is considered a social duty not to leave the offender without punishment but, at the same time, that punishment must not exceed the first offence.

The mockery or *paighour* is considered an insult in Pashtun society. Some actions or omissions can be considered a mockery and end in bloodshed. It is normal to become an object of *paighour* when someone is not able to take revenge against an offender. Thus, the fact of not avenging an offence constitutes in itself a new offence that must be answered.

Besides the basic rules of the *Pashtunwali*, this code of honour establishes a series of concepts and costumes that any good Pashtun must follow: *Zemaka*, or land, the obligation to defend their own territory; *Nang*, honour, individual as well as familiar; *Namas*, or the honour of women that must be defended by the men of the same family, clan or tribe; *Hewad*, or nation. A Pashtun must defend his "country" against any foreign invasion. *Dod pasbani y Tokhm pasbani*, or the defence of the culture and Pashtun ethnics. *Pashtunwali perawana*, or acceptance of the *Pashtunwali*.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC STRUCTURES IN FATA

Pakistan is ranked 136 of the United Nation's Human Development Index. Within Pakistan, Balochistan and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (KP) are

the most backward provinces and, in KP, the FATA's socio-economic indicators are especially negative, making it the most backward region in the whole of Pakistan. Sixty per cent of its population live under the poverty line, compared with 17 per cent at a national level, per capita income is half of that of Pakistan, which itself is already low. Development investment per capita in FATA is one third of the national rate.¹⁵ The first indicator to highlight is the absolute pre-eminence of rural population, mostly dedicated to the sustenance agriculture. Only 7 percent of FATA's soil is suitable for agriculture. Main crops are: wheat, corn, sugar cane, rice and barley. Livestock is mainly composed of goats, sheep and cows.

Industry is practically nonexistent in FATA. According to the KP Government's statistics, there were 193 industrial units in the FATA in 2006, employing 3,800 workers, barely 0.1 percent of the population according to the 1998 census. Most of these industrial workers are in Khyber and Mohmand Agencies, the closest to the Peshawar district, provincial capital and main industrial center. Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa's data from 2003 to 2004 showed an important industrial concentration in the Frontier Region Kohat, with 60 industrial units and 1,200 workers. Nevertheless, this data has disappeared in the 2005-06 statistics. FR Kohat, known as Darra Adam Khel, is famous for its weapons manufactures.

POPULATION DISTRIBUTION RURAL/URBAN (1998)

<i>Population</i>	<i>Pakistan</i>	<i>KP</i>	<i>FATA</i>
Total (million)	132,352	17,743	3,176
Rural (million/%)	89,315 / 67%	14,749 / 83,12%	3,091 / 97,3%
Urban (million/%)	43,037 / 32,5%	2,994 / 16,9%	0,085 / 2,7%

Source: NWFP Government, <http://www.nwfp.gov.pk>.

The mining sector, scarcely developed, has important quarries of limestone and marble, coal deposits and smaller productions of chromates, quartz, steatites, serpentine, manganese, fluorite and sulphate pulp. According to the FATA administrative system, Federal Administration is responsible for the economic development in the region. Provincial Government or NGOs cannot participate in it. The Political Agent (PA) is the planner and manager of development projects designed for its Agency. He uses it as another form of control. Local economic system is based in the distribution of patronage among the local elites by the PA.

One of the economic control measures in the hands of the PA is the concession of export and import licenses. Licenses for wood exploitation, for example, are very profitable. Regarding imports, the PA decides who can import wheat and other basic goods. The PA approves and starts development projects on a political basis and not as part of a coherent development program. On the other hand, there is no clear accountability of the FATA. This fact, along with the great sums of money pumped into this region by the United States as development aid after 2001, has converted the position of the Political Agent into a very profitable one.

The FATA economy is essentially based on growing drug and weapons trafficking, a heritage of the Afghan war, as well as in trans-border smuggling and other illegal practices. The lack of control on the border facilitates the smuggling of any kind of products, representing a loss of potential taxes for the State. In 2002, the Pakistani Army was deployed along the border with Afghanistan with the objective to establish Islamabad writ in the region. But this did not improve the situation. The Army avoided stopping smuggling activities, in a good measure because it represents an income source for the military itself.¹⁶

Since 2001, several development programs have been projected for the FATA based on the United States' funding. Nevertheless these have not been effective or have not been started due to the unstable situation in the region and the number of problems presented by the local administration. During Benazir Bhutto's governments, the introduction of education policies and a public employment quota in the FATA led to the creation of a small middle class. This new population sector was integrated in the Pakistani socio-economic and administrative structure. Nevertheless, FATA did not benefit from this middle class. Most of its members live in urban areas outside the tribal regions, contributing in no way to FATA development. This middle class anyway contributed to reduce the influence of the *Maliks*, further reduced after the introduction of the adult franchise in 1996-97.

Paradoxically, the Afghan war and the enormous increase in smuggling and illegal trade produced as a consequence of it, contributed to open the tribal areas to the outside world. Smuggling provided income to a good part of the population, creating new economically wealthy people, not always integrated in the traditional *Malik* system. Also, a lot of the *Maliks* started sending their sons to study in Pakistani universities and even to Dubai and United Kingdom. On the other hand, there is a wide emigration to the Far and Middle East, as well as to United States

and United Kingdom.¹⁷ Interestingly lot of influential people in FATA, or *Maliks*, receiving government subsidies, are living in cities in the NWFP and even in Islamabad, Rawalpindi and Karachi, quite far from the populations they are supposed to influence.

Educational indicators, as well as those related to sanitation, services or unemployment, correspond to an underdeveloped region. The illiteracy rate is 82.58 percent, of which 70.49 percent is among males and an overwhelming 97 percent among the female population. Education access is limited due to the scarce investment and to the lack of resources of the majority of the population.¹⁸ As in other areas of Pakistan, the FATA witnessed the mushrooming of *madrassas* or religious schools during the 1980's. These institutions provide free education largely to the poorest population in Pakistan. These religious schools are adscript to one of the four *wafaqs* or *madrassas* federations of Pakistan, established in 1959, and following different branches of Islam.¹⁹ During the Afghan war, Zia-ul-Haq Government promoted the construction of hundreds of Deobandi *madrassas* in the FATA, KP and Pathan regions of Baluchistan. Deobandi School especially gives an extremist interpretation of Islam. The mushrooming of *madrassas* subscribing to this School has contributed to the spread of the Taliban phenomenon among the Pathans of the FATA. Some of them openly support the Taliban, acting as logistics and recruitment centers.²⁰

Pathan tribes have followed traditionally a lax interpretation of Islam, mixed with their own traditions. Islam followed by these tribes was dominated by the interpretations of local *mullahs* of different sects or sub-sects. Mostly Sunni, FATA population is divided between Deobandis and Barelvis. Also, there is a small concentration of Shia population in Parachinar, Kurram Agency, all of them of the Turi tribe.

Traditionally, *mullahs* have never had a political role in the tribal areas. In fact, *mullahs* were usually poor and illiterate, a scarcely prestigious figure depending on the *Maliks* for its sustenance and protection. This situation changed in 1979. Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and Shia revolution in Iran led Pakistani Government to react promoting Sunni extremism in its own territory, in an attempt to counterbalance the Shia and Soviet influences. This led to the pumping of money and resources in the hands of the *mullahs*, ending their dependence on the *Maliks*, and transforming into *Maliks* themselves.²¹

Women are a social sector whose influence and rights have been denied systematically. With an illiteracy rate of 97 percent and without

access to any economic resources, women represent the weakest part of the tribal society. Pathan society is extremely conservative, and bases its traditions in concepts of honour, very often making women to be the object of a dispute. *Swara* costume, for example, allows a murderer to surrender his wife or sister to his victim's family as compensation. Female assassinations due to matters of honour are something very common in the tribal areas.

Finally, it is necessary to talk about the important number of Afghan refugees living in the FATA. Official data from the KP or Pakistani governments does not reflect the existence of Afghan refugee camps in the FATA agencies. Conditions in these camps are extremely bad, and the number of refugees is not exactly known, although UNHRC talks about two million Afghan refugees in Pakistani territory.²² Other sources say that the FATA population, around three million according to the 1998 census, could vary between 3.5 and 7 million.²³ Afghan refugees are facing, in spite of their shared Pathan ethnicity with the FATA population, rejection from the locals.

TALIBANISATION OF THE TRIBAL AREAS

As explained before, the propagation of religious extremism in FATA started during General Zia ul-Haq government in the 1980's. The Afghan Taliban movement recruited most of its members among the Afghan refugees studying in *madrassas* in the Tribal Areas. The problem nowadays is that this Taliban ideology consistent with the basic and extremist conception of Islam has been spread among the population of the FATA, allowing the creation of local Taliban groups.

After the US invasion of Afghanistan at the end of 2001, thousands of Afghan Taliban fled to Pakistan, where they established their new bases to attack NATO forces in Afghanistan. At the same time the first Pakistani Taliban groups were created in the Tribal Areas with the aim, initially, of fighting alongside their Afghan brothers against the infidel invader. The Pakistani Army was deployed in the Tribal Areas at the end of 2002, leading to some fighting with local Taliban, especially in South and North Waziristan, where the local group led by Nek Mohammed was strong.

From 2002 onwards, local Taliban grew in force and expanded the territory under its control. Several groups were active in each Agency of the FATA creating their own Islamic States and dictating rules based on

the *Shariah*. Pakistani Army, pressured by the United States launched several operations against the Taliban aiming to recover control over these areas in 2004, 2006 and 2007 in South and North Waziristan, and in 2008 in Bajaur and Mohmand. These operations ended normally in negotiations with the militants after the army suffered high casualties

At the end of 2007 the *Terhik-e-Taliban Pakistan* (TTP) was created, a loose organization joining about forty Taliban groups from FATA. Its leader was Baitullah Mehsud from South Waziristan, successor of Nek Mohammed after he was killed by an American missile launched from an unmanned vehicle.²⁴ This organization remained extremely divided along tribal lines and there have been strategic differences also.²⁵ Whereas some Taliban groups wanted to focus on the war against the U.S and NATO forces in Afghanistan, but other groups prefer to fight the closer enemy: the Pakistani Army and the State. Nowadays, the TTP has been reduced as a consequence of the Pakistani Army operations, but at the same time has become more centralized and it's closer to al Qaeda. At the same time, the TTP has developed links with Punjabi *jihadi* groups who receive shelter in the tribal areas and provide infrastructure inside Punjab.

Along with Pakistan and Afghan Taliban there is a strong presence of Al Qaeda and members from FATA. There is still a large number of Uzbeks from the *Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan*, in spite of their clashes with the local Taliban, as well as lesser numbers of Arabs, Uyghurs or Chechens. After 2002, when General Musharraf banned some terrorist groups operating in Kashmir and closed its training camps along the Indian border, they moved to FATA. Groups like *Harkat ul-Mujahideen* or *Lashkar-e-Jhangvi* are operating from this region launching terrorist attacks against Pakistani targets.

Pakistani Government seems to differentiate between three classes of Taliban: the Afghan Taliban, supposedly based around Quetta in Balochistan, they don't represent a threat to the Pakistani State. They could even be used as a proxy in Afghanistan as in the past, thus, Pakistan is tolerant, may be even supportive of them; Pakistani Taliban fighting in Afghanistan. They don't represent a threat for Pakistan either. The Pakistani Army has been fighting them but not very enthusiastically. These are the groups with whom Pakistan feels that they can negotiate; the third class of Taliban is those who want to impose an Islamic regime in Islamabad. They attack Pakistani troops and represent a threat to the State.²⁶

Since 2007, after the happenings in the Lal Masjid in Islamabad, a new Taliban group, led by Maulana Fazlullah, started its activities in Swat.²⁷ This group took control of the entire district and defeated every attempt of the Frontier Corps and the Army to retake control. In 2009, after long negotiations related to the enforcement of the Islamic Law in the Malakand region of the NWFP, the Taliban of the *Tehreek-i-Nifaz-i-Shariat-i-Mohammadi* started taking control of adjacent districts of Buner, Shangla, Malakand and Dir. The Army finally launched a serious offensive that retook control of the region, causing a huge number of displacements among the civil population. According to the President Zardari, it was the first step to retake control of all the Taliban controlled areas. Although Swat is still under the control of Islamabad, the infiltration of Taliban groups from the neighbouring Agency of Dir and from Afghanistan has been increasing.

In August 2009, Baitullah Mehsud, leader of the TTP, was killed by an American missile, and the Pakistani Air Force started a campaign of bombardment against the Taliban positions in FATA, preparing the land offensive in South Waziristan. The new TTP leader, Hakimullah Mehsud, launched an intense terrorist campaign in Pakistan, forcing the government to launch the land offensive in South Waziristan the last October.²⁸ The *Rah-i-Nijat* operation has occupied Taliban territory, but till today it has not succeeded in arresting top Taliban or al Qaeda commanders in the region. The Taliban forces in South Waziristan have just melted away and withdrawn to North Waziristan.

FUTURE PERSPECTIVES

The Pashtun tribes of the tribal areas constitute an anachronism in Pakistan nowadays. The FATA have been kept in a situation of underdevelopment first by the British and then by the Pakistani governments, avoiding any progress and perpetuating ancient traditions in the region. At the same time, the bad socio-economic situation of the region allowed the promotion of Islamic radical groups based more on their own illiteracy than in any new interpretation of Islam.

The situation of militancy in the FATA is not likely to subside in the short term and, in any case, not until the situation in Afghanistan will be stabilized. Even in the case of an end of insurgency in Afghanistan, militancy in the tribal areas is probably going to persist.

The military operations in the FATA have proven the inability of

the army to effectively control the region. In spite of its military superiority and the apparent victories against the Pakistani Taliban, the army is having problems holding the territory under its control and preventing the Taliban groups from moving to other areas of the FATA.

Any improvement of the situation in the FATA requires the integration of the tribal areas into Pakistan and the promotion of development projects that, for the time being, seem to be far out of reach of Islamabad and even further out of reach if there is no desire for change.

The tribal areas are likely to remain in the Middle Ages for a long time, pleasing a ruling class that profits from the status quo and allowing fanatic ideologies to prosper. Changing this situation does not imply just a change in the politics in the FATA but in the whole of Pakistan, and that is something that is not likely to happen in the near future.

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